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The purpose of this thesis is to explore how transparency and ethics in sovereign wealth funds may 
contribute in avoiding the resource curse, and compare how the sovereign wealth funds of Norway 
(the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global – NGPFG) and Kazakhstan (the National Fund of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan – NFRK, and Samruk-Kazyna) implement transparency and ethics in their 
practical operations.  
Researchers such as Kolstad and Wiig (2009) and Williams (2011) have connected the resource curse 
to transparency. Resource funds, or sovereign wealth funds, work as tools in combating certain 
aspects of the curse, and in this thesis transparency is therefore directly linked up to sovereign 
wealth funds. Based on different transparency models (International Forum of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, 2008; SWF Institute, 2013; Truman, 2010), an analytical framework is developed to assess the 
level of sovereign wealth fund transparency.  
Further, researchers like Hawley and Williams (2000), Kiernan (2009) and Richardson (2011) argue 
that ethical principles in the investment practices of sovereign wealth funds may improve their 
performance and sustainability, making them better able to meet the needs of future generations. I 
therefore suggest and try to explore how ethical principles in sovereign wealth funds work as 
relevant tools in combating the curse by affecting elements of fund performance. 
Interviews have been conducted in Kazakhstan, and public documents have been investigated to 
collect data on the transparency and ethical conduct of the Norwegian and Kazakhstani funds. The 
NGPFG clearly stands out as more transparent than the Kazakhstani funds, as it publishes 
comprehensive, understandable and easily available information. Hence, it is in a better position to 
keep leaders honest, avoid rent-seeking and corruption and encourage public debate, amongst 
others, thus likely enhancing profitability and stability. Further, the NGPFG is the only fund among 
the three that systematically implements ethical principles, based on the belief that it enhances long-
term return and sustainability. Samruk-Kazyna does to some extent consider ethical issues via its 
involvement in CSR. The NGPFG, and to some degree Samruk-Kazyna, are therefore likely better at 
facilitating growth and sustainability also for future generations. According to the ideas presented in 
this thesis, and due to its level of transparency and ethical principles, the NGPFG is thus better able 
at contributing to resource curse avoidance on a longer time perspective than the two Kazakhstani 
funds. Hence, the Kazakhstani funds should implement measures for improving their ability to defeat 
the curse.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Being a country rich in natural resources in not necessarily an outstanding advantage for economic 
development. Throughout time, countries and researchers have experienced that the benefits of 
resource abundance can be undermined by the disadvantages. Many authors and researchers have 
contributed on the topic of ‘the resource curse,’ and empirically it has been shown that countries rich 
in natural resources have a tendency to perform worse than resource-poor countries regarding 
economic growth and general welfare. Several questions have been raised about what causes it and 
how to defeat it. 
Due to an SIU Eurasia project in cooperation between University of Agder in Norway and KIMEP 
University in Kazakhstan, led by my supervisor Stein Kristiansen, it appeared interesting to do a 
comparative study of elements relating to the resource curse in these two countries. Norway and 
Kazakhstan are both oil-rich countries, facing the risk of experiencing the resource curse.  
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are one of the remedies to face and minimize the problems of the 
resource curse. Both Norway and Kazakhstan apply this remedy; Norway with its Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund Global (NGPFG), and Kazakhstan with its National Fund of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan (NFRK) and its welfare fund Samruk-Kazyna. As Kazakhstan was inspired by the 
Norwegian model when establishing one of its funds, it is reasonable to perform a comparison of the 
management of the Norwegian and Kazakhstani funds. 
This thesis has a descriptive and an explorative approach, as it seeks to study two certain aspects of 
sovereign wealth funds, transparency and ethics, and how they relate to the resource curse. Lack of 
transparency has been suggested to be an element of the resource curse, and transparency is also 
considered fundamental for making funds work optimally. Sovereign wealth funds’ ethical conduct 
has not previously been directly related to the resource curse, but this thesis suggests the existence 
of such a relationship, via the effect that ethical business conduct has on sovereign wealth fund 
performance.  
Fighting the resource curse is in essence all about ensuring long-term economic growth. The main 
argument presented in this thesis is that sovereign wealth funds’ transparency and ethical conduct 
will contribute to sustainability and long-term returns, thus facilitating long-term economic growth 
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and the welfare of future generations. Economic growth and long-term returns are dependent on a 
liveable world where there is a sound and sustainable basis for investment and development, – and 
ethical principles strive to maintain this basis. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Therefore, this thesis will compare how Norway and Kazakhstan fulfil transparency in the 
administration of their funds, and how they implement ethical principles. The following research 
questions are raised: 
1) What is the level of transparency in the management of the sovereign wealth funds? 
2) How is transparency achieved in the funds? 
3) How is the awareness of benefits of transparency and ethics? 
4) What ethical principles are the funds obliged to follow, and what instruments are they using 
for their ethical conduct? 
The main question raised is how transparency and ethical principles in sovereign wealth funds may 
contribute to resource curse avoidance. By asking the four specific research questions, I seek to 
suggest how capable the three funds are in facing the resource curse with the help from 
transparency and ethics. This thesis explores the idea of a connection between ethics, transparency 
and the resource curse and does not provide any empirical basis for conclusions. 
1.3 Structure 
Chapter 2 provides the reader with reasoning why ethics and transparency are relevant issues of 
study. The chapter gives a theoretical introduction to the resource curse and its causes, how it 
relates to sovereign wealth funds and how transparency and ethical investment of sovereign wealth 
funds may work as tools for defeating the curse. 
Chapter 3 briefly describes the economic and political background of Norway and Kazakhstan and 
how their sovereign wealth funds were established and work. This is useful to understand why the 
funds are different, and to have a basic reference when comparing the funds in the empirical part. 
Chapter 4 provides more specific theory on sovereign wealth funds, transparency and ethical 
investment. Previous literature is presented and, based on this, a framework for assessing 
transparency and ethical conduct is developed. At last in this chapter, theory is connected to the 
resource curse issue, establishing the basis for my empirical analyses. 
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Chapter 5 describes and explains the methodology used in the thesis, while chapter 6 presents the 
relevant empirical findings. In chapter 7, these findings are discussed and compared in accordance 
with theory and the research questions. 
A conclusion is made in chapter 8, which provides policy recommendations for each of the funds and 
suggests topics for further research.   
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Introduction  
2.1 The Resource Curse 
A country rich in natural resources has the opportunity to achieve resource rents, an increase in 
employment and investment, and an acceleration of economic growth. However, not only benefits 
follow from resource abundance. One of the most commonly known consequences of natural 
resource wealth is the Dutch disease, a term in common use since 1977. Ross (2012) summarizes it as 
“the process that causes a boom in a country’s natural resource sector to produce a decline in its 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors” (ch. 2). Increased revenues from natural resource exports in 
a country cause an increase in the real exchange rate. In turn, this hurts the export of manufactured 
goods, as they become more expensive for other countries, and the resource exporting country loses 
competitiveness. As a result, the economic growth of the country slows down (Gylfason, 2001; Sachs 
& Warner, 2001).  
The Dutch disease is only one of the consequences that may follow from natural resource 
abundance, and is now one of the elements of a broader and newer term, the resource curse. The 
literature to date offers a broad discussion on the causes of and solutions to the resource curse, 
which by Sachs and Warner (2001) is explained as “the observation that countries rich in natural 
resources tend to perform badly” (p. 827). By regression analyses, they found that resource 
abundance correlates with slow growth, and that “none of the countries with extremely abundant 
resources in 1970 grew rapidly for the next 20 years” (Sachs & Warner, 2001, p. 829). The result was 
still standing when controlled for other variables, and thus “empirical studies have shown that this 
curse is a reasonably solid fact” (p. 837).  
However, not all researchers agree with these results. Ross (2012), focusing on oil as the natural 
resource, points out that there are countries, like Norway, who have extracted oil without 
experiencing negative effects. The problems of being resource abundant mainly apply to low- and 
middle-income countries. Ross calls this the irony of wealth: “Those countries with the most urgent 
needs are also the least likely to benefit from their own geologic endowment” (ch. 1). Most previous 
studies of the curse, including the ones by Sachs and Warner, focus on the period between 1970 and 
1990. When looking over a longer period, there is little evidence that extracting oil in general leads to 
slower economic growth. Ross actually found that oil-producing states grew faster than other 
countries both from 1960 to 1973 and from 1990 to 2006. However, some oil rich states are not as 
well off as they should have been, given their petroleum wealth, and this fact is by Ross referred to 
as a milder form of the resource curse.  
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“For oil exporters, the resource curse cannot be attributed to oil itself, which is merely a black 
viscous material, but rather to the types of arrangements that have developed around its 
exploitation” (Karl, 2007, p. 256). One of the risks that emerge with natural resource wealth, is a 
higher level of corruption. Torvik (2011) points to the institutional issues. Resource abundance makes 
it more profitable to be a rent-seeker, instead of engaging in productive activities that benefit the 
economy as a whole. This lowers the income from productive activities, so that even more choose 
rent-seeking, and a negative multiplier process arises.  
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) made a study on the relevance of institutional quality, and 
showed that “quality of institutions determines whether countries avoid the resource curse or not” 
(p. 16). Producer friendly institutions, which attract entrepreneurs into production, promote growth 
as they encourage countries to benefit from the resources, while grabber friendly institutions induce 
lower growth. They find that “the resource curse is weaker the higher the institutional quality” (p. 
13).  
Another issue of the resource curse is overspending. Politicians that have access to resource wealth, 
may face the possibility to gain support through increasing public spending, creating a tendency of 
spending too much too quickly, thus decreasing the value of a country’s resource wealth (Humphreys 
& Sandbu, 2007). Ross (2012) points to the fact that governments that receive more oil revenues, 
have a tendency to collect less revenues from taxes. It is easier and politically more popular to collect 
revenues from the oil sector rather than from the population. Also, when revenues are high, 
international lenders may be willing to lend more, leading the resource rich country to overspend 
(Humphreys & Sandbu, 2007). 
Moreover, resource revenues, and oil revenues in particular, are highly volatile and instable. This is 
due to a volatile extraction rate, fluctuating resource prices, and variability in timing of payments, 
such as taxes, from companies to the state. Because of the financial instability, it is difficult for 
governments to manage their responsibilities and make long-term plans. As a result, expenditure 
may increase when revenues are high, and cut when revenues are low, resulting in poor, 
unsustainable economic growth. This contributes to explaining why some states tend to overspend 
their resource wealth, as financial planning gets more complex when faced with instable revenues 
(Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz, 2007b; Ross, 2012).  
Auty (2007) claims that resource rich developing countries have a tendency to make unsustainable 
investments and distribute resource rents in ways that undermine long-term economic growth and 
sound environmental policies. Auty further argues that “sustainability requires that the capacity to 
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sustain the income stream from the mineral asset needs to be passed on to future generations” 
(2007, p. 6). Drysdale (2007) explains that some paths of resource revenue management contribute 
to sustainable development, while others lead to elements of the resource curse, and that 
institutional quality affect which path is followed. Therefore, sustainable development is the 
opposite state of being resource cursed, and by achieving sustainability, the resource curse is 
avoided.  
Sustainable development is by World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) defined 
as “Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (p. 37). They distinguish between two concepts: The concept 
of needs, in particular the needs of the poor, and the concept of the environment’s ability to meet 
present and future needs. Further in this thesis, sustainability will be related to economic, 
environmental and social sustainability, with a focus on the two last to facilitate economic 
sustainability.  
2.2 How to Defeat the Curse? 
2.2.1 Resource Funds 
Arezki, Gylfason and Sy (2011) suggest that good institutions and governance helps converting 
natural resources in a way that boosts growth. To avoid Dutch disease and overspending problems, 
resource income can be used for investments rather than consumption. Such investment can be in 
human capital, physical capital or financial assets. When investing in financial assets, a resource fund 
is an option. Such a fund can work as a stabilisation fund, to avoid some of the issues that come from 
instable oil revenues and expenditure (Humphreys et al., 2007b), or as a tool for saving parts of the 
resource wealth for future generations (Tsani, 2013), thus contributing to sustainable development. 
A resource fund will work as an institution in the economy, and with the appropriate management 
and policies, the general institutional quality may be raised.   
2.2.2 Transparency 
According to Kolstad and Wiig (2009), transparency is essential to reduce corruption and improve the 
institutional quality. Related to the resource curse, transparency may have an impact on its basic 
mechanisms, especially on rent-seeking. They claim that transparency reforms should “focus on the 
areas most important to alleviating the resource curse” (p. 521), and “focus on increasing access to 
information in areas that matter for reducing rent-seeking and patronage” (p. 527). Williams (2011) 
addresses the issue of transparency as well, claiming that lack of transparency makes it difficult for 
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participants in the economy to make informed and efficient decisions. He concludes that resource-
rich countries are less transparent, which appears to be a direct consequence of resource revenues.  
One of the channels transparency may work through, is a resource fund. A resource fund itself may 
promote transparency, enabling a better overview of resource revenues and the flow of these 
revenues into the economy (Tsani, 2013). Tsalik (2003) points out that “transparency keeps leaders 
honest” (p. 49), an informed public restrains leaders from using the assets of the fund in ways that do 
not comply with the formal objectives of the fund. Revenue Watch Institute (2011) argues that the 
problem of rent-seeking and corruption can be worsened by the lack of transparency and 
accountability in resource funds, and that transparency is a key requirement for having success with 
such funds. As Bauer (2014) explains: “Separating resource revenues can help reduce the risk of 
corruption and mismanagement only where there are strict and comprehensive disclosure 
requirements for fund operations (…)” (p. 15).  
Moreover, a transparent resource fund promotes public understanding of the purpose of the fund, 
making the fund work as a commitment device (Revenue Watch Institute, 2011). With the public’s 
interest, useful debates on the use of resource revenues may arise (Tsani, 2013), which according to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) facilitates economic analyses of the fund from outside 
analysts (IMF, 2007), making it more likely to achieve an optimal management of the fund.  
However, a resource fund could reduce transparency as well, if the government finances deposits 
into the fund by borrowing, making the public believe the country is wealthier than it truly is. For a 
fund to provide better transparency of resource revenue management, the fund itself must be 
transparent (Davis, Ossowski & Fedelino, 2003).  
2.2.3 Ethical Principles 
When discussing resource funds, ethical investment is a relevant element to consider, that may make 
resource funds work better in defeating the curse. Crane and Matten (2007) define business ethics as 
“the study of business situations, activities, and decisions where issues of right and wrong are 
addressed” (p. 5). Ethical investment is also known as socially responsible investment (SRI) or 
sustainable investment, and Kiernan (2009) defines sustainable investment as “a style of investing 
that explicitly and systematically examines performance and positioning of companies on 
environmental and social issues as part of the basic investment evaluation discipline” (p. 64). 
One may claim that there is a link between sustainable economic development, social development 
and environmental protection, and that long-term investors benefit from companies that respect 
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ethical norms. Taking ethical issues into consideration, such as environmental, social and governance 
issues, protects the long-term value of investments, and is an approach of achieving the goals of 
sustainable development (Halvorssen, 2011). Richardson (2011) explains that sovereign resource 
funds in particular may benefit from investing in sustainable development. As these revenue funds 
grow large, and are backed by government, they are more risk-tolerant and are capable to follow 
sustainable investment strategies that are avoided by private investors. Funds with a longer financial 
time horizon are better able to benefit financially from a sustainable world.  
The main benefits of engaging in sustainable investment is, according to Kiernan (2009), that 
investors achieve a clearer picture of the risks and opportunities of companies. Traditional financial 
analysis does not provide sufficient information on the true risk picture of companies, and their 
potential value. For investors engaging in sustainable investment, it is easier to identify the better-
managed companies that are likely to perform better, making it more likely to achieve a better long-
term financial performance. 
According to Hawley and Williams (2000) and Kiernan (2009), institutional investors that hold 
diversified securities on a long term, such as resource funds, have become large and broadly invested 
in the global economy. These investors must care about the global economy as a whole, as they in 
essence own a piece of it. If there is a recession in the global economy, they bear the losses. Often 
funds are so large that it is difficult to pursue an active investment strategy without affecting the 
prices of securities, preventing them from moving in and out of the market and selling securities 
when shortfalls occur. Individual companies may benefit financially from placing negative 
externalities, such as water pollution, on the economy, but the economy as a whole bears the cost. 
Therefore the large institutional investors, such as resource funds, bear the cost, as they are affected 
by the performance of the global economy (Hawley & Williams, 2000). Sethi (2005) concludes that 
large institutional investors therefore must consider environmental and social concerns, because 
there is no better alternative – they must strive for improving their returns in line with the world 
economy.  
Sustainability further focuses on future generations, and enables intergenerational equity. Economic 
sustainability includes focus on impacts on the economic framework in which an organisation is 
embedded (Crane & Matten, 2007). Resource funds involved in ethical investment are therefore 
better able to contribute to the welfare of future generations. Kiernan (2009) stresses the issue of a 
future, liveable world, relating to both current social and environmental conditions. He argues that 
unless negative social and environmental conditions are reversed, “there will be relatively little point 
in investing; we will simply not have the sort of world in which anyone would want to work, raise 
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children, or spend their retirement” (p. 97). Sethi (2005) supports the same view, arguing that one 
must strive for social change to make the world safe for capitalism. 
However, when studying the financial performance of ethical investment, many conflicting results 
appear. Wen (2009) has reviewed some of the literature on SRI, and finds that evidence of a positive 
correlation between SRI and return were unstable when controlled for other criteria. Wen concludes 
that there is no clear correlation between financial performance and companies’ involvement in CSR. 
In terms of financial performance when considering environmental issues, Derwall, Guenster, Bauer 
and Koedijk (2005) found that a portfolio highly ranked in terms of eco-efficiency gave higher 
average returns than a lower ranked portfolio in the period 1995 to 2003. Drut (2010) shows that the 
socially responsible rating, including both environmental and social considerations, of sovereign bond 
portfolios may be improved without harming the risk/return relationship. However, based on 
literature to date, it is difficult to make final conclusions on the financial performance of SRI, as there 
are conflicting results. This is especially true for longer-term investors, such as sovereign wealth 
funds, as most research does not study the performance on a long term.  
2.3 Summary 
Whether the resource curse truly exists empirically or not, this chapter has so far suggested that 
there is an essential relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth. A 
country rich in natural resources, who wishes to achieve sustainable economic growth, should 
therefore take the elements of the curse into consideration when deciding the optimal policy for 
exploiting its resources.   
To sum up, some of the main issues of the resource curse are as following: 
- Dutch disease: Overvalued currency and lost national competitiveness 
- Rent-seeking 
- Corruption and weak institutions 
- Overspending 
- Volatility 
- Unsustainable investments 
To face these issues, resource funds are one of many possible instruments. According to Karl (2007) 
“a far-reaching ‘fiscal social contract’ based on transparency” (p. 257) may create incentives to 
change the rent-seeking behaviour of actors.  
Therefore, based on what has been found so far, this thesis will focus on the linkage between 
resource funds and the resource curse and especially discuss how strong institutional qualities may 
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help defeating Dutch disease, rent-seeking, corruption, overspending and volatility and promoting 
sustainable investments and growth. It has been suggested that transparency is an important 
element of institutional quality, and that transparency is essential for the fund to work optimally. 
Further, it has been shown that ethical investment may work as a tool for making the resource fund 
facilitate sustainable growth in the long run. Therefore, as illustrated in the figure below, this thesis 
will further investigate transparency and ethical principles as essential elements in the management 
of resource funds, as tools in facing the resource curse. More specific details on transparency and 
ethics will be given in chapter 4, while chapter 7 will discuss the level of transparency and ethical 
principles in the sovereign wealth funds of Norway and Kazakhstan. 
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Chapter 3: Contextual Overview: Norway and Kazakhstan 
3.1 Norway 
3.1.1 Background 
With a GDP of USD 500 billion, and a PPP GNI (gross national income converted to international 
dollars by using purchasing power parity rates) per capita of USD 67 450 in 2012, Norway is defined 
as a high income OECD country by The World Bank (2012). It is a constitutional and hereditary 
monarchy, and its constitution endows the legislative power in the Parliament. Norway is rich in 
natural resources such as fish, forests, minerals and oil, and some of the most important industries 
are petroleum, natural gas and fishing. Free market capitalism is combined with an advanced welfare 
state (The Stateman's Yearbook, 2009).  
According to BBC (2013b), Norway “enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world,” and 
Moses (2005) explains that people tend to point to Norway’s oil wealth when explaining why it is a 
rich country. However, Norway enjoyed substantial economic growth also before the discovery of oil. 
After ‘The Great Transformation’ in the mid-1800s, where agriculture got modernized due to new 
technology and tenure systems, the Norwegian industrialization took off at the end of the 19th 
century (Hodne & Grytten, 2002). The rapid industrialization was mainly based on the cheap 
hydroelectric power Norway could produce because of its waterfalls, which formed a foundation for 
more productive industries, also within the agriculture, fishery and forestry sectors. The economic 
progress was followed up by social and political developments, such as democratic and welfare state 
reforms (Moses, 2005).  
Today, Østerud (2007) claims that Norway has “one of the most democratic systems in Europe” (p. 
2), and has strong institutions and a public sector that combines private and public interests, with 
equality and welfare in focus. The economy is stable, with no public debt and a positive balance of 
trade, and Østerud explains that well-working strategies for acquiring and controlling the oil and gas 
deposits have contributed to Norway’s wealth and stable economy.  
Transparency in Norway appears to be high. According to Kristiansen (2014), the Nordic countries 
were among the first to introduce press freedom, in Denmark-Norway in 1771. This meant abolishing 
censorship and contributed towards a transparent bureaucracy. Norway has a press freedom score 
of 10 out of 100, where 100 is the worst (Freedom House, 2013b). Further, the Nordic countries also 
early introduced freedom of information acts, granting the public access to government documents, 
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thus limiting the rent-seeking as government decisions could be made more based on common and 
public interests (Kristiansen, 2014). The level of corruption is low, and Norway is ranked number 5 
out of 177 countries by Transparency International on their corruption perception index. On the 
open budget index, which measures the availability of key budget documents, Norway scores 83 out 
of 100, meaning that Norway provides extensive information (Transparency International, 2013b).  
3.1.2 Oil and Oil Dependence 
In 1969, petroleum was discovered at the Ekofisk field, which is part of the Norwegian continental 
shelf. Norwegian authorities declared the ownership of the resources, but international oil 
companies conducted the first explorations. Production started in 1971, and gradually the Norwegian 
involvement increased. State owned Statoil took a 50 percent ownership share of all new fields from 
1972 and on. Today, the government has a 67 percent ownership share in Statoil (Holden, 2013). An 
oil price shock in 1973 led several developed countries into recession, but in Norway the economic 
growth was higher, as Norway could run a countercyclical financial policy in the same period, thanks 
to the discovery of petroleum. However, partly due to the growth in the petroleum sector, 
deindustrialization took place, and labour costs were pushed upwards. The Norwegian foreign sector 
got less competitive. Despite of this, the country experienced a high growth rate in the last three 
decades of the century (Grytten, 2008). About half of Norway’s exports come from the oil and gas 
sector, and in 2013 the value of output from this sector was NOK 831 billion (Statistics Norway, 
2014).  
The Norwegian oil production peaked in 2000, and the oil revenues have been falling since. However, 
there were new oil field discoveries in 2010 and 2011 (Holden, 2013). Today, Norway is Europe’s 
largest oil producer, and an important supplier of oil and natural gas to other European countries 
(U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012).  
It appears that Norway has so far not experienced any severe consequences of the resource curse. 
According to Gylfason (2011), “the domestic economy has been largely shielded from the influx of oil 
money, thereby avoiding overheating and keeping the value of the Norwegian krone from rising” (p. 
21). An earlier strategy of transferring a “variable but declining proportion of each year’s net oil-tax 
revenue” (p. 21) to the government budget limited the damage to non-oil exports and import-
competing industries. There is a low inflation in Norway which also reflects a disciplined fiscal and 
monetary policy. How the oil revenues are spent in the Norwegian economy will be further explained 
later on in this chapter. 
13 
 
Gylfason (2011) points to five key features of the Norwegian oil wealth management that deserves 
attention (p. 21):  
o The oil and gas reserves of Norway were from the beginning defined, by law, as common 
property and established a legal basis; 
o On this basis, the government has been setting aside most of its oil revenues in the 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (NGPFG); 
o The government has laid down economic and ethical principles to guide the use of the oil 
and gas for the benefit of future generations; 
o The main political parties have shared an understanding of the need to shield the national 
economy and avoid overheating; 
o The central bank manages the NGPFG on behalf of the Ministry of Finance, which maintains a 
distance between politicians. 
The ethical principles mentioned above, were implemented in 2004 and are in line with the 
proposals from the Graver Committee, presented in 2003 (Richardson, 2011). Gylfason (2001) points 
to Norway as a good example of how good policies can turn resources into a blessing. By investing 
the money into foreign assets via the NGPFG, Norway manages to divide the oil receipts between the 
present and the future generations, and shield the domestic economy. However, the total exports of 
goods and services are no larger in proportion to national income than before oil was discovered, 
indicating that oil exports have crowded out the non-oil exports.  
Larsen (2005) examined Norway’s growth performance by measuring its relative performance in 
Scandinavia. Until the early 1970s, Norway trailed its neighbours and experienced the same growth 
pace. By using GDP per capita converted to 1999 purchase power parity as an indicator of economic 
development, Larsen found that Norway accelerated its GDP per capita relative to its neighbours 
after the oil discovery. In the late 1990s, this turned, as Sweden and Denmark grew faster than 
Norway. Larsen concludes that this structural break in the late 1990s could be an onset of a mild 
resource curse, possibly due to a shrinking manufacturing sector. Holden (2013) points out that some 
mechanisms of the Dutch disease have been at work in Norway, as wage costs have increased 
relative to trading partners. On the other hand, the reduction of the size of the manufacturing sector 
relative to the overall economy has been similar to that of several other advanced countries.  
Listhaug (2007) claims that Norway has escaped the serious resource curse, thanks to robust 
institutions that existed before oil was discovered. However, a mild resource curse might exist. It is 
pointed out that Norwegian voters show signs of discontent to the fact that the oil fortune is 
controlled in an oil fund, and not spent. When the state is involved in oil activities, the public expects 
that they will benefit from oil wealth. When expectations are not met, political trust will suffer. 
Listhaug (2007) observes a political dissatisfaction based on survey data, and concludes:  
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It is likely that public perception of a contrast between the growing wealth that cannot be 
touched, and the demands for more public services and lower taxes, contribute to the policy 
dissatisfaction that we observe: voters want more of the oil wealth to be spent immediately. 
Next, these political dissatisfactions weaken political trust. (Listhaug, 2007, p. 146) 
3.1.3 Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global  
In 1982, a committee was appointed by the government, to investigate conditions that may affect 
the petroleum sector. This committee was called the Tempo Committee, and in 1983 they 
recommended that the oil revenues should be placed in a fund, and that only the real return of the 
fund should be spent, isolating oil revenue from spending (Ekeli & Sy, 2011). The idea of a 
government oil fund received support in the 1980s. The Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund was 
created in 1990, and it changed name to the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (NGPFG, 
or the Fund) in 2006. However, the oil revenues which the government received from the oil sector 
in the 1990s were small, due to a fall in the oil price. There was no savings in that period, and money 
was not placed into the fund before 1996 (Holden, 2013). Today, the Fund is among the world’s most 
visible investors, and has a remarkable reputation in terms of its structure, governance, transparency 
and responsible investing (Chambers, Dimson & Ilmanen, 2012).  
The Norwegian parliament is the ultimate owner of the Fund, and decides how the Fund should be 
managed and who is responsible for doing so. The Ministry of Finance is the formal owner, and 
evaluates the operational management. The governance of the fund is based on a legal act passed by 
Parliament, and on a management mandate issued by the Ministry. These will also be described in 
chapter 6. The Norwegian central bank, Norges Bank, is the operational manager, and has a separate 
entity within its organisational structure, called Norges Bank Investment Management – NBIM. NBIM 
is charged with the responsibility of the Fund, and implements the investment strategy, in addition to 
reporting, risk control and exercising the ownership rights of the fund (Holden, 2013). The mandate 
of the Fund is to maximize international purchasing power, given acceptable risk levels decided by 
the Ministry of Finance. Significant changes to investment strategy are presented to Parliament 
before implementation, to help public understanding of fund performance. Both internal and 
external asset managers are used, to obtain a high level of diversification (Chambers et al., 2012).  
According to Holden (2013), when the fund was established:  
(…) it was decided that all government net revenues from the petroleum sector would be 
transferred to the fund. However, the fund would be integrated in the ordinary government 
budget, so in case of a deficit in the ordinary budget, there would be an automatic deduction 
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from the Petroleum Fund. The idea was to avoid that the politicians could “pretend” that 
they were saving in the Fund, while they at the same time borrowed to finance the ordinary 
budget spending. Third, the money from the Fund could only be used on the ordinary 
government budget. (p. 874) 
The government receives oil revenues via different channels. The most important channel is the tax 
system. In addition to the ordinary 28 percent tax that applies to all firms, the petroleum sector pays 
an additional 50 percent tax on oil profits. Another important source of government revenue is the 
direct ownership via State’s Direct Financial Interest – SDFI, which has a passive ownership in all 
active projects. As a third main source, the government receives two-thirds of the dividends from its 
ownership of Statoil (Holden, 2013).  
The Fund mainly invests in publicly traded securities. Due to petroleum inflows, the investment 
horizon is long, and it is estimated that the annual withdrawals from the Fund to cover the oil-
corrected budget deficit will exceed inflows of new money around 2020. All of the assets are 
invested abroad to prevent the Dutch disease effects and protect the domestic economy. The Fund 
acts as a passive investor, and seeks to participate in the growth of the world economy, without 
striving for higher-than-normal returns (Lücke, 2010).  
According to Isachsen (2002), the Fund is a tool to lead a responsible and long-term fiscal policy. 
Petroleum wealth enables increased consumption and welfare on a permanent basis, given that the 
use of oil wealth is separated from the current revenues. By saving the oil revenues in a fund, the 
return of the Fund will provide a basis for increased welfare in the future. Also, due to fluctuations in 
the oil price, oil revenues will vary from year to year. The fund protects the domestic economy from 
such fluctuations. At last, the fund prevents the mechanisms of the Dutch disease from working too 
heavily, because one allocates the use of oil money over time. Therefore, the Fund works as both a 
stabilisation fund and a savings fund. How such funds work will also be described in chapter 4.1.2. 
The Social Democratic government in 2001 introduced a fiscal rule guiding the use of oil revenues, to 
ensure that a large part of the revenues are saved. According to this rule, the spending of oil 
revenues should be equal to the expected real return from the Fund, which is estimated to be about 
4 percent. With this rule, the Fund will never be smaller, as new oil revenues will flow in, but only the 
expected return is withdrawn. The rule enables the government to run a permanent non-oil budget 
deficit, and one ensures that large and volatile petroleum cash flows work as a stable supplement to 
the government budget (Holden, 2013). According to the White paper No. 29 (2000-2001) that 
presents the fiscal rule, money transferred from the Fund to the budget should be used to stimulate 
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economic growth in Norway. Subsequent governments have not made such arrangements, and some 
economists argue that the money is spent on welfare and consumption (Holden, 2013). How the 
money should be spent is thus a continuous debate in Norway. 
This chapter has so far presented how the Norwegian oil fund is established and how it works. 
Chapter 6 will present findings on how the Fund presents transparent information to the public 
regarding these matters, and chapter 6 will therefore at times refer back to this chapter. More 
details on how the Fund implements its ethical principles are also given in chapter 6, while chapter 7 
will discuss the findings regarding the Fund.  
3.2 Kazakhstan 
3.2.1 Background 
With a GDP of USD 203.5 billion in 2012, and a PPP GNI per capita in 2012 of USD 18 870, Kazakhstan 
is by the The World Bank (2012) defined to have an income level of ‘upper middle income.’ One of 
the main historical experiences of Kazakhstan that still affects the country, is that it is a former Soviet 
Union republic. The social system of the Soviet Union gradually failed to provide sufficient supplies of 
basic consumer goods, and after years of stagnation, the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991 (Myant 
& Drahokoupil, 2011). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian countries, including 
Kazakhstan, were subject to a severe negative economic shock, as the demand and supply networks 
collapsed (Pomfret, 2007).  
Kazakhstan is rich in fossil-fuel reserves, gold, and unmined veins of copper and aluminium (Olcott, 
2010), and as an energy exporter, the shift to world prices after the fall of the Soviet Union benefited 
Kazakhstan (Pomfret, 2007). After achieving independence, the ruling elite showed signs of changing 
to democracy, but with time Kazakhstan turned more into a family-run state (Olcott, 2010). In the 
mid-1990s, there was a privatization program, where politically well-connected people gained 
control, which led to a more autocratic system. The government focused more on oil-sector 
development, and became associated with wealth accumulation by the elite (Pomfret, 2006, 2007).  
The regime in Kazakhstan is still autocratic, and power is centralized to President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev and his family (Pomfret, 2007). His control over political life has increased, and family 
members have been appointed to important government positions. Regional level executives are 
appointed by the president, and Parliament is controlled by threat of dissolution. The president is 
entitled to issue decrees which have the power of law (Tsalik, 2003).  
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Olcott (2010) argues that the lack of institutions in Kazakhstan “capable of providing legal protection 
or balancing the president’s power” (p. 22) is a problem, while the government and the president 
argue that it is more critical to maintain public stability, than granting the public with the possibility 
to have a say in the ruling of their country. “President Nazarbayev and his advisers have been trying 
to build the foundation for patriotism in Kazakhstan by guessing at what the population wants, rather 
than allowing the people to state their own desires” (Olcott, 2010, p. 23), and in this way the 
president promotes stability at the expense of public participation. This may influence people to feel 
less loyal towards the country, and can turn out to be a challenge in the long run. However, the 
president remains popular among Kazakhs, and he is credited for the country’s economic growth in 
the first decade of the 2000s (BBC, 2013a). Some of the issues related to the president’s power and 
how it affects transparency will be further discussed in chapter 7. 
The economy and society of Kazakhstan are not regarded as very transparent. According to Olcott 
(2010), corruption is a serious issue, making it difficult to turn away from autocracy. The president 
regularly speaks about the need to defeat corruption, but there are few “checks on his personal 
power” or on those close to him (p. 124). The top leaders of Kazakhstan have all been reported to 
having used their political position to gain economic advantage. OECD (2012) also mentions the 
problem of corruption, and points to public procurement, tax administration and use of subsoil 
resources as areas where the issue is most serious. Furthermore, Kazakhstan scores as number 144 
out of 177 countries on the corruption perception index. On the open budget index Kazakhstan has a 
score of 38 of 100, meaning that Kazakhstan provides minimum information (Transparency 
International, 2013a). 
Further, journalists and press are constrained from expressing their discontent with the power of the 
few, and their ability to pursue anticorruption campaigns is limited. According to Freedom House 
(2013a), the press status of the country is “not free”, and Kazakhstan scores 84 on the press freedom 
score, where 100 is the worst. The constitution guarantees freedom of speech and of the press, but 
in practice these are restricted by the government, and they are moving towards restricting internet 
freedom (Freedom House, 2013a).  
However, there have been some improvements on reducing corruption. The government has 
increased its attention to corruption both in the private sector and among the government. The 
government is also working against corruption in the judicial system, and judicial decisions are now 
available online, improving transparency (Olcott, 2010). There are rumours that the ruling family has 
dominant positions in most sectors, and Olcott argues that it is probable “that they will use their 
continued control of the legal system to introduce transparency only where necessary to meet 
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unrelenting foreign pressure and will seek to expand family control (…) of the economy wherever 
possible” (p. 224).  
3.2.2 Oil and Oil Dependence 
With large oil reserves, Kazakhstan became an oil producer in 1911, but the oil production did not 
increase to a meaningful level before the 1960s (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). After 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was a surge in oil production, and political independence 
allowed local elites to push for extended exploration and production (Lücke, 2010). According to 
Pomfret (2011), Kazakhstan has the Caspian Sea region’s largest crude oil reserves. In 2002, 
KazMunaiGas was created by merging state corporations to form a 100 percent state owned 
company. Following its independence, Kazakhstan has had a significant increase in foreign 
investment, and a number of international oil companies are involved in projects in the country (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2013).  
After 2000 there was a global boom in oil prices, and Kazakhstan experienced an economic boom 
fuelled by oil exports, with a double-digit GDP growth rate in 2000, 2001 and 2002. At the same time, 
a sharp real depreciation of the currency stimulated exports, and verified policymakers’ 
understanding of market mechanisms (Pomfret, 2006, 2007).  
According to the IMF, “Oil accounts for almost one fourth of GDP, 60 percent of total exports, and 40 
percent of total budget revenues. The decision on how to deal with oil revenues is therefore of 
paramount importance to the country” (IMF, 2010, p. 21). Further: 
A key challenge is ensuring that the benefits from the oil wealth are shared by the population 
as a whole. This would require that a higher proportion of the oil sector value added is used 
to for medium-term development of non-oil activities. This objective critically depends on a 
well designed strategy that encourages economic diversification based on Kazakhstan’s 
comparative advantages, and on improved prospects for long-term foreign investment. (IMF, 
2011, p. 27) 
The dependence on oil poses challenges to macroeconomic and structural policies in Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan’s oil resources may lead to a sensitivity to oil price changes, and price declines could 
hinder exploration and development activities in new wells (IMF, 2011). Kutan and Wyzan (2005) 
explain that several researchers have pointed to possible Dutch disease effects in Kazakhstan, as 
exports have turned towards energy-related sectors since independence. Kazakhstan is reliant on 
revenues from export of petroleum and gas in particular, which raises the possibility for being 
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sensitive to external commodity price fluctuations. Kutan and Wyzan show that changes in oil prices 
had a significant effect on the real exchange rate in Kazakhstan during 1996-2003, suggesting that 
there are symptoms of Dutch disease. 
Further, Kalyuzhnova (2008) claims that Kazakhstan is in danger of losing competitiveness, which 
could lead to stagnation of the economy. When excess of revenues from natural resources creates 
rising demand in other sectors, the spending effect could occur. It is therefore important to have a 
sober governmental policy on spending the oil wealth. With the aforementioned challenges, and 
their dependence on oil, it is highly relevant for Kazakhstan to look at one of the tools for handling oil 
revenues, namely resource funds. 
3.2.3 National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
In the late 1990s, there was a suggestion to create a separate budget for the development of 
Kazakhstan, due to the change in oil revenues. Increasing oil prices in 2000 gave new stimulus to this 
idea, and the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK, or the Fund) was established by 
presidential decree in 2000 (Bacon & Tordo, 2006).  
The Fund is not a separate, legal entity, but an account held at the National Bank. The president 
makes all greater decisions, and controls the management. Parliament receives the reports on the 
Fund, but do not accept, decline or amend these. The Ministry of Finance sets the benchmarks for 
the Fund, while the National Bank reports to the Ministry on its performance (Bacon & Tordo, 2006). 
Some of these issues are also mentioned and discussed in chapter 6 and 7. The Fund is run by a 
management council, formed by the president, and includes the president, the prime minister, the 
heads of two chambers of Parliament, the National Bank chairman and the finance minister. This 
council is in response of implementing the powers of the president. The operational management is 
carried out by the National Bank, on the basis of a management agreement between the National 
Bank and the government (Kalyuzhnova, 2008).  
According to the IMF (2011), the NFRK has three objectives. It facilitates capital formation, as the 
absorptive capacity of the economy limits the amount of investment in development that can be 
made. The Fund ensures macroeconomic stability, as it protects the domestic economy from oil price 
fluctuations. At last, it works as a tool for saving for future generations, so that oil revenues can 
support capital investment also in the future. The Fund therefore works both as a stabilisation fund 




Today, according to Lücke (2010), all government revenue is transferred to the Fund, after being 
accounted for in the state budget. The revenues include taxes, royalties, privatization receipts, 
capital income of NFRK assets and further on. The stabilisation portfolio mainly consists of short-term 
assets, while the savings portfolio has a more long-term perspective, and consists of fixed income 
instruments and equity. Both portfolios are invested abroad, protecting the domestic economy 
(Kalyuzhnova, 2011). 
The Fund makes two types of transfers to the budget. Guaranteed transfers are aimed at 
development-related expenditures, while targeted transfers are more ad-hoc in nature (Lücke, 2010). 
The annual withdrawal from the Fund to the state budget is fixed at USD 8 billion. The reason for the 
exact amount of 8 billion is not known (Kalyuzhnova, 2011). These transfers will also be described in 
chapter 6. 
The Fund has received some criticism from various observers. Pomfret (2011) claims that a major 
issue of Kazakhstan is to make a credible commitment with the Fund, to avoid that the assets are 
used in ways they are not supposed to. It may be tempting to use the assets to increase 
expenditures, instead of saving for the future. Further, Karl (2007) claims that the fund is set up 
under direct control of the president, and is at risk of being a parallel budget without control. I will 
come back to a discussion of these issues in chapter 7. 
3.2.4 Samruk-Kazyna 
Samruk-Kazyna is known as Kazakhstan’s “National Welfare Fund,” and was created in 2008, when 
the two funds Samruk and Kazyna merged. Samruk-Kazyna is a joint-stock company, and not a 
traditional resource fund as the NFRK. It holds, in part or in whole, over 400 companies in different 
sectors, including the national oil and gas company KazMunaiGas and Air Astana (Pomfret, 2011). 
Some of the main sectors the fund invests in are oil and gas, energy and infrastructure. The objective 
of the fund is to improve Kazakhstan’s competitiveness and sustainability, and support the 
diversification of the national economy, by managing interests of different national companies and 
institutions (Samruk-Kazyna, 2014d).  
The state is the sole shareholder of Samruk-Kazyna, and the Fund is controlled by the board of 
directors, who are responsible for developing and making decisions on long-term development. 
Samruk-Kazyna was previously led by the president’s son in law, Kulibaev, until riots in the town 
Zhanaozen broke out in 2011 and Kulibaev was fired. Oil workers were protesting, demanding better 
wages, and some got fired by their employers, which were subsidiaries of KazMunaiGas. The protests 
later turned into riots, and 16 people were killed (Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 2011). 
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In 2012, Samruk-Kazyna managed more than USD 100 billion of assets, which at that time accounted 
for half of Kazakhstan’s GDP. Samruk-Kazyna plays an important role in the diversification strategy of 
Kazakhstan, and contributes to financing projects in the non-oil sector (IMF, 2013). By holding 
different companies, the state remains present in different economic sectors. 
The objectives of Samruk-Kazyna are to be achieved by maximising the long-term value and 
performance of its subsidiaries on the world market, and increasing their efficiency. Samruk-Kazyna 
involves in both national and international investment projects, supports national producers and 
aims to attract investments into the real economy (Samruk-Kazyna, 2014d). In the coming years, the 
fund plans to invest up to USD 40 billion in strategic projects in different sectors (IMF, 2013).  
Further, the fund involves in economic stabilisation. During the financial crisis, this was done by 
taking major stakes in banks (IMF, 2013). USD 3.5 billion were placed in the Kazakhstani banking 
sector (OECD, 2012). Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard (2011) explain that this involvement expresses an 
emergence of the fund into a “key governance vehicle and institution” and a “state rescuer” (p. 70). 
The involvement of Samruk-Kazyna in the financial crisis channelled resource revenues into domestic 
credit markets.  
The NFRK and Samruk-Kazyna will be further presented in chapter 6. Chapter 6 will at times refer 
back to this chapter, when findings are in accordance with information given here, and it will provide 
further details on what information the funds provide, and how they engage in ethical conduct. 




Chapter 4: Theory on Funds, Transparency and Ethics 
4.1 Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Chapter 2 proposed that natural resource funds may work as a vehicle for avoiding the resource 
curse. This section will further describe and problematize how such funds work. 
4.1.1 Definitions 
Tsani (2013) defines resource funds as follows: 
Resource funds are directly or indirectly government owned and controlled special purpose 
funds. They are established out of receipts resulting from the extractive and trading 
operations of depletable natural resources, having no outside beneficiaries or liabilities 
involved in asset investments in the short or long term (p. 182). 
Another common term is sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). According to the International Forum of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF), they are defined as “special purpose investment funds or 
arrangements, owned by the general government. Created by the general government for 
macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives” 
(IFSWF, 2008, p. 27).   
A resource fund is therefore a sovereign wealth fund with a special purpose, but not all sovereign 
wealth funds are resource funds. In this thesis, the terms resource fund, oil fund and sovereign 
wealth fund are used interchangeably. When talking about Kazakhstan’s welfare fund Samruk-
Kazyna, the term sovereign wealth fund is more appropriate, as it is not established directly out of 
receipts from the natural resource sector.  
4.1.2 How Sovereign Wealth Funds Work 
According to the IMF (2008), sovereign wealth funds serve various purposes (p. 5): 
 Stabilisation funds insulate the economy against commodity price swings; 
 Savings funds aim to convert non-renewable assets into a more diversified portfolio of 
assets, and protects against the effects of the Dutch disease. Underground wealth is 
converted to aboveground, financial wealth, and wealth is saved for future generations; 
 Development funds help fund socio-economic projects or promote industrial policies that 
might raise a country’s potential output growth; 
 Reserve investment corporations, whose assets are counted as reserve assets, established 
to increase the return on reserves; 
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 Contingent pension reserve funds provide for contingent unspecified pension liabilities on 
the government’s balance sheet. 
Truman (2010) points out that most funds have a mixture of purposes, and that objectives may 
change over time. These purposes directly face the issues of the resource curse mentioned in chapter 
2. As explained in chapter 3, the NFRK and the NGPFG work as both stabilisation and savings funds. 
Samruk-Kazyna is known as a welfare fund, and fits with the purpose of development funds, as its 
goal is to contribute in contribute in efficient management of projects and companies to maximise 
their long-term value, and hence contribute to the country’s output growth. 
Stabilisation funds address the issue of upward pressure on the real exchange rate (an element of 
the Dutch disease), and on the instability of prices and revenues. These funds stabilise public 
finances, and use conditional rules for determining whether financial means will be accumulated or 
withdrawn from the fund for use in the state budget (Arezki et al., 2011). With a stabilisation fund, 
spending does not need to track unstable revenues closely – when revenues are high, revenues can 
be put aside in the fund, and when revenues are low, funds can be withdrawn. Consumption and 
expenditure is therefore smoothed over a longer time horizon. The country is able to save in plentiful 
years to compensate for meagre years, and thus the issue of overspending is more easily avoided. 
Investing in financial assets abroad will further contribute in protecting the exchange rate and the 
domestic economy from volatility of the resource sector (Humphreys et al., 2007b).  
If all resource revenues are committed to current consumption or a reduction in taxes, one will fail to 
provide for future generations. When revenues are instead placed in a savings fund by investing in 
financial assets abroad, this will benefit future generations, which promotes sustainability (Bacon & 
Tordo, 2006). However, this does not necessarily work well for low- and middle-income countries, 
which have more pressing needs (Gylfason, 2011). If domestic investment opportunities yield greater 
returns than investing in financial assets abroad, future income is raised by investing domestically. 
This promotes diversification, and avoids some of the issues of the Dutch disease, where there is a 
too high level of concentration in the resource sector (Bacon & Tordo, 2006). Further, “Easy revenues 
from natural resources are especially tempting in the eyes of politicians’ need of public support. 
Therefore, prudence calls for firewalls to be erected between sovereign wealth funds and the heat of 
the day-to-day process” (Gylfason, 2011, p. 16).  
Sovereign wealth funds are not a guarantee for handling the risk of the resource curse appropriately 
and ensuring sustainability. “While this buffering effect can obviously be important for the stability of 
public finances over the business cycle, there is no guarantee that stabilisation funds are financially 
sustainable” (Hamilton & Ley, 2011, p. 138). Hamilton and Ley (2011) further point to a possible 
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problem with savings funds: Governments are free to run deficits, financed by borrowing which 
offset savings, and as a result, there is no real wealth left for the future. Therefore, as Bacon and 
Tordo (2006) claim, the legal foundation of the fund, the rules determining the payments into and 
out of the fund, and arrangements for the financial management of the fund are of great importance.  
4.1.3 Institutional Aspects of a Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Humphreys and Sandbu (2007) claim that resource funds exist both in countries that use resource 
revenues well, and in countries that use them badly. Resource funds may restrain overspending, but 
there is always the risk of the rules of the fund getting changed, or that the fund is raided by the 
government when they want to increase expenditure. The institutional quality of the funds’ contexts 
are therefore of relevance. 
Torvik (2011) claims that “institutions must place strong checks on politicians” (p. 247) to avoid 
resource funds making the problem of the resource curse worse. When resource revenues are 
concentrated in a fund, it will be easier for politicians and government to misuse the fund and 
monopolize the property rights. This indicates that rent-seeking may actually be worsened by a badly 
managed resource fund. However, “when institutions place strong checks on politicians, (…) 
petroleum funds may contribute to socially beneficial development. Petroleum funds may help 
ensure a sustainable use of the petroleum wealth” (Torvik, 2011, p. 247). 
Countries that have established resource funds, tend to have better governance and institutions, and 
the presence of a fund may help avoiding the resource curse through institutional quality (Tsani, 
2013). This supports the ideas that were made in chapter 2, that resource funds are useful 
institutions in facing the curse. According to Ross (2012):  
Under some conditions, stabilization funds are more likely to work: when the government is 
run by a wise, politically insulated autocrat – or alternatively, by a democratically elected 
leader whose policies are subject to vigorous checks and balances – when corruption is low; 
when the public is well informed, and has confidence in the government’s policies; and in 
democracies, when voters are relatively unaffected by campaign spending. None of these 
conditions are easy to achieve (ch. 7). 
One of the institutional aspects that addresses these issues is transparency, which was explained in 
chapter 2. Ross already mentioned that funds are more likely to work when the public is well 
informed and corruption is low. The next section will therefore discuss transparency in more detail, 
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to develop a framework for how to analyse and implement transparency to ensure the best 
performance of resource funds. 
4.2 Transparency 
4.2.1 Introduction and Definitions 
Before investigating what aspects of a resource fund and its management should be transparent, it is 
useful to define transparency. Florini (2007) defines transparency as “the degree to which 
information is available to outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to 
assess the decisions made by insiders” (p. 5).  
Transparency & Accountability Initiative (2014) states that public officials and others have “a duty to 
act visibly, predictably and understandably to promote participation and accountability. Simply 
making information available is not sufficient to achieve transparency.” According to them, 
information should be relevant, accessible, timely and accurate. That is, information should be 
presented in plain and readily comprehensible language, and retain the details necessary for analysis. 
Further, it should be made available in time to permit analysis, and be up-to-date and complete.  
In chapter 2, it was explained why transparency is relevant to resource funds, and how transparency 
may improve the institutional quality and the performance of the fund. Tsalik (2003) argues that 
resource funds should have the same commitment to publish information about its activities as 
public companies have to their shareholders, since the fund keeps the money of the public.  
However, resource funds in general are not regarded as transparent (Karl, 2007), and the IMF (2008) 
mentions that both “official and private commentators have expressed concerns about the 
transparency of SWFs” (p. 4). There is no uniform public disclosures of the governance of sovereign 
wealth funds, and some funds publish no information. Bauer (2014) argues that resource funds may 
even have been created to act as vehicles for corruption, hence reducing transparency, and claims 
that transparency requirements are often inadequate in such funds. Even though there is a growing 
number of funds that have begun to publish relevant information, half of the 54 funds analysed in a 
study of resource fund governance were “too opaque to study comprehensively, raising questions 
about how they are being used or misused,” and whom they are truly benefiting (Bauer, 2014, p. 4).  
Truman (2008b) mentions four groups that have an interest in how funds are managed. A country’s 
citizens have an interest in how the country’s wealth is managed. Second, the government itself has 
policy interests, which may be financial, economic or political. Third, financial-market participants 
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have an interest in how these large investments are made, as they often have an impact on financial 
markets. Finally, citizens and authorities in the countries in which the funds invest, also have an 
interest in these investments, as large investments in a country may affect the market balance and 
prices. For these groups to be able to fulfil their interests, the fund must be transparent. To assess 
the ability of different funds to defeat the resource curse with help from transparency, and inform 
these groups, it is relevant to look at what researchers consider as important for establishing 
transparency.  
4.2.2 What should be Transparent? 
The IMF (2008) divides transparency of sovereign wealth funds into three categories: Objectives, 
organisational structure and investment portfolio. Information from these categories should be 
published for the fund to be transparent. When studying other transparency frameworks, these 
three categories are further broken down and expanded, and this thesis uses three frameworks as a 
basis for analysing transparency and evaluating what elements of transparency are most important: 
Truman’s scoreboard (Truman, 2008a, 2010; Truman & Bagnall, 2013), the Linaburg-Maduell 
transparency index (SWF Institute, 2013), and the Santiago Principles (IFSWF, 2008). These three 
frameworks cover and specify the three categories of objectives, organisational structure and 
investment portfolio mentioned by the IMF, but also include two categories not mentioned by the 
IMF – inflows and outflows, and investment strategy. The three categories presented by the IMF are 
therefore redefined and expanded into five categories, in accordance with the three frameworks, 
and elements mentioned by other authors such as Bauer (2014), Humphreys et al. (2007b) and Tsalik 
(2003). Each category and its importance to transparency will be presented in this section. 
Truman (2010) developed a scoreboard for sovereign wealth funds, scoring funds on 33 core 
elements from four categories. These elements are relevant to all sovereign wealth funds, and the 
scoreboard makes it possible to compare different funds against each other. Truman’s scoreboard 
and its elements are presented in appendix A. The complete scoreboard provides an appropriate 
basis for making a framework to analyse the transparency of the fund, as all the scores are based on 
regular and public information – hence, to achieve a high score, all elements must be publicly 
available. 
The Linaburg-Maduell transparency index is a method of scoring transparency of sovereign wealth 
funds, and was developed at the SWF Institute. It is based on ten, simple principles that represent 
transparency to the public, and works as a global standard benchmark (SWF Institute, 2013). The 
index and its principles are further presented in appendix A. 
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According to Truman (2010), “in response to widespread support for the development of a code of 
conduct or a set of best practices for sovereign wealth funds, a group of countries with such funds 
organised themselves into the International Working Group (IWG) of SWFs” (p. 121). In 2008, the 
IWG agreed on and published 24 principles that constituted a voluntary code that member sovereign 
wealth funds pledged to implement. This code is known as the Santiago Principles, or Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) (Behrendt, 2010). Their purpose is to provide a framework 
that reflects appropriate governance and accountability arrangements and investment practices 
(IFSWF, 2008, p. 4). Several of these principles point to what information should be publicly 
disclosed, and hence they point towards transparency. The Santiago Principles are presented in 
appendix A.  
a) Governance and legal framework 
This category covers and combines the IMF’s ‘objectives’ and ‘organisational structure’ category, as 
governance and legal framework often include both the objective and organisational structure 
(Bauer, 2014; Truman, 2008a, 2010).  
The most basic elements of sovereign wealth funds that must be made clear to all by transparency, is 
the objective. A clear objective creates confidence and contributes in holding the government 
accountable (Truman, 2008a). According to Bauer (2014), many funds lack clear goals, making the 
public finance related to the funds more complicated and less effective. “The objectives of natural 
resource funds should be clearly stated in government policy, regulation, legislation or even in the 
constitution” (Bauer, 2014, p. 20). The lack of well-defined objectives make it difficult to manage the 
fund optimally, and objectives should be operational to guide the operational rules of the fund 
(Bauer, 2014).  
The objective is a part of the governance and legal framework of the fund, which in general should be 
known to the public. The governance framework includes the policy purpose of the fund, the 
governing body of the fund, and the role of managers of the fund relative to its formal owners. The 
legal framework may include the same elements (if they are stated by law), and includes the legal 
basis of the fund (IFSWF, 2008; Truman, 2010). A clear governance structure with a clear division of 
responsibilities ensures the fiscal rules and investment strategy in being implemented correctly. The 




b) Inflows and outflows 
This category is not mentioned by the IMF, but is included in Truman’s scoreboard and the Santiago 
Principles. The ability of the fiscal rules to meet the objectives of the fund are crucial, and a 
transparent fund encourages compliance with the fiscal rules. Such rules are committing, and define 
under which conditions deposits to, and withdrawals from, the fund are made. Withdrawal rules 
should specify how withdrawals are made, where they go, and the amount of the transfer. To be 
effective, the rules should be “clarified in legislation, regulation or a binding policy document” 
(Bauer, 2014, p. 21). Bell and Faria (2007) argue that, “as a general rule, all oil revenue related 
information should be made public” (p. 307). Relating this statement to sovereign wealth funds, one 
of the most basic elements of a transparent fund is that the entire chain of revenue inflows to 
revenue spending is known. It is not sufficient to know what happens to the revenues while in the 
fund. One needs to know where revenues come from, and where they end up after leaving the fund 
(Tsalik, 2003). Therefore, the inflows and outflows of the fund should be publicly available.  
As pointed out by Humphreys and Sandbu (2007), the resource fund itself should publish details of its 
transactions, and other decisions regarding the fund. They argue that transfers from the resource 
fund should go via the national budget, and not on a separate budget. Even earmarked resource 
revenues should happen trough the national budget. This imposes legal constraints on how the 
resource revenues can be allocated to different expenditures. Even with some transfers made via the 
budget, Bauer (2014) argues that an investment strategy that prohibits investing the revenues to the 
fund in domestic assets, avoids the risk of less transparent transactions made outside the ordinary 
budget. Domestic spending should rather be made via withdrawals from the fund, to make sure it 
stays on budget. 
c) Investment strategy 
While the IMF does not consider the investment strategy, Truman (2008a, 2010) does. According to 
him, an explicit strategy will work more strongly the larger the holdings of the fund, to guide and 
protect the investment managers. A clear investment strategy may explain if the fund prioritizes a 
smooth stream of returns, or higher returns on a longer time scale – the strategy therefore depends 
strongly on the objectives of the fund. The investment strategy also may explain how risk 
management is conducted, what kind of assets the fund invests in, and if the fund uses external asset 
managers, and if so, who they are (Truman, 2010). The chosen level of risk should be explicit, and 
allocation between different categories of investment could be specified in legislation or fund 
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policies. Specific assets that the fund is allowed to hold, such as real estate, should be publicly 
available to avoid investors from investing in obscure or riskier investment categories (Bauer, 2014) 
d) Investment portfolio 
According to the IMF (2008), the investment category includes size, composition, return and risk 
indicators. Disclosure of such as returns, could help identifying poor investment (Bauer, 2014). 
Truman (2010) more specifically also includes the geographic locations of investments, while the 
Linaburg-Maduell model requires an identification of holdings and subsidiaries, if possible (SWF 
Institute, 2013). 
e) Ownership 
At last, funds should publish information about ownership, such as voting records and strategy. This 
element is only mentioned by the Santiago Principles (IFSWF, 2008), but is highly relevant when 
discussing ethical investment later on.  
4.2.3 How to Achieve Transparency? 
After establishing the five categories of information sovereign wealth funds should publish, it is 
necessary for funds to decide how to provide this information to the public. Bauer (2014) argues that 
transparency could be institutionalized, “by requiring the public release of all regulations, policy 
documents, quarterly financial statements and annual internal and independent external audits, and 
requiring that these meet international standards” (p. 25).  
To achieve transparency on the categories of investment strategy and portfolio, one of the most 
common methods is through reporting, which is used to clarify future benchmarks and set public 
expectations (Bauer, 2014). Bacon and Tordo (2006) argue that reports on fund management are 
essential tools for ensuring good use of the resources in the fund. According to Truman (2008a), 
annual reports should contain the same information required by the transparency elements of 
investment strategy and activities. Further, there is the possibility of publishing quarterly reports, but 
according to some, this may impose too much focus on short-term returns. On the other hand, 
quarterly reporting promotes transparency (Truman, 2008a). The reports should further be audited 
by international auditing firms (Bell & Faria, 2007), ensuring that the fund’s resources are used in a 
good manner (Bacon & Tordo, 2006). This is also strongly enhanced by the Truman’s scoreboard, the 
Santiago Principles and the Linaburg-Maduell model. 
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To provide transparency on the most basic element of resource management, namely an overview of 
the flow of taxes from resource sector companies to the government, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) works as a relevant tool. The EITI has an objective of making compliant 
countries publish information on taxes and other payments made by extractive industries (such as 
oil) to governments, and make these available in country reports (EITI, 2013a). The EITI and its 
function, further described in appendix B, therefore provides some information regarding possible 
inflows to the fund. Kolstad and Wiig (2009) criticize the EITI: “The initiative does not address 
transparency in the use of public resource, that is, the expenditure side” (p. 528), thus asking for 
information on what happens to revenues after received by the government. According to them, the 
expenditure side is the key in corruption policies. They also point out that the EITI membership is 
voluntary for states and companies, meaning that countries that choose to follow the initiative may 
also choose if they wholeheartedly follow up.  
One way to provide the pubic with information from all five categories, is via the internet. Bell and 
Faria (2007) point out that all information regarding resource revenue management, including 
resource funds, should be uploaded and maintained on the internet, which enables access to all 
information both locally and internationally. Bacon and Tordo (2006) argue that reports should be 
published online, as the internet is a strong tool for keeping different groups of the public well 
informed. The Linaburg-Maduell model provides 1 out of 10 points if the fund has its own website, 
thus indicating that publishing information online promotes transparency.  
Further, implementing the Santiago-Principles may work as a basic vehicle for achieving transparency 
in all five categories. According to Bauer (2014), being a member of the IFSWF and “agreeing to the 
Santiago Principles provides an incentive to publish key information, make clear the roles and 
responsibilities of key bodies and make decisions openly” (p. 73). Evidence exists that “belonging to 
the IFSWF may have a positive effect on fund transparency (…)” (p. 73).  
Another way to publish information, is through interviews in the press. However, Truman (2008a) 
does not consider this as a sufficient channel of information, as the information will normally only be 
given on an ad hoc basis, and it is difficult to establish the accuracy of the information given.   
Further, Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007a) point out that not all documents related to the 
resource fund should be publicly available. Some data may be sensitive, especially regarding the 
investment portfolio and strategy. Further, there is a risk of information overload if all relevant 
documents are published, making it difficult for the public to manage and find the relevant 
information. Too much published information may lead to a lower transparency. This must be kept in 
31 
 
mind when assessing the transparency of the funds, and when considering how funds should become 
more transparent.  
4.2.4 Transparency Framework 
Based on the elements from Truman’s scoreboard, the Linaburg-Maduell model and the Santiago 
Principles, I will use the framework shown on the next page to assess the transparency of the funds. 
Several of the elements from the three models overlap, and the elements chosen in the following 
framework are the ones that are emphasized in all three models, or that are highlighted by other 
authors (Bauer, 2014; Humphreys et al., 2007b; Tsalik, 2003). The final transparency framework will 
therefore be broader than the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index, and consider some elements 
relevant to governance in general. 
As mentioned, the three transparency categories referred to by the IMF (2008) have been expanded 
into five categories, to make the framework more specific. It is important to note that the categories 
and elements may overlap. As an example, the source of funding may be a part of the legal 
framework of the fund, and the investment income and expenditures affect the return given in the 
category of investment portfolio.  
In contrast to the Truman’s scoreboard and Linaburg-Maduell index, the elements in the chosen 
framework are not simple yes/no questions that receive points. There can be different degrees of 
fulfilling each item, which will be elaborated further in chapter 6, without setting a score on each 
element. As only three sovereign wealth funds are compared in this thesis, it does not have a 
purpose to put scores. The framework evaluates which elements are publically available, and further 




Figure 2: Transparency framework 
Category Is the following publicly available? 
Governance and legal 
framework 
Clearly stated objective 
Governance framework 
Resolution, laws and regulations 
Inflows and outflows Source of funding in general 
Amount of funding 
Investment income 
Approach to withdrawals from the fund 
Amount of withdrawals 
Expenditures 
Investment strategy Investment strategy 
External asset managers 
Categories of investment 
Risk management 
Investment portfolio Size/market value of the fund 
Information on return 
Geographic location of investments 
Companies/indexes in which the fund holds assets 
Market value of holding in each company 





4.3 Ethical Investment 
4.3.1 Introduction and Definitions 
Considerations of ethical and sustainable aspects of investment are known under different terms: 
Ethical investment, sustainable investment, responsible investment, socially responsible investment 
and so on. In chapter 2, a definition of sustainable investments was given by Kiernan (2009). 
However, as there are different practices when considering ethical issues, it may be wise to take a 
closer look at more definitions and explain the content of ethical investment.  
SRI is probably the most common term for ethical investment, known as both ‘socially responsible 
investment’ and ‘sustainable and responsible investment.’ The Forum For Sustainable and 
Responsible Investment (2014) defines SRI as “an investment discipline that considers 
environmental, social and corporate governance criteria (ESG) to generate long-term competitive 
financial returns and positive societal impact.” Individuals and institutions apply SRI strategies to 
promote stronger corporate social responsibility (CSR), build long-term value and introduce products 
that yield environmental benefits. SRI investors may be driven by personal values, demand of their 
clients or their aim for strong financial performance (The Forum For Sustainable and Responsible 
Investment, 2014). 
Kiernan’s definition on sustainable investment, given in chapter 2, focused on the future financial 
outperformance that comes with sustainable investment, while the definitions of SRI are open for 
investment based on ethical value judgements, not necessarily aiming for a financial 
outperformance. This is an important difference to notice, as different investors have different 
reasons for considering ESG issues. In this thesis, the term ethical investment will be used to cover 
the given definitions.  
Ethical investments are controversial, as some believe that investment should be based on financial 
reasons only (Richardson, 2011). It is important to note that not everyone supports the idea of 
ethical investment, and especially not related to institutional investors. According to Truman (2010), 
“(…) SWFs are political by virtue of how they are established, and by their nature are influenced to 
some degree by political considerations. SWFs could be used to achieve economic or commercial 
power objectives” (p. 44). Boards and managers of funds could be pressed by the public to increase 
the returns or to choose certain investments, in ways that do not necessarily increase the 
performance of the fund over time. Sethi (2005) argues that pension funds have an obligation to 
obtain financial efficiency and the best possible returns, and have no mandate to consider 
34 
 
investments based on personal or less objective preferences. Thus, a sovereign wealth fund or 
pension fund should maximize returns only, and not consider other criteria not directly related to 
return.  
However, as Sethi points out, institutional investors need to consider the time period of investments, 
and different types of risk. Performance of investment funds are rarely measured over longer time-
horizons. As explained in chapter 2, there are conflicting results on the financial performance of 
ethical investment, but as some sovereign wealth funds have a long time horizon, they have different 
risks to consider as compared to traditional investment funds. It is therefore not correct to claim that 
ethical investment harms the financial return of sovereign wealth funds, as such research has not 
been conducted on a longer time scale.  
Some sovereign wealth funds, such as Samruk-Kazyna, are not able to engage in ethical investment 
directly, as defined above. For such funds, other definitions are relevant to consider. One of them is 
related to code of ethics, which “are voluntary statements that commit organizations, industries or 
professions to specific beliefs, values and actions and/or that set out appropriate ethical behaviour 
for employees” (Crane & Matten, 2007, p. 175). Organisational code of ethics are specific to a single 
organisation, and attempt to encourage ethical behaviour. Such codes often seek to define principles 
the organisation wants to follow, or set out practical guidelines for behaviour within the 
organisation. Crane and Matten (2007) point out that what is most important, is how the code is 
truly followed and implemented. To write and distribute the code is not sufficient, and does not 
promote ethical behaviour itself.   
Further, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is also relevant to look at. “[CSR] encompasses the 
economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic expectations placed on organizations by society at a given 
point in time” (Crane & Matten, 2007, p. 49). Companies that are perceived to be socially responsible 
might experience more satisfied customers and attract more employees. Such companies also 
contribute to a safer community as a long-term investment, which later benefits the company itself. 
Further, some companies are powerful actors in society, and it may be argued that they have a moral 
obligation to use these powers for benefitting the society, according to Crane and Matten (2007).  
4.3.2 Ethical Principles 
Sparkes (2002) explains that SRI objectives combine social, environmental and financial goals, and 
that institutions that practice SRI try to achieve a return on investments approaching that of the 
overall stock market. Kiernan (2009) and other sustainable investment theories are primarily 
concerned with environmental and social issues, as both have general and crucial economic impacts 
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through sustainability. This thesis will further focus mainly on the environmental and social issues, as 
these are directly related to ethics and sustainability.  
a) Environmental Sustainability 
Sparkes (2002) claims that the environment is the most fundamental concern of ethical investment, 
as there is little point in worrying about other issues, such as financial return or social responsibilities, 
if Earth does not have the ability to support life. Most ethical investment practitioners therefore 
consider environmental issues, but as Sparkes explains, some do that on an ethical basis alone 
because it is morally the right thing to do, and others mainly on an ecological and sustainability basis, 
considering the long-term effect of environmental considerations. There is no theory that suggests 
specifically what environmental issues are more correct to consider for fund investments, and 
various environmental issues are differently considered among investors. 
Sparkes (2002) further points out that ignoring environmental issues can provide losses for investors, 
as environmental damage or risks may lead to potential financial claims and liabilities in the future, 
lowering the profitability of the companies involved. Sparkes (2002) does not only focus on 
environmental risks to avoid, but also takes a look at investment opportunities within 
environmentally sound and sustainable development. Environmental issues directly affect the future 
generations’ possibility to meet their own needs and are therefore crucial for sustainability.  
b) Social Responsibility 
Social issues are closely related to sustainable development, as they may benefit the economy at 
large. However, there are some social considerations which are only related to personal values, and 
not economic return. Hawley and Williams (2000) argue that institutional investors, who are broadly 
invested into an economy, should only focus on actions related to social issues that enhance wealth. 
An example of a social issue which has an impact on the long-term return, is education. It is crucial to 
the long-term economic growth of a country, and as institutional investors capture the benefits of 
growing economies, they should consider such issues. Another example is tobacco, which has 
negative effects on health, and therefore has a negative macroeconomic effect, as productivity is 
reduced and healthcare costs increase. On the other hand, tobacco stocks appear profitable, and the 
investor must assess which effects to consider (Hawley & Williams, 2000).   
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4.3.3 Ethical Investment Strategies 
According to Kiernan (2009), environmental and social issues “need to be consciously, visibly, and 
systematically integrated into the nuts and bolts of investing (…) ” (p. 15). Thus, it is necessary to 
implement strategies and mechanisms for how to consider environmental sustainability and social 
responsibility when investing. These strategies affect the extent to which these ethical issues are 
truly taken into account, and to what extent they succeed in fulfilling their ethical principles. The 
following are major ethical investment strategies, based on PRI Association (n.d.), Eurosif (2012) and 
Sparkes (2002): 
1) Integrated analysis involves explicitly considering environmental, social and corporate 
governance (ESG) risks and opportunities when doing traditional investment analysis, and 
deciding on investments.  
2) Active ownership involves investors using their formal right as owners of the companies they 
hold to affect the way companies engage in ESG issues. This could be through voting, or 
direct communication with the company to encourage certain actions. A group of 
shareholders can come together and raise publicity on a company’s action, shareholders can 
engage in a dialogue with the company, or they can fill shareholder resolutions.  
3) Negative screening involves excluding companies from the investor’s investment universe, 
based on certain criteria related to ESG. This includes excluding individual companies, certain 
products or complete sectors. Common criteria are tobacco, weapons or pornography. There 
is a risk of these exclusion criteria being arbitrary, and that this approach reduces 
diversification since the investment universe in decreased, which in turn reduces growth 
opportunities. Sethi (2005) argues that this strategy is inappropriate for pension funds, as it 
reflects moral beliefs or social values of small minorities.  
4) Positive screening on the other hand involves including certain companies or sectors in an 
investment portfolio based on certain criteria that promote ESG factors. An example would 
be investing in the sector of renewable energy. In practice it is not so easy to achieve, as it is 
difficult to obtain reliable data.  
5) Best-in-class involves investing in those companies that are better performers regarding ESG 
factors within a sector or category. This option does not need to affect financial performance 
negatively as the investment universe is not reduced.  
6) Thematic investment involves selecting securities based on themes linked to ESG, such as 











4.4 Summary and Analytical Framework 
At this point, it might be useful to repeat the objective of this thesis. As the title is “Avoiding the 
curse by transparency and ethics?”, chapter 2 suggested that resource funds work as tools for 
avoiding the resource curse, and pointed to how transparency and ethics are important factors 
affecting resource funds’ ability to face and combat the curse. More specifically, the research 
questions are: 
1) What is the level of transparency in the management of the sovereign wealth funds? 
2) How is transparency achieved? 
3) How is the awareness of benefits of transparency and ethics? 
4) What ethical principles are the funds obliged to follow, and what instruments are they using 
for their ethical conduct? 
Answering these research questions will contribute in suggesting how the funds use transparency 
and ethics in avoiding the resource curse.  
Transparency affects several elements of resource funds and the resource curse. Transparency 
affects fund performance by preventing rent-seeking and corruption, enabling external analysis and 
advising of the fund, and strengthening the public’s understanding of the fund’s operation. A 
transparent fund will remain more stable, as the rules and objectives are known and more difficult to 
change, and more profitable as the management is continuously evaluated and rent-seeking is 
prevented. Good transparency also strengthens the institutional qualities of the fund, hence having 
an indirect impact on the institutional aspects of the country that may have an impact on the 
resource curse, as suggested in chapter 2. 
Ethical investment relates directly to resource funds, as it works as a useful tool for achieving a 
sustainable return on the fund. This is especially relevant for resource funds with the purpose of 
saving for the future. The fund itself should not contribute to conditions that make the future more 
difficult for the next generations, preventing them from benefiting from the resource wealth. 
Further, if ethical investment, as suggested by some, provides superior return in the long term, this 
will increase the wealth accumulated by resource funds with a savings purpose, which in turn 
promotes economic growth and contributes in fighting the resource curse.  
It has now been suggested that transparency and ethical investment have an impact on sovereign 
wealth fund performance. In accordance with the five purposes of sovereign wealth funds mentioned 
by the IMF (2008), it is relevant to assess fund performance by the following elements: 
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o Profitability measures the return of the fund. This is particularly relevant for savings funds, 
as a profitable fund that accumulates more wealth will be better able to benefit future 
generations; 
o Sustainability is connected with profitability, and assesses the fund’s ability to provide 
wealth for future generations beyond long-term returns; 
o Stability relates to the ability of stabilisation funds to prevent upward pressure on the real 
exchange rate, and to stabilise public financing despite instable oil prices. 
 
Figure 3 on the next page suggests how transparency and ethics affects these elements of fund 
performance, which in turn affects the ability to avoid the curse. ‘Transparency Mechanisms’ 
answers research question 2, and explains how the fund achieves its level of transparency, which is 
presented in the ‘Transparency’ box in Figure 3 and relates directly to research question 1. 
‘Ethical Investment Strategies’ have an impact on how the fund implements the ‘ethical principles’ 
and both these boxes connect to research question 4. Question 3 is not illustrated as a mechanism in 
the figure, as awareness on transparency and ethics may both result in and be a consequence of 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
5.1 Research Design 
It is common to distinguish between three sorts of research studies. An exploratory study “is a 
valuable means to ask open questions to discover what is happening, and gain insights about a topic 
of interest,” and is useful “if you wish to clarify your understanding of a problem, such as if you are 
unsure of the precise nature of the problem” (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012, p. 171). Such 
research is flexible and adaptable to change, and one must be willing to change the direction as a 
result of new insights that occur during research. Exploratory research questions seek to reveal new 
knowledge about a phenomenon by specifying its matter, which enables one to develop a theory 
that can result in testable hypotheses (Jacobsen, 2005).  
A descriptive study works well for descriptive research questions, often formulated to find out the 
conditions of a certain phenomenon (Jacobsen, 2005), by addressing who, what, when, where and 
how questions. Such a design is appropriate for describing the characteristics of objects, people, 
groups or organisations (Zikmund, Babin & Carr, 2013, p. 53). According to Saunders et al. (2012) 
“there is a danger of saying ‘that’s very interesting…but so what?’” (p. 171), and it should be thought 
of a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Explanatory studies establish a causal connection 
between variables, to identify a cause-and-effect relationship. Descriptive studies often provide a 
basis for this type of research (Zikmund et al., 2013). Explanatory research questions wish to answer 
why the conditions of the phenomenon are the way they are (Jacobsen, 2005). 
Further, Jacobsen (2005) differentiates between intensive or extensive studies. In an intensive study, 
one will go in depth of a research question, researching a few units, trying to accomplish a holistic 
picture of the situation and a complete understanding of the relationship between the unit to be 
researched and its context. With an extensive study, one is more concerned with the breadth, and 
wants to look at larger sampling units to be able to generalize the findings. 
It is important to notice that the lines between the different types of research are not necessarily 
clear in all situations. The aim of this thesis is to perform a comparative study of certain aspects of 
the management of the oil funds of Norway and Kazakhstan, as explained in the introduction, and to 
investigate possible relationships between transparency, ethics and the resource curse. The study 
therefore falls into the categories of both exploratory and descriptive research. I wish to examine 
and describe the role of transparency and ethical principles in the management of the funds today. I 
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am, to a great extent, asking questions like what, where and how to figure out the differences and 
similarities between Norway’s and Kazakhstan’s approaches. I seek to figure out the awareness that 
representatives from the two countries have towards transparency and the implementation of 
ethical principles, and if they are regarded as useful tools in curbing the resource curse. Further, by 
building upon the descriptive part, the research is exploratory. An open question is being asked, as 
this thesis does not have a sufficient empirical basis to finally conclude on whether transparency and 
ethics truly work as tools for avoiding the resource curse.  
The design of this study is intensive, as the research questions are not seeking to generalize any 
findings. This study will simply establish some facts and observations about the management of the 
oil funds of Norway and Kazakhstan, and may not be generalized to any other cases. The aim is to go 
in depth of the research questions, to get a more comprehensive understanding of the roles of 
transparency and ethical principles. The result of this master thesis may provide a foundation for 
others to proceed on a more comprehensive explanatory research, where generalizations can be 
possible.  
5.2 Qualitative Method 
When deciding on a research design, one also needs to decide on whether a quantitative or 
qualitative approach is best suited for answering the research questions. Typically, one can say that 
qualitative methods are about collecting non-numeric data, while quantitative methods require 
numeric data. A qualitative method is more interpretive, as the researcher will need to “make 
meaning of the socially constructed meanings expressed about the phenomenon being studied” 
(Saunders et al., 2012, p. 163). 
The qualitative method puts few restraints on the answers the respondent can give, and it will be 
possible to receive rich and detailed information. One therefore will get a more correct 
understanding of the phenomenon studied. The data will be nuanced, with different interpretations 
from the respondents. A qualitative approach is more flexible than the quantitative, and the research 
questions may be changed as one collects more information and data (Jacobsen, 2005).  
Due to the reasons mentioned, the approach applied in this thesis is the qualitative one. Non-
numerical data is definitely best suited to describe the implementation and awareness of 
transparency and ethical principles in Norway and Kazakhstan, as it is difficult to put a number on 
complex topics such as transparency and ethics. Words are better for describing and explaining these 
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aspects of the oil funds, and words make it possible to figure out why the level of these aspects are 
chosen.  
However, the qualitative method can be costly and time demanding. When there are limited 
resources available, one often has to settle with few respondents, which in turn affects the 
representativeness of respondents and other data sources (Jacobsen, 2005). There is a danger of 
bias, as the researcher may, intentionally or unintentionally, affect the respondent and his responses. 
The respondent can also influence the researcher, and make the researcher less critical in his 
reflections (Jacobsen, 2005). These are dangers that will always be present when doing qualitative 
research, but by being aware of them, they can be minimized.  
5.3 Data Collection and Sampling Strategy 
When using the qualitative method there are several different ways of collecting data. It is common 
to distinguish between primary data and secondary data. Primary data is data that the researcher 
himself has collected for the first time, typically by conducting interviews or surveys. When the 
researcher is using information he has not collected himself, this is called secondary data. Such data 
is often originally collected by someone else for another purpose, and can take the form of statistics, 
texts and documents, amongst others (Jacobsen, 2005), and can be used in descriptive and 
explanatory research (Saunders et al., 2012). Zikmund et al. (2013) argues that the primary 
advantage of secondary data is their availability. Obtaining such data is often faster and less 
expensive, and secondary data is essential when primary data cannot be obtained. On the other side, 
the researcher has no control over the validity of the secondary data, as the data can be inaccurate.  
In my research, secondary data is used when available and reliable, and is supplemented with 
primary data when necessary. Secondary data about transparency and ethics regarding the 
Kazakhstani funds is not easily available in English, and this data is therefore gathered by conducting 
interviews. 
An important issue when collecting data is deciding on the sampling procedure. According to 
Zikmund et al (2013), “sampling involves any procedure that draws conclusions based on 
measurements of a portion of the population. In other words, a sample is a subset from a larger 
population” (pp. 66-67). It is often not possible to collect or analyse all potential data available. 
Sampling therefore enables one to reduce the amount of data one needs to collect by considering 




There are many different criteria for how to select respondents for interviews. The most appropriate 
for this research, is selection based on information, and snowball sampling. When selecting based on 
information, one seeks to study the respondents one believes has much and valuable information 
about the subject we are studying. All chosen respondents in this thesis, are selected on the basis of 
this criteria, together with snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is useful when it is difficult to 
identify suitable respondents. One selects an initial sample (here based on the information criteria), 
and then asks the people one is interviewing if they can nominate other candidates (Jacobsen, 2005). 
This method was especially useful when conducting interviews in Kazakhstan, as I in advance did not 
have a complete overview of who could provide useful information. The presentation of my final 
interviewees is given in appendix C.  
In an interview, the researcher and the interviewee will engage in a dialogue. One of the benefits 
with the interview is that there are few limitations on what the interviewee can say. It facilitates 
getting rich information and the attitudes and perceptions of the interviewee (Jacobsen, 2005), and 
helps one to gather valid and reliable data that are relevant (Saunders et al., 2012). In the case of this 
thesis, this is a large benefit as I seek to understand what perceptions the management of the oil 
funds truly have about transparency and ethics. There is also limited information available otherwise. 
Most of the interviews were conducted face to face. Face to face interviews make it easier to get a 
personal connection to the interviewee, and it contributes in creating confidence (Jacobsen, 2005).  
According to Saunders et al. (2012), “interviews may be highly formalised and structured, using 
standardised questions for each research participant, or they may be informal and unstructured 
conversations” (p. 374). It is typical to categorise interviews as structured, semi-structured or 
unstructured. 
The conducted interviews for this research were semi-structured and non-standardised. As a 
researcher, I brought a list of themes and key questions to be covered, and let the use of these 
themes vary from interview to interview, depending on the interviewee’s knowledge. The flow of the 
conversation decided much on the order of the questions and the topics, and I was open to ask 
additional questions to explore the topic of the conversation further. The use of semi-structured 
interviews was most appropriate in this study, as the interviewees were knowledgeable about the 
subject, and therefore able to decide what was important to mention. The list of topics and key 
questions used in this research is given in appendix D. 
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When conducting interviews, there are two types of bias to consider. There is the interviewer bias, 
where the behaviour or remarks of the interviewer affect the way the interviewee responds to 
questions. There is also the interviewee bias, where the interviewee may choose not to reveal or 
discuss aspects of a certain topic because this could lead to probing questions that would interfere 
on sensitive information (Saunders et al., 2012). Saunders et al. (2012, p. 383) suggests to be aware 
of the opening comments of the interview, and to use the first minutes to explain the research. 
Further, questions should be open to avoid bias, and one should follow up with probing questions. 
Leading questions should be avoided.  
These measures were followed during the interviews. Jacobsen (2005) also mentions some important 
elements to consider. The use of a voice recorder will enable more eye contact, make it easier to 
collect information correctly, and enable use of verbatim quotes. A voice recorder was therefore 
used together with notes when suitable, otherwise only notes were taken. Further, an interview 
should not be too long nor to too short. Most of the interviews lasted about an hour, which was 
enough time to get the questions answered and without having any rush. All interviewees were given 
the possibility to withhold themselves from having their name published in the thesis. Some of the 
interviewees made it clear that they would not have their name mentioned in relation to certain 
sensitive information.   
5.3.2 Documentary Research 
Text materials, such as correspondence, reports to shareholders, public records, government 
publications, journals and books are considered as documentary data, according to Saunders et al 
(2012). Jacobsen (2005) distinguishes between different types of documentary sources. This thesis 
uses mainly public sources given by institutions, which are published to reach a larger audience.  
Documentary research is suitable when it is impossible to find or get access to primary data, or if we 
want more objective and less spontaneous sources. As interviews are costly and time consuming, the 
main reason for conducting documentary research in this thesis is for limiting the need of spending 
resources on interviews. When sources are reliable and available, documentary research is a valuable 
supplement to interviews (Jacobsen, 2005).  
Documentary sources used in this thesis, which are considered reliable and accurate, are described in 
appendix C. Documents are supplemented with literature survey, when interviews and documents 
have not provided extensive answers to the research questions. 
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5.4 Evaluation of Methodology 
When doing research, it is important to evaluate the reliability and validity of findings. Saunders et al. 
(2012) tell that reliability is “the extent to which data collection technique or techniques will yield 
consistent findings, similar observations would be made or conclusions reached by other researchers 
or there is transparency in how sense was made from the raw data” (p. 680). Validity is “the extent 
to which data collection method or methods accurately measure what they were intended to 
measure” (p. 684), and “the extent to which research findings are really about what they profess to 
be about” (p. 684). 
Both reliability and validity are challenging issues in the research of this thesis. When conducting 
semi-structured interviews, it will be difficult for other researchers to obtain the same findings by the 
same technique. It is therefore important to be clear on what the findings are and where they come 
from, and how they are interpreted. It is also difficult to obtain perfect validity, as it is not always 
easy to measure what one was intended to measure when conducting interviews and doing 
documentary research. Documents are often published for other purposes, and interviews are not 
fully controllable, so there is a risk that the data obtained are not directly relevant or answering the 
underlying research questions.  
Providing participants with a list of the interview topics in advance help credibility and promotes 
validity and reliability because it informs the interviewee about what information the researcher is 
interested in, and provides an opportunity to prepare for the interview (Saunders et al., 2012). For 
this research, this has been done in several of the cases, by sending enquiries beforehand with a list 
of key questions.  
The interviews that were conducted gave relevant insight and information. The most important was 
that many of the interviewees helped pointing out relevant documents and webpages, so that I got 
more sources for my document studies. I have later looked for the same documents that are 
mentioned in the interviews, to confirm the information that was given. Unfortunately, I did not get 
the chance to speak to as many institutions as I wanted to. Even with help from the Norwegian 
embassy in Astana, the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the management of NFRK and Samruk-Kazyna 
and the management of NGPFG were not willing to give an interview. Further, few of the 
interviewees knew much about Samruk-Kazyna, and there are few documents and research 
available. Therefore, there is a chance that there exists relevant information on the NFRK and 




Several of the documents analysed from Kazakhstan were not available in English, and Google 
Translate had to be used to analyse the content. This has an impact on the validity of the analysis of 
these documents, as the chance for misinterpretation is considerable. Also, one of the most 
important interviews was conducted with the help of an interpreter. This affects validity, as there is 
one extra channel of communication where information may be misinterpreted. The flow of the 
conversation was also affected, making it difficult to make appropriate follow-up questions before 
the conversation took a new turn.  
Further, due to a high corruption level in Kazakhstan, some would question the reliability of 
Kazakhstani documents, even from public sources. However, I found no reason to question the 




Chapter 6: Findings 
In this chapter, findings are presented separately for each fund, in accordance with the research 
questions. To answer research question 1, the transparency framework in figure 2 will be followed. In 
the case of NFRK, some other information is also presented to shed a light on the true transparency 
level of the fund. As research question 2 covers the awareness on both transparency and ethics, it 
will be divided into two sections. That is also the case with research question 4, which covers both 
ethical principles and the instruments that are used for implementing them – namely, the ethical 
investment strategies. Only findings that are relevant to the research questions are presented, and in 
chapter 7 the findings will be discussed and compared.  
6.1 Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global 
6.1.1 Transparency 
Research Question 1: Level of Transparency 
a) Governance and Legal Framework 
The legal framework of the NGPFG (the Fund) is set by the Government Pension Fund Act (GPF act) 
No. 123 of 21 December 2005, which is published at the webpage of the Fund, and also at the 
Norwegian legal database, lovdata.no. The act includes the purpose of the Fund, management of the 
fund, specification of the income to the Fund, and the use of the capital of the Fund. These will be 
further described in the later sections.  
Further, NBIM’s Management Mandate is set by the GPF act, and requires NBIM to manage the Fund 
in accordance with the mandate. The legislative mandate is extensive, describing general provisions, 
responsible investment, management of the investment portfolio, performance measurement, 
management costs, requirements for public reporting, and more. Together, the management 
mandate and the GPF act establish a solid, legal foundation for the Fund. Available on the webpage 
of the Fund, with English translations, it is easily accessible for the public.  
The objective of the Fund appears clearly stated and easily available. The GPF act states the purpose 
of the Fund: “The Government Pension Fund shall support government saving to finance the National 
Insurance Scheme’s expenditure on pensions and support long-term considerations in the use of 
petroleum revenues” (NBIM, 2011a). The objective is more thoroughly explained by NBIM, stating 
that “(…) capital is invested abroad, to avoid overheating the Norwegian economy and to shield it 
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from the effects of oil price revenues” and that the fund has a role in financing an expected increase 
in future public pension costs (NBIM, 2014a).  
The governance framework of the NGPFG is thoroughly described on the webpage of NBIM, and is in 
accordance with what was presented on page 19 Ministry of Finance acts as the manager of the 
Fund, and is accountable to the Parliament. The GPF act sets the governance model by law, while 
chapter 7 of the management mandate describes the relationship between the Ministry of Finance 
and NBIM. NBIM explains that the responsibility of the executive board is to lay down guidelines for 
NBIM’s management activities, and its role is further described online, with relevant executive board 
documents published. 
Overall, both the legal framework and the governance framework, including the objective, are well 
described by NBIM, and easy to understand for the public. The information is easily accessible and 
available in English, without need for digging deep to find the correct information. As the governance 
model is set by law, it appears credible and stable. 
b) Inflows and Outflows 
The GPF act generally describes the NGPFG’s source of funding: 
Income to the Government Pension Fund Global consists of the net cash flow from petroleum 
activities, which is transferred from the central government budget, the net results of 
financial transactions associated with petroleum activities and the return on the Fund’s 
capital. (NBIM, 2011a) 
A detailed overview of what the gross revenues and expenses from petroleum activities consists of is 
provided in the GPF act.  
As regards to the withdrawal approach of the fund, the GPF act states that the use of the capital in 
the Fund “(…) may only be used for transfers to the central government budget pursuant to a 
resolution by the Storting (Norwegian parliament)” (NBIM, 2011a). A fiscal policy guideline, known as 
the fiscal rule, whose mechanisms were described page 15, was implemented in 2001, and is set by 
White paper No. 29 (2000-2001). The fiscal rule provides predictability in the fiscal policies, and thus 
enhances transparency of the use of the assets of the Fund. However, the fiscal rule is not 
established by law.  




The fund is an integrated part of the government’s annual budget. (…) This means the fund is 
fully integrated with the state budget and that net allocations to the fund reflect the total 
budget surplus, including petroleum revenue. (NBIM, 2014a) 
This is proven by the national budget, available from the Ministry of Finance (Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance, 2014a), which provides key figures for the Norwegian economy and main figures of the fiscal 
budget. The budget presents the total surplus of the fiscal budget and the Fund, and explains in a 
detailed manner how this surplus is achieved by deposits and withdrawals of the Fund. The budget is 
available in English. 
The actual amounts that are transferred to the Fund emerge from the yearly government accounts 
(such as White paper No. 3, 2012-2013), available from Ministry of Finance. It presents the 
petroleum cash flow to the NGPFG, broken down by type. Some of these cash flows were described 
in chapter 3. 
The government accounts also provide information on transfers from the NGPFG to the Treasury, and 
the monthly transfers to the NGPFG. Hence, the national budget and government accounts provide a 
detailed description of the amounts that are transferred to and from the Fund. However, the 
government accounts are only available in Nynorsk (new Norwegian), and it is therefore difficult for 
international researchers and observers to get a hold of it or be aware of its existence.   
The annual and quarterly reports grant detailed information on the investment income and 
expenditures related to the NGPFG, via its financial statement. The report provides information on 
how much income/expenses come from equities, bonds, financial derivatives, real estate and 
investment properties. In the notes of the financial statements, the management expenses and 
operating expenses are broken down by type.  
c) Investment Strategy 
In regards to its investment strategy, there are limitations on what details the Fund may reveal: 
NBIM’s policy is to be open about NBIM’s evaluation of markets, but not about single 
investments or companies, and to express views on recent market developments, but not 
forecast the future. NBIM will further be open about how the organisation is managed, but 
will not comment on individual contracts or business relationships. (NBIM, 2011b) 
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However, the limitations do not hinder the Fund from publishing relevant information on its strategy. 
The website of NBIM has its own section dedicated to the Fund’s investment strategy, where it is 
thoroughly described in both Norwegian and English: 
The Government Pension Fund Global seeks to take advantage of its long-term outlook and 
considerable size to generate high returns and safeguard Norway’s wealth for future 
generations.  
(…)  
The fund maintains broad exposure to stock, bond and real estate markets. It also seeks out 
exposure to risk factors that are expected to generate high returns over time and identifies 
long-term investment opportunities in specific sectors and companies. (NBIM, 2014d) 
The investment strategy makes it clear that “The fund holds 60 percent of its assets in equities, 35 
percent to 40 percent in fixed income and as much as 5 percent in real estate. The investments are 
spread globally outside of Norway” (NBIM, 2014d). Further, the strategy related to equity 
management, fixed-income management and real-estate management are presented separately. 
These descriptions continuously clarify why the different strategies are chosen, and are quite 
comprehensive.  
When it comes to external asset managers, NBIM presents a list of all managers related both to 
equity and fixed income assets, on their website. Invitations to tenders are also published online. 
The risk management of the Fund is comprehensively described on NBIM’s webpage, in a 
transparent manner. NBIM informs that “the most important market risk factors are the fund’s share 
of equities, movements in stock prices, exchange rates and interest rates, as well as credit risk 
changes in fixed-income investments” (NBIM, 2014f), which gives a basic explanation of why risk 
management is essential. Key figures of different types of risk, such as market risk, credit risk, 
leverage etc. are given, with the limits set by Norges Bank. Several pdf-documents are available for 
downloading, with topics such as highest possible excess return at lowest possible risk, measuring 
and managing market risk, and challenges associated with portfolio and risk management. 
Operational risk management is also explained in different downloadable feature articles.  
d) Investment Portfolio 
The market value of the Fund is available on the front page of NBIM. The value is continuously 
adjusted to new information, and therefore the value will change several times a day. The webpage 
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also informs on historical values of the Fund at different points in time, and in addition to the total 
market value, the separate market value of equity investments, fixed income investments and real 
estate investments are given.  
The financial return of the Fund is well accounted for. The annual return is presented on the front 
page of NBIM, and there are sections on the webpage providing the Fund’s return annually back to 
1999. The relative return in percentage points is also given. Further, the return is split into return on 
equity investments and fixed-income investments. One finds the returns of the benchmark indices, 
relative returns on the three categories of investment, returns in Norwegian kroner, and the return 
on the Fund after management costs. Monthly returns are available in Excel-files until December 
2012.  
Further, NBIM informs how the returns are calculated: “The methodology for calculating returns on 
the funds managed by NBIM is based on the international standard Global Investment Performance 
Standards” (NBIM, 2014e). More details on their calculation method are found on their webpage.  
The most basic and effective way the Fund informs on its holdings, is via an interactive map available 
on NBIM’s webpage. One can click on the countries on the map, or get a list of countries where the 
NGPFG holds equity or fixed-income investments. When clicking on a country, an overview of all 
companies is listed, providing information on amount invested in each company. The webpage also 
publishes holding lists in PDF, as of December 2013 and back to 1998. These are split into the three 
investment categories of equity, fixed income and real estate. Further, “A full list of the fund's 
holdings is published once a year in connection with the fund's annual report. The quarterly reports 
also provide updated lists of the top ten stock and bond holdings” (NBIM, 2014c).  
Together with the interactive map described above, the geographic location of investments is well 
covered. NBIM informs: “The largest geographic exposures are to Europe and North America, 
followed by developed markets in Asia and Oceania and emerging markets,”(NBIM, 2014c), with 45% 
of investments in Europe, 33% in North America and 17% in Asia and Oceania.  
Overall, the Fund provides extensive information on its investment portfolio, covering its returns and 
holdings well. All information is easily accessible, as the front page of NBIM provides a short 




The voting records of NBIM are published back to 2008. These records provide the issuer name, date 
of the meeting, meeting type (special or annual), item category and subcategory, and whether NBIM 
voted for or against. Voting instructions by NBIM are available from 1 July 2012, and “can be 
accessed one business day after the general meeting has concluded” (NBIM, 2014h). 
NBIM has an extensive ownership strategy, thoroughly described on their webpage. The ownership 
strategy is also described in other government documents, such as white papers, and the webpage of 
the Ministry of Finance. Shortly summarized, “NBIM seeks to safeguard its investments in more than 
7,000 companies worldwide by promoting good corporate governance standards and encouraging 
businesses to improve social and environmental standards” (NBIM, 2014e).  As the ownership 
strategy of NBIM and the Fund is closely related to their ethical investment practice, this will be 
further elaborated in the chapter regarding ethical investment. 
Research Question 2: How is Transparency Achieved? 
- Reporting 
The Fund publishes annual and quarterly reports, with auditor’s report included. The requirements 
for reporting are specified in the GPF act: “The Bank shall publish quarterly and annual reports on the 
management of the investment portfolio. The reports shall be based on the greatest possible degree 
of transparency within the limits defined by a sound execution of the management assignment” 
(NBIM, 2011a).  
The GPF act requires reports with descriptive parts and extracts from NBIM’s accounts, and a true 
summary of the Fund’s performance, management costs, strategies and risks. Further, “The annual 
report shall be published no later than three months after the end of the financial year. The main 
points in the reports shall be made available in print. Other data may be reported electronically” 
(NBIM, 2011a). 
NBIM clearly satisfies the requirements of the GPF act. The reports are published online, and are also 
available in print. They provide an extensive summary of different aspects of the Fund, such as the 
return, the investment strategy, market value, benchmarks and inflow of new capital, together with 
the financial statements. The Fund’s exercise of environmental investment and its ownership rights is 
presented. Some feature articles are also published in the reports. Overall, the Fund’s reporting 
practice is extensive and informative. The reports are easily available, in both Norwegian and English.  
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- White papers 
The Ministry of Finance has published white papers regarding the management of the Fund. These 
give the public and the Parliament different, relevant information regarding the Fund, and work as an 
important source of explaining the function and performance of the Fund. The last white paper was 
published in 2014 (White paper No. 19, 2013-2014), and thoroughly describes and discusses the 
investment strategy of the Fund, presents financial results of the Fund and follows up its 
management related to return, risk and responsible management.  
- Webpage 
NBIM will interact with Norwegian and international media through press conferences, press 
releases, interviews and press seminars to give more in-depth information about defined 
topics relating to NBIM’s investment activities. NBIM’s website shall be the main channel for 
general information to all target groups about NBIM’s activities. (NBIM, 2011b) 
The Fund’s website, NBIM.no, clearly works as the main channel of publishing information. The 
website is easy to navigate on, and it publishes information that elaborates the information given in 
annual and quarterly reports. Other than what is required by the transparency framework, the 
webpage publishes discussion notes, feature articles, submissions to the Ministry of Finance, and 
relevant news on NBIM, such as press releases.  
It must be noted, that while in the writing of the thesis, the webpage of NBIM went through an 
extensive redesign. Hence, there is a chance that some of the information that is claimed to exist, is 
no longer available. However, due to my experience, the content of the webpage has not changed 
significantly.  
- Santiago Principles 
Norway is a member of the IFSWF, and is therefore required to implement the Santiago Principles. In 
2013, the Fund scored 94% on the Santiago compliance index, which was the highest score achieved 
among the funds that year (GeoEconomica, 2014). This fact implies that Norway has managed to 
implement the principles, which contribute in achieving transparency. The Ministry of Finance has 
also published a self-assessment of its adherence to the principles (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
2011).  
- EITI 
Norway became a compliant country of the EITI in 2011, and has published five reports since 2008. 
The last report was published in 2012, and the next is due in 2015 (EITI, n.d.). The report shows what 
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payments to the government the oil companies have reported, and payments the government 
reports to have received. Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Tord Lien, has stated, “transparency on 
the cash flows related to the extraction of oil and gas is important for making resources a source for 
a national increase in prosperity” (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013).  
Accordingly, the NGPFG uses different channels to provide the public with relevant information. The 
most important channel is definitely its website, which is comprehensive and straightforward.  
Research Question 3a: Awareness of Benefits of Transparency 
Transparency appears to be fundamental to the NGPFG. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance states 
that “transparency is a prerequisite for ensuring widespread confidence in the management of the 
Government Pension Fund” (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2014b), and that transparency “is a 
prerequisite for broad support” on the construction of the Fund and “proper management in the 
long term. Transparency also reduces the risk of poor management” (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
2013). This is also emphasized by NBIM, who explains: 
We are dependent on confidence to manage our mission, so we aim to be a professional, 
transparent and responsible investment manager. (…) our goal is for the people of Norway 
and others to be able to find all the information they need about the fund and its investments. 
(NBIM, 2014g) 
Hence, it appears that the awareness on the importance of transparency is great, and that 
transparency is highly prioritized, at least in writing. When Jens Stoltenberg was prime minister, he 
stated that the NGPFG “is one of the world’s largest and most transparent funds. We receive 
acknowledgement on this matter, both nationally and abroad. Transparency leads to debate, which I 
welcome” (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2010a).  
However, pointed out by Revenue Watch Institute (2011), one must take into consideration some of 
the characteristics of Norway when comparing its transparency against other funds. All countries 
have different characteristics, and Norway’s characteristics facilitate a transparent fund. One cannot 
expect that the characteristics of the Norwegian fund are appropriate to all sovereign wealth funds, 




Research Question 3b: Awareness of Benefits of Ethics 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the NGPFG has implemented ethical principles in its investment practice. 
The Fund distinguishes between its ethical guidelines, which are pursuant to the GPF act and decides 
on what ground the Fund may exclude companies from its investment universe, and on ethical 
conduct in general which is not related to exclusion.  
NBIM, Ministry of Finance and the Graver Committee, which proposed the ethical guidelines and 
conduct of the Fund, provide several arguments for considering ethical principles in the management 
of the oil wealth. In general, there are two basic arguments on why the Fund engages in ethical 
principles: Economic reasons, which considers the long-term return of the Fund, and value-based 
reasons, which considers the values and beliefs of the Norwegian population. 
As for the value-based reasoning, this is explained as follows:  
[The Fund] is managed on behalf of the Norwegian population. Our common, ethical values 
must form the foundation for a responsible management of the fund. (…)The fund belongs the 
Norwegian population, and we must pay attention to important ethical common values in its 
management. Therefore, we have both a responsibility and an interest in contributing to 
sustainable development, good corporate governance and environmental protection and 
social considerations through management efforts. (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2010b, p. 
12).  
The economic reasons for engaging in ethical investment is thoroughly described by the Graver 
Committee: 
To create economic room for manoeuvre for future generations, a long-term perspective must 
be applied to the management of financial wealth. (…)  Achieving high returns over time is 
dependent on general economic growth. In other words, sustainable economic development 
is essential to a long-term return on a broad-based financial portfolio. (Graver Committee, 
2003) 
The requirement for a long-term return gives rise to ethical obligations in relation to the 
requirement for sustainable development in a longer-term perspective. Sustainable 
development is a precondition for return on the Petroleum Fund’s financial investments in the 
long term. (Graver Committee, 2003) 
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The Graver Committee further explains that companies that do not act in accordance with its 
owners’ expectations are not attractive investments. The Fund may suffer financially if companies 
engages in activities which harm other companies, as the Fund is broadly involved in the investment 
universe. The Fund therefore has a financial interest in ensuring that its firms do not pass their costs 
on to other firms via society, and thus should engage in ethical considerations of their investments. 
The Ministry of Finance underscores the same aspects, arguing that long-term return depends on 
sustainable development in economic, environmental and social terms (White paper No. 19, 2013-
2014; White paper No. 27, 2012-2013). 
Research Question 4a: Ethical Principles 
In the management mandate given by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Norges Bank is given the 
responsibility to integrate environmental and social considerations in the investment practices of the 
Fund. The ethical considerations of the Fund are based on the UN Global Compact, OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Norges Bank and the 
Ministry of Finance also take part in the UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), which are 
based on the view that considerations related corporate governance and environmental and social 
issues may affect the financial return of investments.   
a) Environmental Sustainability 
Regarding environmental issues, section 2 of the NGPFG’s ethical guidelines establishes: 
The Ministry of Finance may, on the advice of the Council of Ethics, exclude companies from 
the investment universe of the Fund if there is an unacceptable risk that the company 
contributes to or is responsible for: (…) severe environmental damage. (Council on Ethics, 
2013) 
The Fund argues that environmental issues in general may have an impact on the return of 
investments, and that achieving a good long-term return is strongly dependent on sustainable 
development in environmental terms, and it therefore also considers: global climate change, water 
management and tropical deforestation. (White paper No. 19, 2013-2014): 
o Global climate change: Companies should develop strategies related to climate change and 
provide reports on what companies do to reduce the risk of climate change having a negative 
impact on the company’s profitability (NBIM, 2014e); 
o Tropical deforestation: Contributes to climate change, and companies are therefore 
expected to implement measures to reduce their negative impact on deforestation (White 
paper No. 19, 2013-2014; White paper No. 27, 2012-2013); 
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o Water management: Limited access to freshwater is considered an increasing risk to many 
companies, and is therefore an important ethical consideration (NBIM, 2014b). 
 
b) Social Responsibility 
Some of the Fund’s ethical conduct related to social responsibility is mentioned in section 2 and 3 of 
the ethical guidelines (Council on Ethics, 2013): 
The assets in the Fund shall not be invested in companies which themselves or through 
entities they control: 
a) produce weapons that violate fundamental humanitarian principles through their 
normal use; 
b) produce tobacco; 
c) sell weapons or military material to states that are affected by investment 
restrictions on government bonds as described in the management mandate for the 
Government Pension Fund Global (…) 
and 
The Ministry of Finance may, on the advice of the Council of Ethics, exclude companies from 
the investment universe of the Fund if there is an unacceptable risk that the company 
contributes to or is responsible for: 
a) serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture, deprivation of 
liberty, forced labour, the worst forms of child labour and other child exploitation;   
b) serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war or conflict;   
(…) 
d) gross corruption;   
e) other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms.  
The Graver Committee (2003) argues that the Fund should consider social issues because companies 
that break with accepted principles of right and wrong to achieve short-term return may damage the 
company’s reputation, and thus harming the long-term return. As human rights are “firmly rooted in 
the Norwegian tradition and conception of justice” (Graver Committee, 2003), they are important for 
the Fund to consider. Further, the Fund specifically is concerned with children’s rights: 
NBIM is mandated to safeguard and build wealth for future generations, but we will not do 
this at the expense of children. NBIM recognize that enterprises should contribute to the 
effective abolition of child labour and that promotion of children’s rights is closely linked to 
decent work for youth and adults and human rights standards. (NBIM, 2011c) 
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One of the reasons for excluding tobacco is its negative health effects which have considerable costs 
to society. The exclusion of certain weapons, such as chemical, biological, cluster and nuclear 
weapons, is to some extent based on what is prohibited by international law, but also one the basis 
of the values of the Norwegian people (Graver Committee, 2003).  
Research Question 4b: Ethical Investment Strategies 
The ethical considerations mentioned above are related to different types of strategies, and the 
strategies and instrument the NGPFG are implementing is now presented. As one may see, the Fund 
only implements three out of the six strategies mentioned in figure 3, namely active ownership, 
negative screening and thematic investment. 
- Active ownership 
The operational manager of the Fund, NBIM, is responsible of exercising ownership rights in 
accordance with the Fund’s ethical principles. 
 [NBIM] uses its rights as a shareholder to promote social and environmental issues and help 
improve standards of corporate governance. The bank is in contact with companies, investors 
and governments. It also in dialogue with other actors who establish standards for the 
financial markets. (White paper No. 19, 2013-2014, p. 95) 
As the Fund is one of the largest investors in the world, NBIM argues that they are in a better 
position to affect markets and individual companies than many other investors are. They prioritize 
active ownership on companies where the Fund has its largest holding, as they have a greater effect 
on the risk and return of the Fund. The analyses and development of knowledge that comes from its 
active ownership is significant for the long-term return of the companies the Fund holds (White 
paper No. 19, 2013-2014).  
NBIM’s active ownership is especially concentrated on climate change, water management and 
children’s rights, and it has prepared reports of expectations on these areas. In addition to being in 
dialogue with companies, investors and governments, NBIM votes in annual general meetings and 
files shareholder proposals, which is its most important, formal possibility to express opinions and 





- Negative screening 
The ethical guidelines of the NGPFG establish on what ground companies, products and sectors may 
be excluded from the Fund’s investment universe. Exclusion is based on product-based criteria, or on 
conduct-based criteria, and is restricted to special or severe cases: 
Companies are to be excluded from the Fund if they produce the specified products. 
Companies can also be excluded if there is an unacceptable risk that they are contributing to, 
or are responsible for, grossly unethical conduct as defined in the guidelines. (White paper 
No. 19, 2013-2014, p. 19) 
The Council on Ethics is responsible for assessing whether the criteria for exclusion of companies are 
fulfilled, and seeks to identify companies that fulfil the criteria of exclusion or observation, regardless 
of the company’s size or home country. The council makes use of consulting companies, researchers 
and voluntary organisations to document the conduct of the companies the Fund is invested in. 
Based on documentation from available documents or fieldwork, the council gives its advice to the 
Ministry of Finance, who makes the final decision (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2010b). 
On certain occasions, companies may be placed under observation rather than being excluded: 
The Ministry may, on the basis of advice from the Council on Ethics (…), decide to put a 
company under observation. Observation may be chosen if there is doubt as to whether the 
conditions for exclusion have been fulfilled, uncertainty about how the situation will develop, 
or if it is deemed appropriate for other reasons. Regular assessments shall be made as to 
whether the company should remain under observation. (Council on Ethics, 2013) 
Monitoring and inspection of the companies of the Fund’s portfolio is used to identify whether they 
produce products prohibited by the ethical guidelines. Companies that should be excluded based on 
conduct, are identified by monitoring online news in many languages, or by inquiries from external 
organisations. When activists are protesting on ethical issues related to the Fund, these protests 
reach the Council on Ethics, and are considered after a thorough review of information from 
different sources (Council on Ethics, 2014b; Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2010b; White paper No. 
19, 2013-2014). The work of monitoring and inspection is to a large degree done by consulting 
companies, such as Livingstone & Company, RepRisk and Sustainalytics. These companies have a 
broad network, which is their trump card, making them able to collect relevant information not 
found directly in media (Gundersen, 2014). 
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On page 36, it was shortly explained that negative screening may be inappropriate, as exclusion is 
considered to reflect moral or political beliefs. This is a greater risk for sovereign wealth funds, as 
they in principle should not work as political instruments. Øystein Olsen, governor of Norges Bank, 
has addressed this issue and stated:  
If the Fund is perceived as an instrument for achieving other political objectives, its role as 
investor will be undermined. This is sound advice. If Norges Bank is assessed using criteria 
other than return and risk, its mission will become unclear. This might also impact return 
performance. There must be no doubt as to the objective of investment management. (Olsen, 
2014) 
There are people who consider the NGPFG to act politically, when implementing its ethical principles. 
Professor Lawrence H. Summers from Harvard believes there is reason for concern when a country is 
judging the practices of other countries, such as the NGPFG is doing. Former Minister of Finance, 
Kristin Halvorsen, disagrees, stating “it is not possible to say that this is a political fund.” According to 
her, fighting child labour and nuclear weapons is of such fundamental character that it cannot be 
called politics when the Fund is excluding companies (Knudsen, 2008). There clearly exists strong 
perceptions on whether the NGPFG acts as an instrument for Norwegian political objectives or not, 
and the debate is continuous. Hence, the Fund experiences the challenges of negative screening.  
- Thematic investment 
The management mandate of NBIM clarifies that NBIM shall make environment-related investments 
with a market value of 20-30 billion NOK. Since 2009, NBIM has awarded mandates for 
environmental investments to external and internal managers. These have a focus on renewable 
energy and water and waste management (NBIM, 2014b). However, there are challenges related to 
the environmental investments, as the investment universe is unclear (White paper No. 19, 2013-
2014).  
Current work on ethical investment strategies 
The ethical investment strategies of the NGPFG are continuously being assessed and analysed. In 
2013, Ministry of Finance appointed the Strategy Council to assess how the work of responsible 
investment in NGPFG could be strengthened. Their research was finished at the end of 2013, and 
they gave Ministry of Finance ten recommendations on how to improve the Fund’s responsible 
investment practices, which should guide the Fund’s managers to purse responsible investment 
strategies that enhance the value of the Fund. The recommendations that have received most 
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attention, are to delegate exclusion decisions to NBIM, and integrate today’s work of Council on 
Ethics into NBIM. The strategy council believes that exclusion should only be made after all 
ownership strategies have been tried. Further, integrating decisions into NBIM will avoid some of 
today’s duplication of resources needed for the operation of both NBIM and Council on Ethics 
(Strategy Council, 2013). The Ministry of Finance considers these recommendations to be useful, 
while Council on Ethics does not agree with all of them (White paper No. 19, 2013-2014).  
The recent recommendations from the Strategy Council and the government’s view on these have 
created debate. It is likely that the responsible investment practices of the Fund will change in the 





6.2 National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
6.2.1 Transparency 
Research Question 1: Level of Transparency 
a) Governance and Legal Framework 
The main source of information regarding the legal framework of the NFRK (the Fund) is Adilet, 
Kazakhstan’s legal database. Adilet contains relevant legislation and presidential decrees, with some 
information available in English, and most available in Russian and Kazakh.  
A presidential decree of August 23, 2000 establishes the Fund:  
The Fund's assets are concentrated in the account of the Government (…) in the National 
Bank (…). The amount and direction of the use of the Fund are determined by the President of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, on the proposal of the Government (…). (Adilet, 2000) 
However, the most relevant legislative document, is what is named On the Formation and use of the 
National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Adilet, 2010), also called the Concept by some of the 
interviewees. I will further refer to this presidential decree as the Concept. This document is a 
presidential decree from April 2, 2010. 
The Concept describes the main objectives and principles of the NFRK, which is “saving financial 
resources by generating savings for future generations and reduce dependence on the national 
budget situation on world commodity markets. Accordingly, the functions of the National Fund are 
savings and stabilisation.” Hence, the objective of the Fund is strongly stated in legislation, and 
appears transparent.  
A description of the governance structure is provided by a presidential decree from December 28, 
2004 (Adilet, 2004), which describes the management board of the National Fund and the board’s 
composition. I have not been able to get hold of public government documents that confirm the 
governance structure presented on page 19.  
As one may see, the legal basis of the NFRK is to a large degree based on presidential decrees. On 
page 19 it was explained that this involves the president making all greater decisions. Zhanibek 
Khassan points out that there are issues with such a system, which decreases the transparency level 
of the Fund:  
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First of all, the Fund is not a legal entity. Second, it is only managed by executives, like the 
president, Minister of Finance, and so on. There is no participation of the public, no public 
discussions about how to manage this Fund. And the only decision maker of the Fund, on how 
to invest, where to invest, is the president. Just a single person (…)The president can declare 
that a legal act is urgent, then the parliament has to consider and approve it. The president 
can discharge parliament and the executive bodies. This structure affects transparency badly, 
because there are just 10 persons who decide what happens to the nation. There is 
asymmetry of information, scientists and researchers don’t participate. Not every solution is 
taken into account. (Khassan) 
Tsalik (2003) addressed the same issue much earlier, claiming that the Fund should be established by 
law to make it more difficult to change central rules of the fund by presidential decree. Even though 
the governance and legal framework of the Fund appears transparent, there are clearly issues with it 
affecting transparency negatively.  
b) Inflows and Outflows 
The Concept specifies the source of funding of the NFRK, which is in accordance with what was 
presented in chapter 3.  
The Concept further specifies the withdrawal approach from the NFRK, which is the guaranteed 
transfers of USD 8 billion described on page 20. The function of the savings fund is also explained, 
establishing that its balance should be at minimum 20% of GDP at the end of the financial year. By 
this, it seems that the Concept gives a fair description of the general source of funding and 
withdrawal approaches from the Fund. Due to the lack of English descriptions, it is difficult to fully 
comprehend the mechanisms of withdrawals, but the description appears detailed.  
Some point to the fact that the rules of withdrawal from the Fund keep changing, making it difficult 
to keep track when analysing the Fund. Dina Azhgaliyeva, who has previously done research on the 
NFRK, explains: 
If you want to be transparent, I have to see how much oil producers pay to the government, 
and how it is spent by the Fund. However, when the amended rules regarding the fund kept 
changing, and even the name of the law regarding the rules changed, it got difficult knowing 




Further, there exists a list of oil related companies whose taxes are deposited into the Fund, and 
which companies are on this list decides how much revenues are truly transferred to the Fund. Bauer 
(2014) claims that this list may be changed arbitrarily from year-to-year, and Azhgaliyeva has pointed 
to the same issue, arguing that this list contributed to making the rules of deposit and withdrawal 
less stable and transparent.  
Ilyas Sarsenov, Senior Economist at the World Bank office in Astana, explains why the rules keep 
changing: 
The government tries to fix the approach, and that is why it is changing the rules so 
frequently. They are still trying to find the best method to fit Kazakhstan. They have a very 
volatile environment that needs quick adjustments. When we are more developed and the 
growth is more sustainable, I think the approaches will change. But for now, this is the 
justification for these quick changes. (Sarsenov) 
The webpage of the Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan provides annual and monthly reports on the 
NFRK, in English, Russian and Kazakh (Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014). These 
reports provide the amount of receipts to the Fund, broken down by type of inflow, in accordance 
with the different sources of funding described by the Concept. Likewise, the amount of withdrawals 
is given in the same report, specifying the amount of guaranteed transfer to the national budget, 
together with the amount of a targeted transfer.   
Further, the targeted transfers described in chapter 20 are presented in these reports. According to 
Sarsenov, these “create some discretion and power on the government side on how much to 
basically allocate in addition to the guaranteed transfers.” According to Azhgaliyeva, it is difficult to 
see how these targeted transfers are truly invested, and what the return from they are. There is no 
data available to the public on what happens to this money, and for all they know, the money could 
be given away for free. Khassan has pointed to the same issue regarding the guaranteed transfers, 
stating that in general, “the spending of the Fund is unpredictable, and one cannot trace money. The 
8 billion that is taken each year from the Fund is not possible to trace. It is just taken and invested.”  
According to Tengri News (2013b), Kazakhstan’s Finance Minister Bolat Zhamishev has also remarked 
this issue, especially relating to targeted transfers: “There are issues with transparency of use of the 
National Fund’s money aimed for anti-crisis activities”, Zhamishev stated, further explaining that 
there are plans on publishing reports regarding the return of the use of the fund’s money to anti-
crisis measures (Tengri News, 2013b). Earlier that year, President Nazarbayev said that $10 billion, 
which were withdrawn from the NFRK to be used in anti-crisis measures, had gone nowhere. “It’s 
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easy to ask for money out of the National Oil Fund. The $10 billion allocated to combat the financial 
crisis is gone. There is no pay-off” the president stated (Tengri News, 2013a). This is a clear indication 
that there truly are issues with transparency of the Fund and its use of money.  
The national budget of Kazakhstan is available in Russian and Kazakh on Adilet, and shows the 
transfers from the NFRK, and such confirms the amounts of the guaranteed transfers given in the 
reports. According to Sarsenov, “flows are reflected in the budget, if they are on budget. There is of 
course a possibility that they are off-budget.” Sarsenov explains that when the $10 billion were taken 
from the Fund during the financial crisis, part of this money went as a targeted transfer on budget, 
while some was off budget and borrowed from Samruk-Kazyna.  
The investment income of the Fund is given in the annual and monthly reports described above. The 
investment income is not broken down by type, only a total amount is given. It is therefore 
impossible to know if the investment income comes from returns on equity, on bonds, or something 
else. Likewise, with the amount of expenditure, the reports provide the “expenditure connected with 
the National Fund Management and conducting annual external audit.” How much is connected to 
operational management costs of the fund, and how much is related to audit fees, is not possible to 
know.  
c) Investment Strategy 
There is little information available about the investment strategy of the NFRK. The Concept 
describes that the policies of the NFRK “will remain conservative. However, the main objectives of 
investment operations under the management of national funds are safety, maintaining sufficient 
liquidity to ensure profitability in the long term at a moderate level of risk.” The Concept also 
mentions that the assets of the Fund must be traded in foreign financial markets, and be included in 
the list of permitted financial instruments. What these permitted instruments are, is not given.  
A chapter from the National Bank’s annual report gives a hint about some of the investments of 
NFRK (National Bank of Kazakhstan, 2013). Amongst others, the report reveals that NFRK has a 
“Global Bond Mandate”, a “Global Equity Mandate” and a “Global Tactical Asset Allocation 
Mandate.” External managers manage these portfolios, but who these are, is not given.  
There is no information available on risk management. 
The information given in the annual report of the National Bank increases the transparency on the 
given elements. However, it must be mentioned that none of the interviewees mentioned this report 
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as a possible source of information, and this report is easy to miss, when one is specifically looking 
for information regarding the NFRK. The information is also quite limited, and not easy to understand 
for people without deeper knowledge in the field of investments and finance. Summarized, the 
transparency level regarding the investment strategy is very low. 
d) Investment Portfolio 
The size of the Fund is given in tenge in the annual and monthly reports provided by the Ministry of 
Finance. The statistical database on the website of the National Bank also gives the volume of the 
assets of the NFRK in US dollars on a monthly basis. The annual report of the National Bank provides 
the size of the savings fund and the stabilisation fund separately. The size of the fund is therefore 
considerably well covered, and Sarsenov argues that “by publishing the size of the Fund on the 
webpage of both the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank, the data is verified.”   
The annual report of the National Bank provides the financial return of the NFRK since its inception in 
2001. The separate returns of the savings fund, the stabilisation fund and the benchmark is given for 
the year of the report. The return of the equity portfolio, bond portfolio and tactical asset allocation 
portfolio from 2002 is also given in the report. The return of the fund is therefore covered, if one 
manages to find the annual report of the National Bank.   
The NFRK does not provide any information on geographic location, companies in which the fund 
holds assets or on market value of holding in each company. 
e) Ownership 
The NFRK does not provide any information on its ownership strategy or voting records. 
Other Relevant Information 
Different commentators and interviewees have different views on whether the transparency of the 
NFRK is sufficient or not. Khassan is very clear in his perceptions, stating that the NFRK is “not very 
transparent.” He argues that transparency of the Fund is very important, and that today’s situation is 
making it difficult to know which information is real or not: “Is it just fake information? Is it just like 
paint, just cooked up for these special purposes?” Sarsenov, on the other hand, believes that the 
NFRK is quite transparent, but with room for improvement:  
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It’s not that the government hides anything, but there is an issue with consistency of data. 
When comparing the National Bank’s data with the Ministry of Finance data, they use their 
own approaches which sometimes don’t match. (Sarsenov) 
Azhgaliyeva agrees with Sarsenov in that there is room for improvement on transparency of the 
NFRK. Neither she believes that the Fund tries to hide funds, and claims that the National Bank and 
the Ministry of Finance are doing well at trying to make the Fund more transparent. Regarding 
corruption, Natalia Malyarchuk, Chair of the Board at Transparency International Kazakhstan, 
explains: “The main problem of Kazakhstan is top-level corruption. It is connected to oil and to the 
extractive sector.” However, despite of top-level corruption, she considers the NFRK as a “quite clean 
organisation.”  
It is also relevant to mention that in her research, Azhgaliyeva found that regarding the stabilisation 
function of the Fund, the NFRK was able to stabilise the government expenditure in an effective 
manner, but it did not manage to stabilise the exchange rate. This will be commented in chapter 7. 
Research Question 2: How is Transparency Achieved? 
- Reports 
As already mentioned, the Ministry of Finance publishes annual and monthly reports regarding the 
NFRK on its website, in Russian, Kazakh and English. However, these are not standard, 
comprehensive, audited reports, but simply one-page reports listing the receipts and application of 
the NFRK. The same reports are given on a monthly basis. Annual reports exist from 2006, monthly 
reports from 2012. The reports contain the assets of the National Fund at the beginning and the end 
of the period, and an overview of the deposits and withdrawals of the Fund.  
Khassan believes that the transparency and predictability of NFRK could be improved if the Fund 
followed Norway’s example, making more comprehensive reports available. As he simply summarizes 
the quality of reporting, “it is regular, but not detailed.”  
Regarding audited reports, Sarsenov explains “the Fund is subject to an annual audit, by an audit 
company, but these are not placed in the public domain.” Already in 2003, Tsalik argued that the 
NFRK should commit more to transparency, by making independent audit reports available to the 
public. In 2010, Lücke mentions that NFRK provides little information, and there are no published 





Kazakhstan became an EITI candidate in 2007, and was in October 2013 accepted as an EITI 
compliant country (EITI, 2013b). Their latest EITI report was published in 2011, and according to 
Dyveke Rogan, Regional director at EITI, this report was more comprehensive than the previous ones. 
Cash flows are broken down by company in the 2011 report, not just providing a total as it has 
earlier. However, regarding the National Fund, the EITI report of 2011 does not provide much 
relevant information. Rogan points out that the report of 2012/2013, which should be available at 
the end of 2014, should cover where money flows after received by the government, and thus how 
much flows into the National Fund.  
It seems that the reports from the EITI may provide information as a relevant supplement to 
information given from the government, the National Bank and the National Fund in Kazakhstan. 
“The source of funding to the National Fund has become very transparent, because of the EITI. EITI 
helps a lot” (Khassan). Tatiana Sedova, EITI consultant at the World Bank office in Almaty, agrees that 
the EITI could make the NFRK even more transparent. She also believes that the EITI has changed the 
way the government thinks about transparency, to the better. However, as the reports work today, 
the detail level is not high enough create involvement regarding the National Fund on its own.  
- Webpage 
The NFRK does not have its own webpage. Previous literature, such as Kalyuzhnova (2011), describes 
the existence of a webpage, nationalfund.kz, but this is not up and running. According to Khassan, 
“when the National Fund was established, there was a webpage. But it has not been working for the 
last six years.” However, according to him, the webpage of the Ministry of Finance contains all the 
same information that was provided by the webpage. 
- Santiago Principles 
There did not seem to be much knowledge about the Santiago principles in Kazakhstan. 
Sagindykovich, from Ministry of Finance, did not know about the Santiago principles, stating “this is 
the first time I hear about these principles. Maybe they are not formally named, but implemented in 
practice in the NFRK.” This is in accordance with the results from Kalyuzhnova (2011), who 
experienced that public officials, managers of the fund and even Kazakhstani analysts had not heard 




To understand why the Ministry of Finance was not aware of the Santiago Principles, the IFSWF was 
contacted. Kristian Flyvholm, the Deputy Secretary-General responded: 
Kazakhstan was not part of the IWG at the beginning of the process, when the Santiago 
Principles were crafted in 2008. However, it is important to note that the IWG was not a 
comprehensive group of all SWFs, so many countries were not represented. (Flyvholm) 
Flyvholm elaborates: “In terms of the National Fund of Kazakhstan, we would certainly welcome 
them as a member of the IFSWF. In fact, we have been in liaison with them in this regard in 2013,” 
further explaining that the NFRK are welcome to apply for membership.  
Research Question 3a: Awareness of Benefits of Transparency 
There are few written sources on the Kazakhstani government’s and state officials’ perceptions on 
importance of transparency. According to the Concept, the formation of the Fund is based on the 
principle of transparency. Transparency is by the decree defined as mandatory disclosure of 
approved indicators of the Fund, reports on the use of the Fund, and reports on the investment 
management of the Fund (Adilet, 2010).  
According to Sagindykovich, from Ministry of Finance, transparency is “absolutely essential” in the 
management of the NFRK.  
This conversation about transparency is a never ending one, it’s an internal conversation. 
When we are talking about transparency, we need to understand what level of detail there 
should be, so that there is no redundancy. We need also to be governed by the content, not by 
the form of transparency. (Sagindykovich) 
By this, it seems that the Ministry of Finance does not have a fixed view on how to achieve 
transparency in the NFRK, but that it is a continuous process. Sagindykovich further states: “the NFRK 
is sufficiently transparent. In principle, all relevant information is public, not being kept as a secret, 
but there is still work going on to improve transparency and regulations on the Fund.” However, the 
transparency of the Fund is not regarded as perfect, and Sagindykovich recognizes that there is still 
work to be done to make the general public more aware of the Fund and how it works: 
I guess that the public are aware of the Fund to a quite high extent. However, there is always 
room to move forward and improve, and some points can be reinforced. (…) An important 
question is whether the general mass is capable of understanding the given information and 
reports, reports that sometimes the accountants would not understand. Transparency is 
70 
 
important, not only from the supply of information, but also on the reception of this 
information, the recipient must understand this information. (Sagindykovich) 
When asking for a higher level of transparency in the management of NFRK, Khassan appears to be 
very aware of the benefits of transparency: 
Releasing more information, would give an opportunity to researchers, to investigate, and 
show the positive and negative sides of the policy, which is around this National Fund 
management. There could be this opportunity to have a dialogue between researchers, 
scientists, the general public and the government. This makes ties stronger, investments 
stronger and the overall policy on these issues stronger. And of course corruption! A 
transparent management would make less corruption, because of less opportunities to hide 
money. (Khassan) 
As to why the level and awareness of transparency in Kazakhstan is low, Sarsenov believes that “the 
development of transparency in the NFRK is a natural process. I think the government is quite 
comfortable the way it is now.” Malyarchuk points out that the awareness of transparency in 
Kazakhstan may as well be related to building an image, rather than seeing the true benefits of 
transparency: 
NFRK was created not transparent; I don’t see a reason to be transparent now. (…) If we 
speak about corruption and the anti-corruption activity of the government, I see that there is 
a desire to be transparent. I see the desire to promote anti-corruption values. (…) For our 
government, it is more a PR project, to be transparent. (Malyarchuk) 
6.2.2 Ethics 
Issues that should have been covered in this section, are awareness of benefits of ethics, ethical 
principles and ethical investment strategy, in accordance with the structure from chapter 6.1.2. 
However, the NFRK does not provide information on any of these issues. There is no clear statement 
confirming that the NFRK truly does, or does not, take ethical considerations in its investment 
decisions. When Sagindykovich at the Ministry of Finance was asked about this issue, he did not 
seem aware on the existence and benefits of ethical investment. Exclusion of tobacco companies was 
given to him as an example of ethical investment considerations, and he responded: “As I said 
before, the concept of management is very conservative. And we need to understand that these 
tobacco companies are very profitable, but they are also very risky and it’s not within the concept of 
our management” (Sagindykovich). 
71 
 
Thus, it appears that the Fund does not implement any ethical decisions in its investments. However, 
as the investment strategy of the Fund is conservative, there is a possibility that the Fund does not 
invest in what is typically considered as unethical companies and products. This is impossible to know 
for sure as long as an overview of companies the Fund holds is not available, and the Fund does not 






Since Samruk-Kazyna (the Fund) is a joint stock company, and not a traditional resource fund as the 
NFRK and NGPFG, one must expect different results when assessing the transparency of Samruk-
Kazyna. Not all the elements mentioned in the transparency framework will be relevant to analyse, 
and there are other elements not mentioned in the framework that might affect the transparency of 
Samruk-Kazyna.  
Research Question 1: Level of Transparency 
a) Governance and Legal Framework 
The webpage of Samruk-Kazyna clearly states the objective of the Fund (Samruk-Kazyna, 2014b): 
According to the Law, the main objectives of the Fund are as follows: 
1. contribution to sustainable development of the economy;  
2. contribute to the modernization and diversification of the economy,  
3. improve the performance of companies. 
The objective of the Fund is explained more thoroughly on the webpage. Samruk-Kazyna provides a 
large degree of transparency regarding its objective, which is strongly stated and well-defined in 
legislation and presidential decrees as well. 
Regarding the legal framework, Samruk-Kazyna is regulated by the law on joint-stock companies, 
which also concerns what information should be publicly disclosed: 
This Law defines the legal status, the establishment, operation, reorganization and liquidation 
of the company; rights and obligations of shareholders, as well as measures to protect their 
rights and interests; competence, order of formation and functioning of the company; powers 
and responsibilities of the procedure for electing its officers. (Adilet, 2003) 
The webpage of Samruk-Kazyna publishes most of the laws and presidential decrees relevant to the 
Fund. A presidential decree by October 13, 2008, only available in Russian or Kazakh, establishes the 
Fund. The relevant laws that are mentioned are also available on Adilet.  
The governance framework of the Fund is described in English on its webpage. The members of the 
board of directors are presented, with the CV of each member enclosed, which makes it possible to 
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assess the qualification of the members. An overview of the institutional structure of Samruk-Kazyna 
is provided in English. Further, the governance system of the Fund is explained: “The Fund evaluates 
corporate governance on three major components: structure, process and transparency” (Samruk-
Kazyna, 2014a), with further details to be found online.  
Another issue to consider, relating to the governance of Samruk-Kazyna, is that its management has, 
or has had, close relations to the government. As an example, the previous head of Samruk-Kazyna, 
Kulibaev, is the president’s son in law, which was also mentioned in chapter 3. Some of the 
interviewees, requesting to be anonymous when discussing the issue of family relations to the 
president, believe this affects transparency. They explain this as part of culture in Kazakhstan, that 
family relations in politics and business is common and often accepted, but not necessarily a good 
thing. 
Another governance-related issue of the Fund, mentioned by Nygmet Ibadildin, associate professor 
at KIMEP University, is that it “works as a parallel government, with a parallel budget. It creates 
another layer of bureaucrats for national companies.” He elaborates: “When Samruk-Kazyna controls 
the main Kazakhstani companies and their financial flows, they also control a large part of the 
economy, and in ways works like a government on its own,” and, “there is critique over its 
centralization of decisions, and overstaffing of directors” (Ibadildin).  
Hence, at first glance, the governance structure of Samruk-Kazyna may appear transparent, but there 
certainly are issues of its governance structure which decreases transparency. 
b) Inflows and Outflows 
As Samruk-Kazyna is a holding company with subsidiaries, the process of inflows and outflows of the 
Fund does not follow the same pattern as in traditional resource funds. The structure of this section 
therefore does not follow the more detailed structure of the analysis of NFRK and NGPFG. 
The government resolution from September 14, 2012, On approval of the Development Strategy of 
JSC National Welfare Fund Samruk-Kazyna, describes the development strategy of the Fund. This 
document is available on Adilet, but not in English. The development strategy describes the sources 
of funding to the holding companies of Samruk-Kazyna, which are (Adilet, 2012b): 
1) generated by the company's own funds;  
2) low investment and borrowing;  
3) borrowing from the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (…) 
4) market borrowing in the domestic and international capital markets; 
5) proceeds from the public offering of shares in companies (IPO/SPO);  
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6) intra-group financing.  
Further, “The Fund aims to provide financing for the investment program of the group of companies 
through the use of all sources of funding available to it, including its own funds, funds of the 
republican budget and the National Fund (…).”  
The Fund does not receive transfers from the national budget on a regular basis, but as shown above, 
the Fund occasionally may use sources of funding from the budget or NFRK. “Twice, money was 
transferred from the National Fund to Samruk-Kazyna, first in 2007 and second now in March 2014. 
Samruk-Kazyna was more an operator of these money” (Ibadildin). Further, the Fund might transfer 
money to its subsidiaries on certain occasions: “It depends upon the company and project. They 
finance projects in companies until the project has reached a certain financial stability according to 
its business plan” (Ibadildin). What is required for the Fund to transfer money to its subsidiaries, is 
not clearly stated. 
The Fund publishes its annual reports, consolidated financial statements (presenting aggregated 
financial information, including the subsidiaries, as one economic entity) and separate financial 
statements (presenting financial information of the Fund as parent company) on its webpage. These 
include statements of comprehensive income and cash flows. These reports provide a high level of 
transparency in regards of net profit, revenues, grants from the government, expenses broken down 
by type, and income such as profit from subsidiaries and interest income. The annual report also 
provides a short, financial summary of the Fund’s major subsidiaries. The separate report provides 
the relevant information on the Fund’s separate income and expenditures. 
Sarsenov believes that the reports present essential information, but that there are still “underwater 
flows which sometimes are not captured. Unfortunately, the government does not consider the Fund 
as a contingent liability to their fiscal accounts.” Sarsenov therefore points out that there may be 
transactions that are not as transparent as they should be. The IMF also calls for increased 
transparency in the Fund’s transactions and operations: 
Given the large presence and reach of its activities across many sectors of the economy, 
concerted efforts are required to properly account for SK’s financial operations, particularly 
including those involving the fiscal accounts (transfers of taxes and royalties to the budget, 
loans from the government, holding of government securities, treatment of contingent 
liabilities, foreign borrowing on behalf of public entities, etc.). (IMF, 2013) 
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Based on documents alone, it is not easy to assess the transparency of the general approach of 
inflows and outflows. Also, the transparency of the Fund is to a large degree dependent on the 
transparency of its subsidiaries. Understanding the process of inflows and outflows requires 
knowledge on how holding companies work, and Samruk-Kazyna does not provide information on 
this matter. As a reputable organisation such as the IMF asks for enhanced transparency, it clearly 
indicates that there are issues with transparency regarding what money flows into and out of the 
Fund. 
c) Investment Strategy 
As the Fund is a holding company that engages directly into the management of its subsidiaries and 
their projects, the description of its investment strategy is not expected to be of the same pattern as 
of the NFRK or the NGPFG. On their webpage, Samruk-Kazyna makes clear that it has three strategic 
areas to focus on (Samruk-Kazyna, 2014f): 
1. Increasing the long-term value of the companies 
2. Participation in diversification and modernization of the national economy 
3. Social responsibility 
The development strategy, described in the previous section, contains many pages, and describes the 
strategy both in a basic and a comprehensive manner: 
Investment activities of the Fund should promote their long-term value. For effective 
implementation of investments, projects will be given a clear financial discipline, based on 
market principles. In this case the key criteria the implementation of investment projects 
should act profitability and strategic importance for the country's development (…) The Fund 
intends to permanently carry out a detailed analysis of the new opportunities and priority 
sectors both in Kazakhstan and abroad. (Adilet, 2012b) 
The development strategy further contains a SWOT-analysis, and a description of strategic directions 
of development, such as how to improve long-term value, how to participate in the diversification of 
the economy, and sources and funding needs. Describing external asset managers and categories of 
investment is not relevant to the Fund. 
The risk management of the Fund is described both on its webpage and in its annual report, in 
English: 
The Management Board and the Board of Directors of the Fund are periodically informed 
about the risks situation (…) In 2009, to improve the effectiveness of the corporate risk 
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management and improve the risk communication with the subsidiaries of the Foundation 
Board it was created the Risk Management Council, which includes the representatives of the 
Fund and its subsidiaries. (Samruk-Kazyna, 2014c) 
The webpage further explain that risk management also involves managing the risks of its holding 
companies. Hence, the Fund is quite clear on the existence of a risk management system, and 
describes how it works. Descriptions are also provided in annual reports.  
The information available on Samruk-Kazyna’s investment strategies does appear to be transparent. 
There is detailed information regarding both the development strategy and the risk management, 
which is easily accessible. However, Dyveke Rogan at the EITI tells that the civil society of Kazakhstan 
request more transparency around the investment policies of Samruk-Kazyna. There is not a lot of 
clarity on what kind of companies the Fund wishes to hold, and on what basis the Fund buys shares 
in companies.  
d) Investment Portfolio 
Not all the companies the Fund holds are publicly traded, and it is therefore not possible to directly 
find the market value of the Fund, without using valuation methods for calculating the value of each 
company. Thus, there is no meaning to speak of the market value, and the balance sheet may 
provide a sufficient figure of the Fund’s size. The audited separate report of Samruk-Kazyna 
comprises the Fund’s separate balance sheet, which provides a line with the amount of investments 
in subsidiaries. This could be an indicator of the value of the companies the Fund holds. Values are 
set by fair value for annual periods beginning after January 2013. In the consolidated report, the 
consolidated book equity value of Samruk-Kazyna is provided.  
As to financial returns of the Fund, the annual reports provide information on the EBITDA margin 
(earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization as a share of total revenue) for 
Samruk-Kazyna, together with the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). These must be 
seen as the most relevant profitability/return measures of the Fund.  
A list of subsidiaries is provided on the webpage of Samruk-Kazyna. This list, not available in English, 
provides the name of the company and the industry sector. A pull-down menu enables one to choose 
information regarding net income, assets, operating profit, ROE, ROA, return on investment (ROI) 
and much more. However, the list is not complete – only 20 subsidiaries are listed. On page 20 it was 
told that the Fund holds over 400 companies.  
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The webpage also contains an overview of subsidiaries, with more detailed information of each 
company, such as history, key figures and company guidelines. As far as I have found, this overview is 
not complete either.  
Information on market value of holding in each company is not provided directly by Samruk-Kazyna, 
but exists for publicly traded companies on the website of Kazakhstan Stock Exchange, www.kase.kz. 
This requires that one knows which companies the Fund holds.  
Summarized, Samruk-Kazyna publishes relevant information regarding its investment portfolio. What 
is lacking, is an exhaustive list of all its subsidiaries.  
e) Ownership 
Samruk-Kazyna owns large shares in its subsidiaries, thus following a different ownership strategy 
than traditional resource funds, which normally owns smaller shares. The overall strategy of the Fund 
is more related to the management and governance of its subsidiaries, and the ownership strategy 
may therefore be associated with the development strategy which has been described. 
Research Question 2: How is Transparency Achieved? 
- Reports 
As a joint-stock company, Samruk-Kazyna is by law required to conduct annual financial statements. 
The Fund publishes all its reports, including audited reports, online. Quarterly reports are published 
now and then, but not every quarter. There are three different reports published: 
o The annual report, which presents general information regarding the Fund, its activities and 
projects, and relevant figures and facts about the Fund and its subsidiaries; 
o Consolidated financial statement, which contains aggregated financial information (which 
includes the subsidiaries), such as cash flow, balance sheet and comprehensive income 
statement, and the auditor’s report; 
o Separate financial statement, which includes the same type of information as the 
consolidated report, but not aggregated together with information from subsidiaries. 
Most of the reports are available in English. Samruk-Kazyna thoroughly describes its selection 
procedure of external auditors, and its auditing policies. The reporting of the Fund must be 





The Fund has its own webpage, www.sk.kz, which provides information regarding the Fund. The 
webpage is to a large extent used to provide relevant information, and most of the information 
analysed in this thesis regarding the Fund, is collected from its website. A large portion of the 
information is available in English as well.  
Samruk-Kazyna stands out as a good example of how useful a webpage may be, as it makes it easier 
to collect information and increases the reliability of information. In addition to the information 
reported in this thesis, the webpage also publishes project maps, information on procurement, and 
relevant news and speeches regarding the Fund and its subsidiaries. As the name suggests, 
Informational and analytical portal of SWF Samruk-Kazyna, the webpage works as a useful 
informational portal, even for international researchers and observers. The information published 
online covers a lot more than what is required in the transparency framework. 
Further, in addition to reports and the webpage, Samruk-Kazyna provides information to the press, 
which is published in different newspapers 
- Santiago Principles 
As explained on page 68 regarding the NFRK, the management of NFRK and the Ministry of Finance 
were not aware of the existence of the Santiago Principles. Therefore, it is interesting to discover 
that Samruk-Kazyna joined the IFSWF on February 11, 2014:  
We welcome JSC Samruk-Kazyna. The IFSWF Board notes the strong commitment of the 
management to corporate governance and the willingness to endorse the Santiago Principles 
on a voluntary basis. We look forward to collaborating with Umirzak Shukeyev (Chairman of 
the Management Board of JSC Samruk-Kazyna) and his team to meet our common objectives. 
(IFSWF, 2014) 
By becoming a member of the IFSWF, Samruk-Kazyna has accepted to implement the Santiago 
Principles. This will work as a good tool for the Fund to achieve and maintain transparency. 
By using both reports and its webpage as important sources of information, Samruk-Kazyna manages 
to make relevant information accessible for the public. 
Research Question 3a: Awareness of Benefits of Transparency 
On their webpage, Samruk-Kazyna makes it clear that transparency is of importance to the Fund: 
“Samruk-Kazyna will rely on the following key principles: (…) 2. transparency, efficiency and flexibility 
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of Samruk-Kazyna and Companies; (…) 4. commitment and accountability” (Samruk-Kazyna, 2014d). 
The role of transparency is also emphasized in their business ethics code of the Fund:  
The relationship with the Sole Shareholder shall be based on the principles of transparency, 
accountability and responsibility in compliance with the Legislation of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan (…) and internal documents of the Fund 
(…) 
The Fund shall interact with business partners on the basis of mutual advantage principles, 
transparency and full responsibility for obligations undertaken in accordance with contract 
terms based on legitimateness, honesty and efficiency. (Samruk-Kazyna, 2010). 
Even though Samruk-Kazyna show awareness on the importance of transparency, the IMF has 
commented this issue, arguing that “the systemic nature of SK requires enhanced transparency of its 
operations” (IMF, 2013).  
6.3.2 Ethics 
Research Question 3b: Awareness of Benefits of Ethics 
As a joint-stock company, with large holdings in many Kazakhstani companies, Samruk-Kazyna is 
better suited to engage in corporate social responsibility rather than directly in SRI activities. Samruk-
Kazyna involves itself in the corporate governance of its holdings, and with a larger ownership share 
in each company than a traditional resource fund would have, the Fund is better equipped to have a 
major impact on how its subsidiaries engage in CSR.  
In fact, Samruk-Kazyna does claim to engage in CSR: “Social responsibility is one of the strategic 
directions of the development of the Fund” (Samruk-Kazyna, 2012). The Fund has also published a 
business ethics code, which provides some information on what ethical considerations the Fund 
makes: “Our Business Ethics Code sets standards for each of the Holding and is compulsory for all, 
without exception. All the employees and officials of the Fund are responsible for complying with its 
requirements” (Samruk-Kazyna, 2010, p. 3).  
Samruk-Kazyna does not provide extensive information on why it engages in CSR, and it is therefore 
difficult to assess whether or not it is well aware of the benefits of ethical conduct: 
Our national management holding – (…) Samruk Kazyna (…) will not be able to grow and 
develop without the trust from the Government, business partners, employees, and at a 
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higher level - without the trust of the society as a whole, the part of which we are. (Samruk-
Kazyna, 2010, p. 3) 
The scope of activities of JSC "Samruk-Kazyna" and the organisations included in the group of 
"Samruk-Kazyna", are of strategic importance for the development of the entire economy, 
and affect the interests of many people. (…) In this regard, the company strives to ensure 
sustainable development of its business, paying attention not only economic but also social 
aspects. (Samruk-Kazyna, 2014b) 
Research Question 4a: Ethical Principles 
a) Environmental Sustainability 
Samruk-Kazyna considers environmental protection in its business ethics code (Samruk-Kazyna, 
2010): 
2.6.5. The Fund shall support the initiatives on ecology and environment protection. (…) 
4.5.1. The Fund shall comply with (…) environmental protection stipulated by the current 
legislation in this sphere. (…) 
4.5.3. The Fund shall follow the principles of environmental protection itself and stimulate 
other companies to introduce energy-saving technologies, non-waste industry, and waste 
recycling.  
It appears that the Fund specifically considers energy-saving and waste-issues. This is also 
emphasized by the Fund’s development strategy, which requires its subsidiaries to minimise the 
impact of their operations on the environment, and prevent accidents that damage environment, in 
addition to having energy efficiency and alternative energy sources as key principles. (Adilet, 2012b) 
As to why the Fund considers environmental protection, it reasons:  
The economic activity of the group of companies of the Fund (…) affects the interests of 
millions of people. The environmental impact exerted by a group of companies of the Fund in 
carrying out its activities, determines its responsibility to society.  (Samruk-Kazyna, 2012, p. 
42) 
Hence, the Fund is clearly concerned with environmental issues, but it does not provide much detail 
on what issues are of importance, and why they are relevant for the Fund to consider. 
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b) Social Responsibility 
Social issues seem to be a greater concern to the Fund, compared to environmental sustainability. 
According to the business ethics code, the Fund considers the following social issues: 
- provide compliance and respect of human rights; 
- not to discriminate on race, religion, nationality, sex, age, political and other criteria; 
recruitment and promotion is carried out exclusively on the basis of compliance with 
qualification requirements, taking into account the professional skills, knowledge and skills; 
- support programs aimed at the development of physical culture and sports, education, 
culture (…) 
Some of the projects of the Fund are “aimed at improving the image of the Fund and/or 
organisations.” As to sports, the main areas focused on by the Fund, are development of sports, 
sporting events and construction of sports facilities and infrastructure (Samruk-Kazyna, 2014e).  
Hence, the Fund clearly emphasizes social considerations, but it does not provide specific 
information on what those considerations are.  
Research Question 4b: Ethical Investment Strategies 
This section will describe how the Fund implements the ethical issues it has stated to consider. It 
must be noted that as the Fund does not engage directly in SRI, but rather in CSR, it cannot directly 
implement the strategies provided in chapter 4.3.3. The Fund does give some indication on how it 
implements its social and environmental principles, but it is not given in detail. If the Fund applies 
negative or positive screening of its current or potential subsidiaries, is not known, and the strategies 
described below are best suited to describe as active ownership via its business ethics code. 
- Active ownership 
The business ethics code states how the code should be followed (Samruk-Kazyna, 2010): 
2.4.2. Companies shall adopt their own ethics codes, taking into account their particularities 
of business conduct, but not contradicting to the basic principles of business ethics set forth in 
this Code 
(…) 
4.7.3. Relevant employees of the Fund should react on the problems connected with violation 
of the requirements of business ethics (…)  
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Further, an ombudsman is appointed to ensure compliance with the Fund’s business ethics code. The 
ombudsman has the right to “initiate procedures revealing the violation” of the code, and “give 
employees and officials the explanations and interpretations of code’s provisions.” He or she has the 
duty to keep records of complaints provided on non-compliance with the code (Samruk-Kazyna, 
2010).  
As mentioned, some of the social issues the Fund is engaged in, is social projects and sports. This is 
implemented by providing sponsorship and charitable assistance to projects. On what grounds 
charity and sponsorship is given, is not explained thoroughly. 
The development strategy establishes some ways on how the Fund implements its environmental 
considerations. The Fund shall: 
o collect and evaluate information concerning activities’ impact on the environment; 
o set measurable targets for improving environmental performance and resource 
management; 
o monitor and verify progress towards goals of environmental protection. 




Chapter 7: Discussion and Comparison 
This chapter discusses and compares the most relevant findings in accordance with the structure 
from chapter 6, to answer the research questions systematically. Based on the theory and ideas 
presented in this thesis, this chapter also discusses how transparency and ethics affect the funds’ 
abilities to contribute to avoiding the resource curse. 
7.1 Comparison of Transparency and Ethical Principles 
Research Question 1: Level of Transparency 
Figure 4 below summarizes the findings on the transparency level of the three funds. Some of these 
elements will be further discussed and compared. 
Figure 4: Comparison of transparency level 
Element NGPFG NFRK 
Samruk-
Kazyna 
Clearly stated objective Yes Yes* Yes 
Governance framework Yes Yes* Yes 
Resolution, laws and regulations Yes Yes* Yes 
Source of funding Yes Yes* Yes* 
Amount of funding Yes Yes n/a 
Investment income Yes Partially Yes 
Withdrawal approach Yes Yes* n/a 
Amount of withdrawal Yes Yes n/a 
Expenditures Yes Partially Yes 
Investment strategy Yes No Yes 
External asset managers Yes No n/a 
Categories of investment Yes Partially n/a 
Risk management Yes No Yes 
Size of the fund Yes Yes Partially 
Information on return Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic location of investments Yes No n/a 
Companies/indexes in which the fund holds assets Yes No Partially 
Market value of holding in each company Yes No Partially 
Voting records Yes No No 
Ownership strategy Yes No Yes 
* not available in English 




a) Governance and Legal Framework 
All funds have clear objectives stated in respective legislations, which contribute in creating 
confidence and holding the management accountable. As a joint-stock company, Samruk-Kazyna 
faces strict requirements, also regarding disclosure of information, by Kazakhstani law. Such 
requirements do not exist for the NFRK, which is only held as a government account. Samruk-Kazyna 
and the NGPFG both present the relevant legal framework on their webpage, making it easily 
accessible for the public. This is not the matter with NFRK, where legislation is only available on 
Adilet. This is a disadvantage, as the interested public must puzzle together the relevant pieces 
themselves, thus making it more difficult for the public to judge whether legislation is truly followed. 
As pointed out on page 16-17, Kazakhstan is autocratic, with power centralized to the president and 
his family. This issue is reflected in the management of both NFRK and Samruk-Kazyna, as both are 
based on presidential decrees, assigning a significant amount of power to the president. The 
president’s power in NFRK harms the credibility of the fund, as the public’s trust in the fund depends 
strongly on their trust in the president. There are currently no reasons to believe that the president 
would use his power to directly affect the operation of the fund. However, the risk of the president 
using his control of the legal system to only introduce transparency in areas required by foreign 
pressure, as argued on page 18, clearly exists regarding the NFRK. In comparison, the legislation of 
NGPFG appears more solid and credible, as it is approved by Parliament and not dominated by any 
single person.  
Further, Samruk-Kazyna risks to appear less transparent than the other two funds due to the 
management’s close relationship with the government, which was especially the case when the 
president’s son in law was the manager of the fund. This may turn out to harm the credibility of the 
fund, making it difficult for the public to know on what ground decisions are made, and if the fund in 
reality places more concern on current politics than on running an efficient fund. 
These are elements not directly captured by the transparency framework, which lower the 
transparency of the Kazakhstani funds compared to the Norwegian one. 
b) Inflows and Outflows 
By legislation, all funds have to some extent stated how funding and withdrawals are made. As 
referred to by Bauer (2014) on page 28, such transparent rules work committing, as the funds have a 
public obligation on how to deposit and withdraw funds. As a joint-stock company, Samruk-Kazyna 
does not follow the same pattern as the other two funds, and its process of funding and withdrawal 
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appears more complex. It is not easy for the public to comprehend on what grounds Samruk-Kazyna 
finances projects or transfers money to companies. 
On page 28 it was argued why transfers should go via the national budget. The NGPFG is the only 
fund doing this completely. NFRK makes guaranteed transfers via the budget, which is publicly 
available, but it may transfer funds to Samruk-Kazyna or others via targeted transfers, sometimes off 
budget. This points to the same issue mentioned by Karl (2007) on page 20, that the NFRK risks being 
a parallel budget without control. Hence, some of the transfers of NFRK also end up being less 
transparent, as was the case of the USD 10 billion that the Kazakhstani president claimed went to 
nowhere, which was explained on page 64-65. That case shows that there clearly is a need for the 
NFRK and Samruk-Kazyna to clarify how money from targeted transfers are spent. The plans on 
publishing reports regarding the return, as mentioned on page 64, are wise, but have not yet been 
put to life.  
Further, as was argued by Ibadildin on page 73, Samruk-Kazyna works as a parallel budget to the 
national budget, thus creating a separate budget decreasing transparency, which also makes it less 
clear which transfers the government should be held accountable for. Both NFRK and Samruk-Kazyna 
should make clarify on what grounds transfers are made, and Samruk-Kazyna should be held more 
accountable for what happens to funds received by NFRK and what their payoff is. The connection 
between Samruk-Kazyna and NFRK should lead to increased transparency, and not the other way 
around.  
The NGPFG appears most transparent regarding inflows and outflows. The Norwegian fiscal rule 
enhances predictability and has been followed by all governments since its implementations. 
However, as the rule is not established by law, there exists a risk that future governments will not 
follow the fiscal rule. This limits the strength and true predictability of the rule, which will only work 
as long as there is democratic stability and political consensus on the application of the rule. The 
rules of the NFRK keep changing and are less predictable, decreasing its transparency and control. 
However, as explained on page 64, Kazakhstan might be in need of changing its rules, and achieving a 
transparent fund must not be at the expense of having an efficient fiscal framework, which to some 
degree justifies the change of rules. Norway has a more stable political environment, enabling to 
keep its rules fixed.  
Overall, the NGPFG clearly has the most transparent withdrawal approach, as it specifies how 
withdrawals are made, where they go and the amount of the transfer, and is clarified in legislation 
and policy documents, as required by Bauer (2014) on page 27. The targeted transfers of NFRK make 
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withdrawals less transparent and predictable, while the withdrawal approach of Samruk-Kazyna is 
quite diffuse.  
Further, the NGPFG and Samruk-Kazyna break their investment income and expenditures down by 
type, while the NFRK only provides the total amount of investment income and expenditure. Lack of 
detailed information on this element makes it difficult for the public and external analysts to consider 
if the NFRK is efficiently managed. 
c) Investment Strategy 
As the NFRK does not reveal anything on its investment strategy, other than that it is conservative, it 
has a low level of transparency in this category. However, Samruk-Kazyna presents its development 
strategy and also its risk management, so there clearly exists a perception in Kazakhstan that 
information on risk management and investment strategy is interesting to the public. When looking 
at Samruk-Kazyna, it appears strange that the NFRK does not publish as much information. 
The NGPFG thoroughly describes its investment strategy and risk management, which works in 
guiding and protecting its investment managers. What really distinguishes the NGPFG from both of 
the other two funds, is that it explains why the strategies are chosen. This adds an extra dimension of 
transparency, enhancing the public’s ability to understand the given information. Samruk-Kazyna and 
NGPFG are better able to guide and protect their investment managers than NFRK, as their strategies 
are clear and public, thus acting committing.  
Both NFRK and NGPFG informs what their categories of investment are, but this information is quite 
difficult to obtain from NFRK, as it is hidden in the annual report of the National Bank. NGPFG makes 
it more clear, and explains why these categories are chosen. 
d) Investment Portfolio 
The NGPFG clearly stands out as highly transparent in this category. While the Norwegian fund 
provides an interactive map of subsidiaries, continuously updates its portfolio size, provides details 
on return, and makes all these elements easily accessible on its webpage, the NFRK has spread this 
information more around. NFRK’s information on these matters is not updated as often, and 
information on return is well hid in the National Bank’s annual report, making it more difficult for 
outsiders to identify poor investments. The NGPFG even explains how returns are calculated, making 
it possible for external observers to understand and assess the method. The NFRK does not give any 
such information.  
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Further, what mostly harms the transparency of NFRK in this category, is that it does not reveal 
which companies or bonds it has invested in, at all. It is impossible for the public to gain knowledge 
on what the wealth of the country has been invested into, and if these are profitable, wise 
investments. The NFRK is claimed to belong to the people, saving for future generations, but lack of 
information regarding its investment portfolio may decrease the public’s trust to the fund and their 
feeling of the fund belonging to Kazakhstan.  
Samruk-Kazyna does not publish information that is directly comparable to the other two funds, but 
does clearly appear more transparent than NFRK regarding its portfolio. It publishes some of the 
companies it has invested in, and the annual report describes the profitability of some of its 
investments. Both NGPFG and Samruk-Kazyna gathers all portfolio related information in one place, 
while NFRK both spreads and lacks information. 
e) Ownership 
While the NFRK does not provide any information on its ownership strategies and activities, the 
NGPFG publishes most of the relevant information, as shown in chapter 6. NFRK’s lack of information 
on this topic makes it difficult to assess what influence the fund has on the companies it has invested 
in, and whether or not the fund uses its positions as an owner on achieving political goals. For 
Samruk-Kazyna, active ownership is its main activity, described both in the development strategy, 
and by news and press releases published online.  
Other Relevant Information 
As shown on page 67, there does not seem to be a perception in Kazakhstan that the NFRK is 
affected by corruption or rent-seeking. Neither Sarsenov or Azhgaliyeva believed that the 
government or the NFRK tries to hide anything, but both Khassan and Sarsenov point out that there 
is a problem with the accuracy and consistency of information on the NFRK. None of the respondents 
had strong perceptions on whether rent-seeking and corruption are issues in Samruk-Kazyna, and it is 
difficult to assess from this thesis. As top-level corruption is a problem in Kazakhstan, there is always 
a risk that corruption and rent-seeking also take place in the management of the funds. The lack of 
some credible and accurate information on certain elements of the funds enhances these risks.  
During the research, there has not appeared to be any problem of rent-seeking and corruption in the 
NGPFG. Overall, there is no reason to believe that rent-seeking and corruption are problems in any of 
the funds, but the risk is definitely greater in the Kazakhstani funds.  
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Overall, the Norwegian fund appears to have a higher transparency level than the two Kazakhstani 
funds. This is in accordance with findings of Truman’s scoreboard (Truman, 2010), which gives the 
NGPFG a total score of 97 out of 100, while the NFRK receives 65. However, the SWF Institute (2013) 
scores the NGPFG 10 out of 10 in its Linaburg-Maduell transparency index, while NFRK scores 8. 
Thus, it seems that the Linaburg-Maduell index gives the NFRK a quite high score, which contradicts 
my findings and discussion so far. This may be because the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index is 
more superficial than Truman’s scoreboard or the transparency framework suggested in this thesis, 
and does not measure all elements or consider them in detail. There are no known measures on the 
transparency of Samruk-Kazyna.  
Research Question 2: How is Transparency Achieved? 
The NFRK does not publish audited, annual reports, while the other two funds do. Both Samruk-
Kazyna and NGPFG uses their reports to publish general information as well, and manage to set 
public expectations in their reports and provide information on the investment strategy and 
portfolio. The NFRK is audited, but as these reports are not published, it harms the credibility of the 
fund, and it is difficult for the public to know if the fund’s resources are used in a good manner. By 
not publishing the audited reports, the NFRK misses a strong tool for guidance and control of its 
information. The published reports of the NFRK provide no information on its investment strategy, 
and little on its portfolio.   
Both Norway and Kazakhstan are compliant members of the EITI. By publishing the EITI reports, both 
countries are able to increase their transparency and level of credibility. The usefulness of these 
reports will increase when future reports will account for where money flows after received by 
government, thus facing some of the criticism by Kolstad and Wiig (2009) presented on page 30. In a 
country such as Kazakhstan, where the trust to the politicians and the government is not considered 
very high, this supplement must be regarded as useful. The development of the reports also make it 
more suitable for the public to make use of the information that EITI provides, as it will enable asking 
questions about the distribution of resource revenues. As the reports work today, the detail level is 
not high enough to create involvement regarding the funds on their own.  
Also, Samruk-Kazyna and NGPFG both have their own websites, where most of the relevant 
information exists. The NGPFG website appears as the most informative, as all information in 
available in English, and presented in a clear manner, making it a useful portal for everyone who 
wants to learn more about the fund. The lack of a webpage must be seen as a drawback to the 
transparency of the NFRK. If all relevant information regarding the fund was collected in one 
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webpage, it would increase the accuracy of information, making it more reliable and easier to collect 
for different groups of the public, also outside Kazakhstan.  
However, it must be noted that in Norway it works well to publish all relevant information online, 
while this is not sufficient for Kazakhstan. Even if the NFRK does create its own website, it should not 
rely on the website as the only channel of information. While most of the Norwegian population is 
used with finding information online, this is not the case for Kazakhstan, especially in rural areas, 
where newspapers are more often used for acquiring information. Even though Truman (2008a) on 
page 30 argued that interviews in the press is not a sufficient channel of information, this channel 
may work more appropriately in Kazakhstan than in Norway. Both Samruk-Kazyna and NFRK should 
therefore publish information via other channels as well, such as the press, to reach out to a larger 
part of the public. 
Both the NGPFG and Samruk-Kazyna are members of IFSWF, and have agreed to implement the 
Santiago Principles. Therefore they face an incentive of providing key information. However, the 
NFRK is not a member, and claim to not being aware of the existence of the Santiago Principles, even 
though the information is easily available. It appears remarkable that the Ministry of Finance and 
NFRK are not aware of the principles, while Samruk-Kazyna has recently joined the IFSWF. It is 
certainly recommended that the NFRK at least acquire knowledge on the existing principles.  
As pointed out on page 30, sensitive data regarding the resource funds should not be published. The 
NGPFG seems aware of this, and still publishes more comprehensive information online and in 
annual reports than the NFRK. As the NGPFG is a large fund, this points out that the NFRK also has a 
potential of publishing more information, without harming its performance. 
Hence, Samruk-Kazyna and NGPFG have clearly managed to institutionalize transparency, as required 
by Bauer (2014) on page 29, by publishing audited reports, having comprehensive websites and 
implementing the Santiago Principles. By publishing white papers and other policy documents, the 
Norwegian fund has institutionalized its transparency to an even larger extent than Samruk-Kazyna. 
On page 25-26 it was pointed out by Truman (2008b) which groups have an interest in how funds are 
managed, and Samruk-Kazyna and the NGPFG are better than the NFRK at providing information to 
these groups, by using extensive reports and the internet. The NFRK only manages to provide 
sufficient information to the government itself, while Samruk-Kazyna and especially the NGPFG reach 
out to citizens, financial-market participants and citizens and authorities in the countries in which 
they invest.  
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Research Question 3a: Awareness of Benefits of Transparency 
All funds have stated the importance of transparency in their legislation or in other publicly available 
documents, thus committing to transparency. However, the degree of transparency in NFRK is not 
very high, even though Sagindykovich has claimed it to be sufficient. This does not seem to be the 
case, and one may question if the Kazakhstani government and the NFRK truly acknowledges the 
importance of transparency. As Sagindykovich also explained on page 69, transparency is affected by 
the public’s ability to understand, but there does not seem to be any attempt in the management of 
NFRK to make information comprehensible to the public. Compared to NFRK, both Samruk-Kazyna 
and NGPFG appear more transparent, thus implementing the importance of what is stated by 
legislation.  
Based on the interviews conducted, it also appears that the Kazakhstani society does not consider 
neither NFRK nor Samruk-Kazyna to be particularly transparent, and some are asking for more 
accurate information regarding both funds. It also seems like the society is aware that it is a long 
process to develop transparency, and interviewees claim that there seems to be a will from the 
government of increasing transparency, but difficulties of implementing it. None of the organisations 
that were interviewed were working on increasing transparency in NFRK or Samruk-Kazyna, and one 
might ask, if this indicates a societal acceptance of the low transparency level in Kazakhstan? If so, 
increasing the transparency level of Samruk-Kazyna, and especially the NFRK, might take longer time, 
as few are demanding the transparency to increase.  
Compared to Kazakhstan, the awareness of the importance of transparency appears higher in 
Norway. One of the objectives of transparency in NGPFG, is creating confidence and support to the 
fund with the public. Based on available documents, the confidence to the Norwegian fund appears 
to be much stronger than the confidence to the Kazakhstani fund, and the awareness on importance 
of transparency has probably contributed in making the Norwegian fund into one of the most 
transparent sovereign wealth funds.   
Research Question 3b: Awareness of Benefits of Ethics 
As far as found in chapter 6, the NFRK does not consider ethical investment practices at all, and the 
Kazakhstani Ministry of Finance and the NFRK do not appear to be aware on possible benefits of 
ethical conduct. 
However, both Samruk-Kazyna and the NGPFG consider ethical issues. Samruk-Kazyna establish their 
CSR practice on both value-based and economic reasons, as does the NGPFG in their ethical 
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investment practice. When comparing against the arguments for ethical investment provided in 
chapter 2.2.3 and 4.3, one may recognize that the NGPFG shares several of the arguments:  
- The fund is broadly invested in the global economy, and should therefore be concerned with 
the performance of the overall economy; 
- Sustainable economic development and growth enhances long-term returns; 
- Companies that place negative externalities on society harm other companies, and thus harm 
the return of the investor 
The NGPFG does not seem to relate ethical investment to the fact that it contributes to a future, 
liveable world, as argued on page 8-9. However, the arguments of a future, liveable world may be 
considered among the NGPFG’s value-based reasons for its ethical conduct. As the Norwegian fund 
acknowledges both economic-based and value-based reasons for ethical investment, it applies the 
definition of SRI rather than Kiernan’s more narrow definition of sustainable investment (see page 7).  
Samruk-Kazyna does not provide as comprehensive motivation and reasoning as the Norwegian 
fund, and one may ask if Samruk-Kazyna is truly aware of the benefits of ethics. Samruk-Kazyna 
claims that their social responsibility conduct is based on the trust of society and the need for 
sustainable development, but without specifying this any further. 
It seems that the NGPFG is very well aware of the benefits of ethical conduct. This increases the 
credibility of the NGPFG’s ethical conduct, as it appears to be a deliberate decision, while Samruk-
Kazyna’s CSR practice may appear to have been implemented only because it is expected by society. 
The NFRK and Samruk-Kazyna might take a look at Norway, and learn from Norway’s knowledge, and 
how knowledge is implemented into practice.  
Research Question 4a: Ethical Principles 
Both Samruk-Kazyna and the NGPFG focus on environmental issues in their ethical conduct. Samruk-
Kazyna considers energy saving, waste issues and environmental protection, while the NGPFG 
considers environmental damage, climate change, deforestation and water management. Hence, the 
NGPFG is more precise on what issues it considers. Further, Samruk-Kazyna mainly bases 
environmental considerations on non-economic reasons, claiming it is their responsibility, while the 
NGPFG is more concerned with sustainability and its connection to long-term return. The NGPFG 
provides details on how it considers the environmental issues, while Samruk-Kazyna does not. Hence, 
it is impossible to assess whether Samruk-Kazyna truly engages in these issues.  
Social responsibility is also a concern for both funds, and both consider human rights. Samruk-Kazyna 
does not explain what they mean by human rights, while the NGPFG refers to international policies, 
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and is specifically concerned with children’s rights. The NGPFG also considers social issues by 
excluding certain products, such as tobacco and types of weapons, while Samruk-Kazyna has not 
informed on any such restrictions. In its consideration of social issues, Samruk-Kazyna seems more 
concerned with national events, such as sports and social projects. The NGPFG is more concerned 
with issues relevant worldwide. This difference is to be expected, as Samruk-Kazyna only invests in 
Kazakhstani companies, and thus is directly dependent on national issues, while the NGPFG invests 
worldwide, thus more dependent on global issues.  
Research Question 4b: Instruments for Ethical Conduct 
The NGPFG is more specific on what instruments it uses for ethical conducts, and one recognizes 
several of the strategies mentioned in chapter 4. As Samruk-Kazyna engages in CSR and not ethical 
investment directly, it is not possible to compare it directly against those strategies. Samruk-Kazyna 
engages in sponsorship, evaluation, performance targets and monitoring, but does not specify how 
these work.  
As the NGPFG engages in excluding companies from its investment universe, it faces the issue of 
turning the fund into a political instrument, as argued in the findings on page 60. On page 33, 
Truman (2010) and Sethi (2005) argued that such funds should only be used to achieve economic 
objectives. However, the NGPFG is doing exactly that – using ethical principles to achieve a high, 
sustainable return. Not all of its principles are set on the basis of economic reasons alone, some are 
just considered as necessary and required by the society. This thesis does not seek to speculate in the 
difference between ethics and politics, but it must be seen as a relevant argument that a fund, which 
shall support the wealth of current and future generations, should act in accordance with the basic 
values of these generations. Certain ethical considerations, such as human rights, are so fundamental 
that violating them would diminish the public’s trust in the fund. A sovereign wealth fund considering 
ethics should be aware of the danger of becoming political, and make sure to base decisions on 
thorough evidence. If the fund turns into a political instrument, it may lose its credibility and face 
problems on the international market, decreasing its ability to face the curse. Samruk-Kazyna does 
not face the same risk, as it only invests domestically, and conducts ethical considerations through 
management and governance, not through exclusion.  
Based on this, one cannot recommend the NFRK do engage in ethical investment, without assessing 
whether the management of the NFRK is able to do so without political influence. Ethical conduct 
requires the institutional quality of the fund to be of such level that the fund does not risk meeting 
political pressure, forcing the fund to make investments that are rather political than ethical, not 
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enhancing long-term return. In the assessment of NFRK’s transparency, it appears that the NFRK is in 
danger of facing political pressure, due to the president’s substantial power. Hence, maybe it is wise 
for the NFRK to stay out of ethical investment – for now?  
7.2 Avoiding the Curse? 
As this thesis suggests, transparency and ethics work as tools for improving fund performance and 
thus contribute to avoiding the resource curse. Figure 3 suggested that fund performance could be 
measured by three elements: profitability, sustainability and stability. 
Profitability 
An element of the resource curse which may affect profitability is rent-seeking and corruption. It has 
been argued how transparency may reduce such behaviour, and as the NGPFG is the most 
transparent fund, it is in a better position to achieve profitability. During the research, there has been 
no reason to believe that the Kazakhstani funds today experience rent-seeking and corruption. 
However, with the great power of the president in the country, and close ties between politicians, 
family and management of the funds, the risk of rent-seeking and corruption is greater in 
Kazakhstan. Actually, according to Tsalik (2003), critics claim that the NFRK is an attempt of the 
president to sanitize tainted money. Shortly after US authorities started investigating payments 
made by American James Giffen to Swiss bank accounts that were linked to senior Kazakh officials, 
the NFRK was established and money were transferred from the Swiss accounts to the NFRK. 
Accordingly, these payments were initially made to seal some oil deals, and were perceived as 
bribery (Tsalik, 2003). If bribery was among the reasons of establishing the NFRK, there clearly exists 
a risk that bribery, corruption and rent-seeking may affect the fund today as well. Lack of 
transparency and audited confirmations of inflows and outflows make it easier to use the money in 
the fund for corruption and rent-seeking, or to hide money from such activities in the fund. Little 
information on the investment strategy and portfolio contributes to this risk, as the public may not 
check if money are invested as intended, and what assets they are invested into. Thus, there is a risk 
that the NFRK invests into assets that are truly not most profitable to the fund, but are rather used to 
finance bribery or the president’s own, private interests. Overall, lack of information in the different 
categories of our transparency framework means that leaders do not have an incentive to be honest 
and provide accurate information, which in turn may decrease profitability. 
The risk that lack of transparency facilitates corruption or rent-seeking in Samruk-Kazyna is also 
present. Some have argued that Samruk-Kazyna is just an instrument used by the president to 
94 
 
promote his own interests (Goodley, 2010), and thus the lack of transparency on some elements of 
the fund’s governance facilitates the fund being used to achieve the personal interests of the 
president. Complex mechanisms of inflows and outflows, and unclear investment policies, contribute 
to the risk of Samruk-Kazyna promoting the president’s own interests, rather than being optimally 
profitable and achieving its stated objectives.  
As to the NGPFG, its governance framework works in a transparent manner, thus not facilitating rent-
seeking or corruption. Transparency on inflows and outflows, investment strategy, portfolio and 
ownership contribute in making it difficult for fund managers or government officials to use money 
from the fund to promote their own interests in ways that are overall less profitable. Further, the 
NGPFG’s clear strategy and information on holdings and return make sure that external analysts and 
experts are able to provide economic analyses and give advice, ensuring that the NGPFG makes well-
informed and wiser decisions, which in turn promotes profitability. The fund actually maintains a low 
level of management costs (Holden, 2013; NBIM, 2014b), which is probably facilitated by its high 
level of transparency – as income and costs are transparent, fund managers are held more 
accountable for the fund’s cost level, encouraging managers to keep costs down.  
Further, ethical investment may also affect profitability. Many studies show that ethical investment 
provides better returns, but as explained in chapter 2, some research show the opposite, or that 
ethical investment has no impact on return. There is clearly a need for more research to be done on 
this area before concluding, and research should focus on longer time scales than previous studies, 
to assess the effect for sovereign wealth funds, as they operate with longer terms than traditional 
funds. If ethical investment provides better returns than traditional investment practices, the NGPFG 
is better equipped to achieve profitability than the NFRK.  
The NGPFG has had an average annual return of 5.7% since its inception (NBIM, 2014e), while the 
NFRK’s average return has been 4.5% (National Bank of Kazakhstan, 2013), indicating that the NGPFG 
is more profitable than the NFRK. However, it is difficult to simply compare the return of the two 
funds and assess which of them are most profitable, and thus make assumptions on whether or not 
transparency and ethics truly have an impact on their profitability. They have different investment 
strategies, and NFRK follows a more conservative strategy, indicating that the NFRK aims for lower 
risk than the NGPFG, which in turn decreases the expected return. Both funds achieve returns in 
accordance with their benchmark. As Samruk-Kazyna is a joint-stock company, measuring and 






A sustainable fund will help avoiding the unsustainable investment element of the resource curse, 
and is also linked to profitability, as sustainable funds are profitable also on longer terms. A fund 
practicing ethical investment optimally is better at investing in sustainable companies and activities, 
has a clearer picture of true risks and opportunities, avoids investments which harm future 
generations, and make investments which benefit the economy as a whole.  
Both the NFRK and NGPFG function as funds saving for future generations, and invest globally. 
Therefore, both are directly affected by incidents that affect the global economy, and are harmed by 
companies which profit on placing negative externalities on the economy. The NGPFG takes this into 
account by its ethical conduct, and is therefore likely better equipped to achieve a sustainable fund 
performance. The Norwegian fund seeks to avoid unsustainable investments, and is well aware that 
its long term perspective requires such considerations. In 2013, the total number of companies 
excluded from the NGPFG’s investment universe was 60, and 14 of these were due to severe 
environmental damage, where 10 of those cases also regarded human rights (Council on Ethics, 
2014a). By excluding such companies, the NGPFG avoids some investments that in the future may 
perform badly itself, or cause other companies to perform worse, due to environmental damage or 
social issues. The holdings of the NGPFG are therefore in better accordance with environmental 
sustainability and social responsibility.  
As far as this thesis has found, the NFRK does not consider such elements, and there is a risk that the 
NFRK invests in companies the NGPFG has excluded. The NGPFG is therefore likely to achieve better 
sustainability in the long-term than the NFRK. Further, the NGPFG engages in active ownership, thus 
facilitating sustainability via environmental sustainability and social responsibility. In 2013, the 
NGPFG considered and voted on 239 shareholder proposals on environmental and social issues. The 
fund’s active ownership in accordance with its ethical principles improves the fund’s knowledge and 
provides it with a clearer picture of its risks, which in turn makes it able to improve its long-term 
return and sustainability, and thus outperform the NFRK in the long run. The NFRK claims to have a 
conservative investment strategy, but by not considering ethical principles, it is in danger of facing 
higher and unexpected risks in the long run, harming the sustainability of its investments. The 




Samruk-Kazyna seeks to improve the welfare of Kazakhstan, and it is therefore in the fund’s interest 
to lay a basis for sustainable development, and avoid investments that harm the welfare of the 
Kazakhstani public. By engaging in CSR, Samruk-Kazyna facilitates its opportunities for achieving 
welfare and sustainability, but as there is little information available on whether the fund truly does 
follow its principles or not, it is difficult to assess its true ability of achieving sustainability. 
Stability 
Stabilising the impact volatile oil revenues have on the exchange rate and public expenditure is an 
important objective of both NFRK and NGPFG. Stability is related to the Dutch disease, overspending 
and volatility elements of the resource curse, and transparency may improve the funds’ abilities to 
face these elements. Particularly, transparency of the governance and legal framework and the 
inflows and outflows are of importance. A transparent governance and legal framework clarifies who 
is responsible for establishing and implementing the rules of the stabilisation fund, making those 
responsible truly follow the rules and therefore work as a commitment device. By making the rules of 
the fund clear and committing, transparency helps the fund putting in place reliable tools to avoid 
overspending, relieve the pressure on the currency, and smooth expenditure and the effect of 
volatile oil prices. Hence, managers and leaders are held accountable for the effectiveness of the 
fund. By preventing weak institutions and populist decisions, transparency contribute in avoidance of 
overspending. Transparent inflows and outflows make sure that the assets of the fund are used in 
accordance with the rules, and not for other purposes. 
The Norwegian fund is more transparent on these elements, and is therefore assumed to be better 
equipped to fulfil the stabilising function of the fund. The rules of the NGPFG are stable and clear, 
and there is little political risk of the fund being used to other objectives than stabilisation and 
savings. Also, on page 24, Ross (2012) argued under what conditions stabilisation funds were likely to 
work well. One sees that the Norwegian fund fulfils most of these conditions, due to its transparency: 
– there is low corruption and the public is well informed and has confidence in the government’s 
policies. As was also mentioned in regards to profitability, the NFRK risks facing the issues of 
corruption and rent-seeking, which also affects the performance of the fund’s stabilisation function. 
If money are placed in the pockets of policymakers rather than being used according to their rules, 
the fund will not be able to smooth expenditures or contribute to stabilising the exchange rate. 
According to Azhgaliyeva on page 67, the NFRK manages to smooth its expenditures, but not to 
stabilise its exchange rate. This suggests that the NFRK has potential for improvement regarding its 
stabilisation function, and increased transparency might be one of the elements which may improve 
the fund’s performance on this area. 
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However, the NFRK keeps changing its rules of withdrawal and deposits, indicating that it is trying to 
find the best method for Kazakhstan. Transparency is essential in this concern, and if the NFRK 
changes the rules in a transparent manner, and is open to the public on how it tries to make the fund 




Chapter 8: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
8.1 Summing up 
This thesis has dug deeper into the transparency level of the funds and provides more details, 
compared to what is given by well-known transparency scores such as Truman’s scoreboard and the 
Linaburg-Maduell transparency index. As appears from chapter 6 and 7, the Norwegian fund clearly 
stands out as more transparent than the Kazakhstani funds, and meets the definitions given on page 
25 to a larger degree. One fundamental characteristic of the NGPFG is that it clearly seeks to make 
the public understand the information that is given, and why it is important. It does not only intend 
to inform and provide solid facts, but also to teach and explain. Thorough explanations are given on 
several of the topics, such as risk management, return calculation and investment strategy. This 
increases the degree of the transparency, making it comprehensible for a broader public, making it 
possible for the public to assess the decisions made by insiders in the fund. Samruk-Kazyna and the 
NFRK both publish some fact-based information, but it is not always comprehensible or retaining the 
details necessary for analysis. The information provided by the NFRK is difficult to collect, and 
provides a puzzle rather than the whole picture. 
The high transparency level of the Norwegian fund works as a stronger commitment device than the 
lower transparency of the other two funds, as the fund commits to act in accordance with the given 
information. It is better able at keeping leaders honest and contribute to avoiding rent-seeking and 
corruption. The higher level of transparency encourages public debate and makes the public aware of 
its existence and functions. Debates on how the money in the fund should be used and invested are 
clearly more common in Norway than in Kazakhstan, and many people feel entitled to have an 
opinion. The Kazakhstani funds could clearly increase their ability to face the resource curse by 
increasing their transparency level. In Kazakhstan, Samruk-Kazyna appears more transparent than 
the NFRK, and the NFRK has therefore much to learn from both the NGPFG and Samruk-Kazyna.  
However, as was pointed out by Revenue Watch Institute (2011) on page 54, one must take Norway’s 
characteristics into considerations when comparing its transparency level against others. From 
chapter 3, Norway appears to be traditionally a more open and democratic country than Kazakhstan, 
which naturally affect the transparency level of its fund as well. One can therefore not expect the 
same transparency level of the Kazakhstani funds, without some fundamental changes in the political 
environment of Kazakhstan, and it would be unfair to use Norway as a benchmark, also regarding 
ethics. However, even when not comparing against Norway, it is clear that the Kazakhstani funds 
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have room for improvement on their level of transparency. The establishment of a sovereign wealth 
fund may be a step in the right direction of increasing oil revenue transparency, if handled correctly. 
On a short term, ethical investment may not work as an efficient tool for combating the resource 
curse. One may argue that sovereign wealth funds should be concerned with return and efficiency 
only, and not about global development and responsibility. However, the effects of the resource 
curse are best measured on a longer time scale, and defeating the curse should be a long-term 
project. Short-term return should not be prioritized at the expense of sustainable, long-term returns 
that also benefit future generations. This thesis has suggested that ethical principles may work as 
tools for ensuring such sustainability. The NGPFG clearly implements ethical principles as tools for 
sustainability in its investment practice, while the NFRK does not, and Samruk-Kazyna is somewhere 
in the middle.  
The NGPFG seems very well aware of the possible benefits of ethical conduct, and has implemented 
strategies for achieving these benefits. Samruk-Kazyna publishes little relevant information, making it 
difficult to assess whether or not they are using CSR in a manner that helps facing the resource curse. 
Based on the findings and ideas of this thesis, the Norwegian fund is therefore better equipped to 
face and combat the resource curse, as it considers long-term return and sustainability which benefit 
future generations. 
8.2 Policy Recommendations 
Here are some policy recommendations for each fund, to increase their level of transparency and 
improve ethical principles and instruments. These recommendations intend to increase the fund’s 
and the public’s understanding of these issues, create public debate, provide relevant, accessible and 
accurate information to researchers, analysts and others, and make managers and policy makers 
accountable for the management of the funds. This will contribute to better decisions, avoid rent-
seeking and corruption, and in general increase the credibility of the funds. 
The NFRK could:  
o Provide simple and understandable information aimed at the general public, such as 
booklets, infographics and information in newspapers;  
o Re-establish a separate website for the fund; 
o Provide relevant information to the press, so that information reaches the public who are not 
online; 
o Publish comprehensive, audited annual reports, also online; 
o Make the most relevant information available in English, such as comprehensive annual 
reports, national budgets and relevant legislation;  
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o Publish more details on the investment portfolio; 
o Provide description of the investment strategy; 
o Establish the fund by law alone, not by presidential decree ; 
o Make sure changes of fiscal rules are published, clear and traceable; 
o Present reports on the pay-off of targeted transfers; 
o Collect and consider research and information regarding ethical principles in investment; 
o Make a comprehensive assessment on whether ethical principles could improve the 
performance of the fund; 
o Provide clear statements on whether it considers ethical principles or not 
Samruk-Kazyna could: 
o Avoid close personal relations between top management, the government and politicians; 
o Provide an exhaustive list of subsidiaries, as it is the transparency of these companies that 
affect the transparency of Samruk-Kazyna; 
o Give all of the information available on its website in English; 
o Provide a closer description of the fund’s relation to the government; 
o Better explain the process of funding, inflows and outflows, to improve the clarity of its 
funding processes; 
o Better assess and explain why the fund truly engages in CSR; 
o Assess if they capture all the benefits of CSR; 
o Require subsidiaries to publish reports on how they implement CSR; 
o Publish more information on how CSR is implemented in the fund 
The NGPFG could: 
o Establish the fiscal rule by law, making it independent of the political state in Norway; 
o Publish the government accounts in English; 
o Publish direct links to the national budget and government accounts on the webpage of 
NBIM, so that all relevant information regarding the fund and its transactions is gathered in 
one place; 
o Regularly assess how implementation of ethical principles enhances sustainability and long-
term performance 
8.3 Limitations of the Study  
Due to limited time and resources, this thesis has not done extensive research on the corruption 
level in the three funds. I have only taken for granted what interviewees have told me, that 
corruption is not a serious issue within the funds. Corruption is an essential element of the resource 
curse and transparency, and therefore this thesis only assesses transparency to a certain degree, and 
has not dug deeper into the material.  
Further, this thesis has not tried to establish a statistical association between transparency, ethics 
and the resource curse, but has explored the relationship between them. It is therefore not possible 
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to empirically conclude on a definitive connection between these elements, or the funds’ true ability 
to curb the curse.  
As has been noted throughout the thesis, Samruk-Kazyna is not a resource fund, and therefore does 
not follow the same pattern as the other two funds. The theory given in chapter 2 and 4, together 
with the transparency framework in figure 2, is therefore not always directly applicable to Samruk-
Kazyna. As Samruk-Kazyna is a complex fund, there is a risk that some of the conclusions on its 
transparency level are not correct, and that mechanisms have been misunderstood. Further, to get a 
true picture of the transparency and ethical principles of Samruk-Kazyna, its subsidiaries should be 
objects of studies. 
8.4 Prospects for Further Research 
Overall, there are two main directions for further research in this field: 
Intensify and extend the study that has been performed in this thesis, with continued focus on 
Norway and Kazakhstan. This could include investigating the level of corruption in the NGPFG, the 
NFRK and Samruk-Kazyna and to further study how transparent they truly are. The research could 
also be extended by studying the transparency level on areas related to the oil sectors in Norway and 
Kazakhstan, thus not only assessing the transparency of oil funds. Such a study could be interesting, 
as a country’s transparency in general has been suggested by Kolstad and Wiig (2009) and Williams 
(2011) to be related to the resource curse. Such intensified and extended studies could include 
making research on how well CSR and ethical principles are integrated into the management of 
organisations. 
Seek to generalize and empirically establish the suggested relationships from this thesis, by 
conducting empirical research on more sovereign wealth funds and assess the causal relationship 
between transparency, ethical principles and fund performance by using econometric methods. This 
would require that one gives a score to the transparency level and ethical conduct of the funds, and 
analyse their relationship with profitability, stability and sustainability/long-term return. However, as 
few sovereign wealth funds implement ethical principles, this would be difficult, and a comparison 
against ethical mutual funds and other institutional funds could be necessary to see if ethics have an 
effect on performance over the long term. Next, one should study the effect of fund performance on 
the resource curse, to establish a connection between ethics, transparency and the curse. 
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Appendix A: What should be Transparent? 
Truman’s Scoreboard 
Truman’s scoreboard consists of 33 elements/questions that can be answered either yes or no. The 
elements are grouped into four categories. All categories are presented here, while the elements 
belonging to the categories are presented in detailed as question. All scores of the elements are 
based on regularly, publicly available information, hence the scoreboard gives an idea of what 
elements of an SWF should be publicly available. 
The first category is the structure of the fund, and includes fund’s objective and links to 
governmental fiscal policy. It covers the basic organization of the SWF.  
Governance of the fund is the second category. The roles of the government, the board of the fund, 
and whether the fund follows guidelines for corporate social responsibility are evaluated in this 
category. Elements that are scored includes internal ethical standards and ethical investment 
guidelines. According to Truman, the element considering ethical investment guidelines is 
controversial, and involves socially responsible investment, sustainable development, active 
promotion of clear energy etc. It is pointed out that even ignoring ethical considerations is seen as an 
ethical guideline. 
The third category regards accountability and transparency in investment strategy, investment 
activities, reporting and audits.  
The last category is behaviour of the fund in managing its portfolio and its risk management policies, 
including the use of leverage and derivatives. This category has not been prioritized when making a 
framework for evaluating the transparency, as it has not been promoted by other researchers.  
The list of elements/questions that are asked to score an SWF: 
Every yes receives a point. 
Structure 
- Is the SWF’s objective clearly stated? 
- Is there a clear legal framework for the SWF? 
- Is the procedure for changing the structure of the SWF clear? 
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- Is the overall investment strategy clearly stated? 
Fiscal Treatment 
- Is the source of the SWF’s funding clearly specified? 
- Is the nature of the subsequent use of the principal and earnings of the fund clearly 
specified? 
- Are the SWF’s operations appropriately integrated with fiscal and monetary policies? 
- Is the SWF separate from the country’s international reserves? 
Governance 
- Is the role of the government in setting the investment strategy of the SWF clearly 
established? 
- Is the role of the governing body of the SWF clearly established? 
- Is the role of the managers in executing the investment strategy clearly established? 
- Are decisions on specific investments made by the managers? 
- Does the SWF have internal ethical standards for its management and staff? 
- Does the SWF have in place, and make publicly available, guidelines for corporate social 
responsibility that it follows? 
- Does the SWF have ethical investment guidelines that it follows? 
Transparency and accountability 
Investment Strategy Implementation 
- Do regular reports on investments by the SWF include information on the categories of 
investments? 
- Does the strategy use benchmarks? 
- Does the strategy use credit ratings? 
- Are the holders of investment mandates identified? 
Investment activities 
- Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include the size of the fund? 
- Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include information on its returns? 
- Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include information on geographic 
location of investments? 
- Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include information on the specific 
investments? 
- Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include information on the currency 
composition of investments? 
Reports 
- Does the SWF provide at least an annual report on its activities and results? 




- Is the SWF subject to a regular annual audit? 
- Are the audits independent? 
Does the SWF publish promptly the audits of its operations and accounts? 
Behaviour 
- Does the SWF have an operational risk management policy? 
- Does the SWF have a policy on the use of leverage? 
- Does the SWF have a policy on the use of derivatives? 
- Does the SWF have a guideline on the nature and speed of adjustment in its portfolio? 
Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index 
Each principle adds one point to the index rating. A minimum of 8 points is recommended by the 
SWF institute to claim adequate transparency.  
Point Principles of the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index 
+1 Fund provides history including reason for creation, origins of wealth, and government ownership structure 
+1 Fund provides up-to-date independently audited annual reports 
+1 Fund provides ownership percentage of company holdings, and geographic locations of holdings 
+1 Fund provides total portfolio market value , returns, and management compensation 
+1 Fund provides guidelines in reference to ethical standards, investment policies, and enforcer of guidelines 
+1 Fund provides clear strategies and objectives 
+1 If applicable, the fund clearly identifies subsidiaries and contact information 
+1 If applicable, the fund indentifies external managers 
+1 Fund manages its own website 
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+1 Fund provides main office location address and contact information such as telephone and fax 
The Santiago Principles 
The Santiago Principles are a voluntary code of principles, “documenting SWF’s investment decisions 
to be driven by financial and economic considerations, not political motives” (Behrendt, 2010, p. 2). 
The aim of GAPP is to support the institutional framework and investment operations of SWFs 
(International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2008). The principles are divided into three parts. 
The first part call for SWFs to disclose their legal framework, policy purpose and funding and 
withdrawal arrangements. The second part covers institutional frameworks and governance 
structures, while the third part requests SWFs to apply appropriate investment and risk management 
frameworks. IWG was later renamed to International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, and works 
as “an informal coordination and knowledge-sharing platform” (Behrendt, 2010, pp. 4-5). Behrendt 
has performed assessments of how compliant the member countries are to the principles, and found 
that there is a wide spread among the countries regarding their commitment to the 24 principles.  
The 24 principles are presented below. I have marked the ones that are directly related to 
transparency in bold and italics. These are principles that require public disclosure, or in other ways 
are reasonable to associate with transparency. 
 GAPP 1. Principle 
The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective operation and 
the achievement of its stated objective(s). 
o GAPP 1.1 Subprinciple The legal framework for the SWF should ensure the legal 
soundness of the SWF and its transactions. 
o GAPP 1.2 Subprinciple The key features of the SWF's legal basis and 
structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and the 
other state bodies, should be publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 2. Principle 
The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 3. Principle 
Where the SWF's activities have significant direct domestic macroeconomic implications, 
those activities should be closely coordinated with the domestic fiscal and monetary 
authorities, so as to ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies. 
 GAPP 4. Principle There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, 
procedures, or arrangements in relation to the SWF's general approach to 
funding, withdrawal, and spending operations. 
o GAPP 4.1 Subprinciple The source of SWF funding should be publicly 
disclosed. 
o GAPP 4.2 Subprinciple The general approach to withdrawals from the SWF 
and spending on behalf of the government should be publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 5. Principle 
The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a timely basis to 
the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where appropriate in macroeconomic 
data sets. 
 GAPP 6. Principle 
The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a clear and 
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effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate accountability and 
operational independence in the management of the SWF to pursue its objectives. 
 GAPP 7. Principle 
The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of its governing 
body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and exercise oversight over the 
SWF's operations. 
 GAPP 8. Principle 
The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and have a clear 
mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its functions. 
 GAPP 9. Principle 
The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF’s strategies in an 
independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined responsibilities. 
 GAPP 10. Principle 
The accountability framework for the SWF's operations should be clearly defined in the 
relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement. 
 GAPP 11. Principle 
An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF's operations 
and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in accordance with 
recognized international or national accounting standards in a consistent 
manner. 
 GAPP 12. Principle 
The SWF's operations and financial statements should be audited annually in 
accordance with recognized international or national auditing standards in a 
consistent manner. 
 GAPP 13. Principle 
Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made known to the 
members of the SWF's governing body(ies), management, and staff. 
 GAPP 14. Principle 
Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF's operational management should be 
based on economic and financial grounds, and follow clear rules and procedures. 
 GAPP 15. Principle 
SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in compliance with all 
applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which they operate. 
 GAPP 16. Principle 
The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which the 
SWF's management is operationally independent from the owner, should be 
publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 17. Principle 
Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly disclosed to 
demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to contribute to 
stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient 
countries. 
 GAPP 18. Principle 
The SWF's investment policy should be clear and consistent with its defined objectives, risk 
tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the owner or the governing body(ies), and 
be based on sound portfolio management principles. 
o GAPP 18.1 Subprinciple The investment policy should guide the SWF's financial 
risk exposures and the possible use of leverage. 
o GAPP 18.2 Subprinciple The investment policy should address the extent to which 
internal and/or external investment managers are used, the range of their 
activities and authority, and the process by which they are selected and their 
performance monitored. 
o GAPP 18.3 Subprinciple A description of the investment policy of the SWF 
should be publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 19. Principle 
The SWF's investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a 




o GAPP 19.1 Subprinciple If investment decisions are subject to other than 
economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in 
the investment policy and be publicly disclosed. 
o GAPP 19.2 Subprinciple The management of an SWF’s assets should be consistent 
with what is generally accepted as sound asset management principles. 
 GAPP 20. Principle 
The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or inappropriate 
influence by the broader government in competing with private entities. 
 GAPP 21. Principle 
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity 
investments' value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a 
manner that is consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value of its 
investments. The SWF should publicly disclose its general approach to voting 
securities of listed entities, including the key factors guiding its exercise of 
ownership rights. 
 GAPP 22. Principle 
The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages the risks of its 
operations. 
o GAPP 22.1 Subprinciple The risk management framework should include reliable 
information and timely reporting systems, which should enable the adequate 
monitoring and management of relevant risks within acceptable parameters and 
levels, control and incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct, business continuity 
planning, and an independent audit function. 
o GAPP 22.2 Subprinciple The general approach to the SWF’s risk 
management framework should be publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 23. Principle 
The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to benchmarks, if any) of 
the SWF should be measured and reported to the owner according to clearly defined 
principles or standards. 
 GAPP 24. Principle 
A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be engaged in by or 
on behalf of the SWF. 
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Appendix B: EITI 
The EITI “is a global coalition of governments, companies and civil society working together to 
improve openness and accountable management of revenues from natural resources” (EITI, n.d., 
What is the EITI?). The EITI principles “underline the importance of transparency by governments and 
companies in the extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management and 
accountability” (EITI, 2013, p. 9). Further, “we are committed to encouraging high standards of 
transparency and accountability in public life, government operations and in business” (p. 9).  
The authoritative source on how countries can implement the EITI is the EITI standard. There are two 
groups of implementing countries: candidate countries and complying countries. EITI candidature is a 
temporary state, intending to lead to compliance with the EITI standard, becoming a compliant 
country. For a country to become an EITI candidate (EITI, 2013, p. 11): 
o The government is required to issue an unequivocal public statement of its intention to 
implement the EITI; 
o The government is required to appoint a senior individual to lead on the implementation of 
the EITI; 
o The government is required to commit to work with civil society and companies, and 
establish a multi-stakeholder group to oversee the implementation of the EITI; 
o The multi-stakeholder group is required to maintain a current workplan, fully costed and 
aligned with the reporting and Validation deadlines established by the EITI Board. 
To become a compliant country, countries must demonstrate that they meet the following 
requirements (EITI, 2013, p. 10): 
o Effective oversight by the multi-stakeholder group. 
o Timely publication of EITI Reports. 
o EITI Reports that include contextual information about the extractive industries. 
o The production of comprehensive EITI Reports that include full government disclosure of 
extractive industry revenues, and disclosure of all material payments to government by oil, 
gas and mining companies.  
o A credible assurance process applying international standards. 
o EITI Reports that are comprehensible, actively promoted, publicly accessible, and contribute 
to public debate. 
o The multi-stakeholder group to take steps to act on lessons learned and review the outcomes 
and impact of EITI implementation. 
Countries implement the EITI standard to ensure full disclosure of taxes and other payments made by 
the extractive sector to the government. These payments are published in the annual EITI report, 
which allows citizens to see for themselves how much their government receives in payments from 
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the extractive industry. The EITI report is required to include contextual information about the 
extractive industries, and should:  
Indicate which extractive industry revenues, whether cash or in-kind, are recorded in the 
national budget. Where revenues are not recorded in the national budget, the allocation of 
these revenues must be explained, with links provided to relevant financial reports as 
applicable, e.g. sovereign wealth and development funds, sub-national governments, state-
owned enterprises, and other extra-budgetary entities (EITI, 2013, p. 22). 
EITI implementing countries need to go through an external validation process. Candidate countries 
need to do this within two and a half years, while compliant countries are required to be validated 
every three years.  
The EITI Standard is illustrated below. 
 
Source: EITI (2013) 
References: 
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Appendix C: Interviewees and Documents 
Presentation of Interviewees 
Name Date Institution  




Lecturer at IAB, has previously done 
research on public transparency and the 
NFRK via Soros Foundation.  
Natalia Malyarchuk 26 February Transparency 
International 
Kazakhstan, Almaty 
Chair of the board at TIK, works with 
providing transparency and anti-
corruption initiatives. Provided thoughts 
about the transparency of NFRK. 
Tatiana Sedova 27 February World Bank: Central 
Asia Regional Office, 
Almaty 
EITI consultant, provided information on 
the work EITI and how this relates to 
NFRK.  
Dina Azhgaliyeva 3 March Nazarbayev 
University, Astana 
Lecturer in field of economics, has done 
research on NFRK.  
Ilyas Sarsenov 3 March World Bank Country 
Office, Astana 
Senior economist with charge of 
macroeconomic analysis, provided 




4 March Ministry of Finance, 
Astana 
Director of department of budgetary 
lending, national fund and interaction 
with finance sector. Interview conducted 
with interpreter. Interview arranged with 
help from KIMEP University and the 
Norwegian embassy in Astana.  
120 
 
Dyveke Rogan 6 March EITI, Oslo Regional director of EITI, provided info 
on the work of EITI. Before the meeting, 
she provided contact details for some of 
the interviewees mentioned above. 
Wilhelm Mohn 7 March Ministry of Finance, 
Oslo 
Senior adviser. Provided information 
already publicly available, and provided 
relevant documents regarding ethical 
investment in NGPFG. 
Kristian Flyvholm 11 March International Forum 
of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds 
Deputy Secretary-General. Answered 
questions via e-mail, regarding IFSWF 
(previous IWG) membership. 
Nygmet Ibadildin 20 February, 2 
April, 10 April 
KIMEP University, 
Almaty 
Associate professor. Discussed the topic 
of resource funds in general, and later 
answered follow-up questions via e-mail. 
Several attempts to make interviews with others has been made. The Norwegian embassy in Astana, 
Kazakhstan helped sending formal request written in Russian to the Ministry of Finance, the National 
Fund of Kazakhstan and Samruk-Kazyna. NFRK never replied, but Samruk-Kazyna were willing to 
meet. However, they did not find a time for a meeting during my stay in Kazakhstan. 
Presentation of Documentary Research Sources 
Kazakhstani sources 
Institution Type Information 
Ministry of Finance Webpage: www.minfin.gov.kz Provides reports on NFRK. 




Adilet: Legal database Webpage: www.adilet.zan.kz  Publishes Kazakhstani laws, 
orders and presidential decrees. 
Mostly in Russian and Kazakh. 
The National Bank of Kazakhstan Webpage: www.nationalbank.kz  Provides the annual report on 
NBK and some statistical data on 
NFRK. Information in Russian, 
Kazakh and English. 
Akorda: Website of the President Webpage: www.akorda.kz  Provides info when laws and 
decrees are signed. Mainly 
Russian and Kazakh. 
Samruk-Kazyna Webpage: www.sk.kz Main source for information about 
Samruk-Kazyna, in Russian, 
Kazakh and English. 
 
Norwegian sources 
Institution Type Information 
Ministry of Finance/ the 
Norwegian Government 
Webpage: www.regjeringen.no  
White papers 
Graver report 
Main source in understanding 
attitudes and reasons for 
transparency and ethics, available 
in Norwegian and English. Main 
source for ethical principles 
The White paper no. 27, 2012-
2013 and White paper no. 19, 
2013-2014 are relevant documents 
used from MoF. 
The Graver Committee, appointed 
by government, presented its 
proposals to ethical guidelines in 
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the Graver report. This report 
explains several of the aspects 
behind NGPFG’s ethical 
guidelines. 
Council on Ethics Webpage: www.regjeringen.no   
- Ethical guidelines 
- Annual reports 
- Recommendations 
Norges Bank Investment 
Management 
Webpage: www.nbim.no  Provides information on the 
management of NGPFG, main 




Appendix D: Interview guide 
For interviewing NFRK, NGPFG, Samruk-Kazyna and others 
Transparency 
The role of transparency in the management of the fund 
 
 Stated somehow in the law? 
 
Is transparency considered to be important in the management of the fund? 
 
 Why? 
 Political reasons? Economical reasons? 
 
Benefits or disadvantages with a high/low level of transparency 
 
What is the level of transparency?  
 
 What information is publicly available? 
o Objectives of the fund 
o The organizational structures of the fund and institutional arrangements 
o Investment policy and strategy 
o Investment portfolio – returns, size, composition 
o Annual reports? Quarterly reports? 
o Source of funding? 
o Spending 
o Approach of withdrawal from the fund 
o Detailed and regular reporting 
 






o Trenger navn på presse! 
 
 In what language? Why? 
 
Is Internet considered to be an important source of information? 
 
What work is done by organisations or government to improve transparency? 
 
The president’s substantial power regarding the fund 
 
 How and why? 
 Is this optimal? 
 Does it affect transparency? 
 
Is the fund based on a legislative act or only backed by presidential decree? 
Specifically about Samruk-Kazyna 
“Samruk-Kazyna will rely on key principles: (…) Transparency, (…) Accountability” 
 




“The fund is a code of corporate governance and code of ethics that define the company’s values 
and principles of its operations and external communications.” 
 
 What are the principles? 




The president’s son in law, Kulibaev, has been head of Samruk-Kazyna 
 
 Other relatives of the president that are connected to oil money? 
 Are there any challenges related to this regarding transparency, governance and ethics? 
 
Ethical Guidelines 
Any ethical guidelines implemented? 
 
 Regarding investments directly 
 Regarding governance and internal guidelines 






 Deliberate decision? 
 Benefits/disadvantages of such guidelines 
 Focus on sustainability and far-sighted companies when investing? 
 Is it costly to implement and control guidelines? 
 
What are the ethical guidelines? 
 
 Access? 
 Main principles and focus areas 
 Why these? 
 Based on industries? Principles? Countries? 
 If none: are no considerations made due to industry, products etc? 
 





 Negative screening 
 Active ownership 
 Index-based investment 
 Positive screening 
 Best in-class performance 
 
To what degree are guidelines followed? 
 
Is there political pressure behind implementing guidelines and investment decisions? 
 
 Hvordan skille mellom økonomiske, politiske og moralske årsaker? Hvor kommer de 
moralske «retningslinjene» fra? Eks tobakk vs alkohol. Er det støtte i befolkningen? 
 
Does the management of the fund consider itself to have an important role as a universal owner in 





Does the implementation of ethical guidelines affect the performance of the fund? 
 
Does the fund have an overview or database of information about relevant ethical aspects of each 
company it has invested in (greenhouse gas emissions, human rights, HMS)? 
 




Norge: “Strategirådet i oppdrag å utarbeide en rapport om den overordnede strategien for 
ansvarlig investeringspraksis i SPU, 2013» - Status? 
 
Hvordan sikrer man at ekskluderingen av selskaper og andre reaksjoner er basert på et riktig 
grunnlag? 
Specifically about Samruk-Kazyna 
Active ownership? 
 
Any companies that may violate ethical considerations? 
 
Dashing between oil workers and police in Zhanaozen 2011 – workers demanded better wages, 
improved working conditions – head of SK (Kulibaev) and KazMunaiGas being fired 
 
 How are such cased being handled? 
 Did this result in considerations about transparency or ethics? 
 Are there other cases? 
 





Are Santiago-principles accepted and implemented? 
 




What is your mission? 
 
Transparency of NFRK and Samruk-Kazyna? 
 
 Or in general about oil revenues – what happens to them? 
 How does it work? 
 Where are revenues reported? 
 Does the government report revenues received?  
 Where? 
 Satisfactory? 
 How are you approaching the issue? 
 
Could NFRK and SK make information more publicly available? 
 
 How? 
 Language? 
 
Any recommendations? 
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